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Abstract
This thesis aims to provide new and useful insights into the effects that var-
ious tax, labour and product market reforms have on the overall economic perfor-
mance. Additionaly, it aims also to provide insights about the optimal monetary
and scal policy behaviour within the economy characterized with various real
labour market frictions.
We analyze the benets of tax reforms and their effectiveness relative to prod-
uct or other labour market reforms. A general equilibrium model with imperfect
competition, wage bargaining and different forms of tax distortions is applied in
order to analyze these issues. We nd that structural reforms imply short run costs
but long run gains; that the long run gains outweigh the short run costs; and that
the nancing of such reforms will be the main stumbling block. We also nd that
the effectiveness of various reform instruments depends on the policy maker's ul-
timate objective. More precisely, tax reforms are more effective for welfare gains,
but market liberalization is more valuable for generating employment.
In order to advance our understanding of the tax and product market reform
processes, we then develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which
incorporates search-matching frictions, costly ring and endogenous job destruc-
tion decisions, as well as a distortionary progressive wage and a at payroll tax.
We conrm the negative effects of marginal tax distortions on the overall economic
performance. We also nd a positive effect of an increase in the wage tax progres-
sivity and product market liberalization on employment, output and consumption.
Following a positive technology shock, the volatility of employment, output and
consumption turns out to be lower in the reformed economy, whereas the impact
effect on ination is more pronounced. Following a positive government spending
shock the volatility of employment, output and consumption is again lower in the
reformed economy, but the ination response is stronger over the whole adjustment
path. We also nd detrimental effects on employment and output of a tax reform
which keeps the marginal tax wedge unchanged by partially offsetting a decrease
in the payroll tax by an increase in the wage tax rate. If this reform is anticipated
one period in advance the negative effects remain all over the transition path.
We investigate the optimal monetary and scal policy implication of the
New-Keynesian setup enriched with search-matching frictions. We show that the
iv
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optimal policy features deviation from strict price stability, and that the Ramsey
planner uses both ination and taxes in order to fully exploit the benets of the
productivity increase following a positive productivity shock. We also nd that the
optimal tax rate and government liabilities inherit the time series properties of the
underlying shocks. Moreover, we identify a certain degree of overshooting in in-
ation and tax rates following a positive productivity shock, and a certain degree
of undeshooting following a positive government spending shock as a consequence
of the assumed commitment of policy maker.
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Introduction
It is commonly argued that the main cause of differences in economic performance
between the EU and North America can be attributed to product market regulations and
labour market rigidities. The obvious economic lag of the EU member states relative to
their American counterparts made structural reforms a leading policy issue in the Euro-
zone. As pointed out in Sapir et al. (2004), the removal of barriers to the mobility of goods
and services, as well as labour and capital, through the Single Market Programme, aimed
to boost competition and productivity, and to accelerate growth. However, growth was at
best modest, leading to the deterioration of the European economic performance both in
absolute terms and relative to the USA.
Sapir et al. (2004) identify several important causes of poor European performance
in the last decades. One of the most important turns out to be the Europeans' poor em-
ployment record, which is related to the generous social security system. In the immediate
post-war period, rising employment and increases in productivity provided resources suf-
cient to sustain the welfare state. However, in the last three decades, things changed.
The decline in the employment rates and inability to create new employment, relative de-
terioration of productivity, and increase in the number of dependants required increases in
the charges needed to sustain the existing level of benets. As a result, the tax wedge on
labour income had to increase. This led to further employment deterioration.
In addition to the employment effects, stress has been put on the effects of product
market regulations on overall economic performance. Specically, the increase in prod-
1
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uct market competition and market openness, as well as low entry costs, are viewed to be
important stimuli for economic activity, which should have positive effects on overall em-
ployment performance. All of these things imply that what is required, but has not yet
occurred on a large scale in Europe, is a thorough change in economic institutions and
organizations.
However, very little formal analysis has been conducted to evaluate the potential ef-
fects of certain reforms. The main aim of this thesis is to shed new light of the effects of
various labour and product market reforms on economic behavior. Specically, we con-
tribute to the existing literature by explicitly considering scal issues, such as the effects of
various taxes as well as the tax reforms on overall economic performance, that have been
largely neglected so far. Additionally, we aim to contribute by considering not only the
long run effects of specic reforms, but also their effects on the uctuations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates. We complete our analysis by considering optimal monetary and scal
policy in an economy characterized by various product and labour market frictions. We
thereby challenge the results obtained by the class of models that abstracted from any real
frictions on the labour market side.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides both an empirical and the-
oretical literature review and outlines the main motivation behind the research conducted
in this thesis. In Chapter 2 we develop a theoretical model of wage bargaining, with im-
perfect competition in the product markets and different forms of tax distortions, in order
to analyze the incentives, costs and potential benets of structural reform. The results
Introduction 3
are then used to explain policy makers' behavior, and to derive certain conclusions about
which reform measures are the most effective.
Chapter 3 then takes a step towards a deeper understanding of the tax and product
market reform processes, and its dynamic impacts, by developing a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model which incorporates search-matching frictions, costly ring and
endogenous job destruction decisions, as well as a distortionary progressive wage and a at
payroll tax. We also analyze the effects of a specic preanounced tax reform which keeps
the marginal tax wedge constant. In Chapter 4, we analyze the implications of the search-
matching frictions for the optimal conduct of monetary and scal policy. Specically,
we are interested in testing the robustness of the conclusions from setups which abstract
from real labour market frictions and assume Walrasian labour markets. Finally, Chapter
5 concludes and suggests several possible directions for future research along the lines of
the analysis presented in this thesis.
Chapter 1
Literature Review and Motivation
As stated in the Introduction, a thorough change in the European economic institu-
tions is of utmost importance for future European economic performance, but the formal
analysis of the structural reform process is scarce. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to
summarize the main existing empirical and theoretical literature and to point out the main
gaps and drawbacks in it what will provide the motivation for the analysis conducted in
the rest of the thesis.
In section 1.1 we begin by reviewing the empirical literature which aims to explain
the relatively poor European labour market performance by linking the observed unem-
ployment behavior to the characteristics of labour market institutions. We continue by
reviewing the evidence of product market effects on the reform process. Section 1.2 out-
lines the theoretical consideration in the literature on the effects of various reforms and
provides the motivation for our research. It also outlines the main results from our sub-
sequent analysis. Section 1.3 deals with the existing optimal monetary and scal policy
literature and provides the motivation for the nal chapter in this thesis, together with the
main ndings from it. Section 1.4 concludes.
4
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1.1 Empirical Studies
1.1.1 The Importance of Labour Market Institutions
Since the European unemployment problem goes back a long time, there are many pre-
cursors in the academic literature that tried to identify unemployment's major causes. One
can broadly identify three prevailing but distinct streams. Back in the 1970s, the discus-
sion of the observed rise in unemployment mainly focused on the role of adverse economic
shocks. These shocks can certainly lead to changes in employment, at least for some time,
and in the last thirty years one can easily identify many plausible candidates to justify this
view. In the 1970s, the focus was reasonably directed towards the oil price increase and
the total factor productivity slowdown. As time advanced the list was expanded to the
observed shifts in the labour demand and changes in the real interest rates. However, as
pointed out in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), the initial rise in unemployment can be at-
tributed to the adverse common shocks, but explanations of European unemployment rates
which solely focus on the effects of the adverse shocks have a serious drawback; they are
incapable to explain the cross-country differences evident in the data.
An additional important characteristic of the European labour markets is the persis-
tence of high unemployment rates for more then three decades. This observation raises the
question of institutional inuences on labour market developments, because it can hardy
be disputed that labour market institutions affect the nature of the unemployment and have
certain power in generating high unemployment rates. Moreover, it was also hard to ac-
cept that the shocks from the 1970s and the 1980s could have had such strong impacts that
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they would inuence unemployment in the 1990s and 2000s. Additionally, the increasing
commonality of shocks and the observed heterogeneity in unemployment rates among the
European countries made the view resting on shocks as the sole factor behind European
unemployment even more implausible. But although the shocks hitting different European
economies were similar, the institutional framework across countries was not. This was
sufcient to justify the shift in focus from adverse shocks to institutional characteristics in
an attempt to explain the European unemployment rates.
In what follows we will present a broad overview of the most inuential empirical
studies. It is important to point out that although the empirical literature is highly abundant,
it is far from being conclusive in every aspect. Layard et. al. (1991) were the rst to point
to the importance of the institutions for the functioning of labour markets. The 1994 OECD
"Jobs Study" was the rst and highly inuential policy report to put the blame on rigid
labour markets as a major cause of high European unemployment.1 Before proceeding,
and in order not to create confusion, it is useful to dene what we mean by "institutions".
"Institutions" in a broad sense represent certain features of labour markets such as labour
taxes, laws and regulations covering employees' rights, trade unions and the structure of
wage bargaining, social security system and the treatment of the unemployed,among many
other things. These features have occupied the most interest in a wide range of empirical
studies.
1 It could be argued that this view is still largely dominant among policy makers and many academic
economists. This can be seen in Sapir's report. But it would be wrong to say that it is universally
accepted.
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In a comprehensive study, Nickell (1997) and Layard and Nickell (1999) provide de-
tailed analysis of the institutional effects on unemployment as well as on growth rates in a
panel of 20 OECD countries. They argue that not every institutional rigidity is bad for the
unemployment and growth, and identify the subset of labour market institution on which
economic policies should be focused. More precisely, they nd some evidence for the
overall negative effect of labour taxes on short-run and possibly a long-run unemployment.
Furthermore, unions, wage setting and social security systems have additional important
effects on unemployment, whereas employment protection and strict labour market regu-
lations are found to have no effect. However, in a similar study, albeit concentrated on the
measure of structural instead of actual unemployment, Elmeskov et al. (1998) conclude
that an important fraction of the estimated changes in structural unemployment cannot be
ascribed to changes in institutions.
Several empirical studies investigated the impact of employment protections, since
employment protections are frequently criticized as being the important source of the
labour market inexibility. Despite this widely accepted view, empirical studies have
mixed results. Lazear (1990) shows an important effect of employment protection on un-
employment. Addisson and Grosso (1996) extend the Lazear (1990), correct for data mis-
takes and apply the correct estimation procedure, and conclude that there is little to suggest
that the contribution of the severance payments to rising unemployment is material. Ben-
toila and Bertola (1990) develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model and calibrate it to
the average European economy. They nd that ring costs have a larger effect on rms'
propensity to re than to hire, and a slight positive effect on long-run employment. In
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contrast, Abraham and Houseman (1993) nd a negative effect of employment protection
policy on employment and suggest a hiring subsidy to dampened the adverse effects on job
creation. Layard and Nickell (1999) also can only identify a very small effect of employ-
ment protection on the unemployment rate. However, as in Lazear (1990), the negative
effect of employment protection on the employment-population ratio is signicant.
The importance of the tax impact on unemployment remains the subject of some
debate despite the numerous empirical studies. Again, empirical evidence is inconclusive.
Some studies such as Gruber (1994) and Layard and Nickell (1999), indicate that the long
run effects of differential taxes on unemployment are absent. On the other hand, Scarpetta
(1996) conrms the positive albeit small inuence of the tax wedge on the unemployment,
a result also obtained in Layard and Nickell (1999). In contrast, Daveri and Tabellini
(2000), who undertake an extensive OECD panel study and allow the coefcient on taxes
to differ between three group of countries, nd signicant positive and large effects of the
tax wedge on unemployment of the group containing the continental European countries.
Nickell et al. (2003) nd similar results when controlling for a broader set of the labour
market institutions. It is important to point out that most of the studies abstracted from
the progressivity of the tax system. When progressivity is included in the analysis, several
studies, such as Lockwood and Manning (1993) and Holmlund and Kolm (1995), nd
positive effects of the increase in progressivity on the employment rate.
The nal stream of literature combines the two approaches and investigates whether
both the shocks and the institution as well as the interactions of relatively stable institu-
tions and shocks, lies behind observed high unemployment rates in continental Europe.
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As emphasized by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) the explanation relying solely on the
institutions is potentially capable to explain the observed cross-country differences in the
unemployment rates, but it is not capable to explain the observed evolution over time, since
those institutions were much the same in the 1960s as they are today. The main idea in this
approach is that although the shocks drive the unemployment, the size of the unemploy-
ment consequences of any particular shock is determined by the underlying institutional
structure of the economy. This approach is inherently capable of explaining not only the
increase in unemployment rates but also the heterogeneity in unemployment dynamics.
Bruno and Sachs (1985) rst emphasized the importance of both shocks and institutions in
explaining unemployment. Their interaction was rst presented by Layard et al. (1991),
whereas Phelps (1994) was the rst to apply panel data analysis to explain the effects of
shocks and institution on long run unemployment. The most prominent paper in this line
of research is the study by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). They consider two different
panel data specications; one assuming unobserved but common shocks, and another us-
ing articially constructed country specic shocks such as interest rate, labour demand
and total factor productivity shocks. In both specications, they allow for interaction be-
tween institutions (assumed not to be time varying) and the shocks, and nd, somewhat
surprisingly, that this type of specication can account for both the rise in the unemploy-
ment and the observed heterogeneity. Moreover, the magnitudes of the shocks as well as
of the institutional effects are empirically plausible.
In a similar study, Belot and Van Ours (2001) start from the argument that the role
of each institution depends crucially on the rest of the surrounding institutional framework
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and analyze the importance of the direct interaction between specic institutions. They
nd that without controlling for country and time period xed effects and abstracting from
interactions, the unemployment rate is positively related to taxes, the replacement rate and
the level of union density whereas employment protection and centralization have signi-
cant negative effects. However, when the controls are introduced, the direct effect of every
institution on the unemployment rate becomes insignicant, implying that unemployment
was caused by the xed differences across countries and time and not by within coun-
try variations in labour market institutions. However, by controlling for the interactions
among specic institution, the effects of the tax rate turn out to be signicant, the more
so the larger is the replacement rate. On the other hand, the effect of employment protec-
tion is signicant only at the decentralized bargaining level. These results imply a certain
importance of interaction effects.
In order to test the Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) critique of the approach based on
institutions as the sole cause of the European unemployment, and to determine the amount
of the change in long term unemployment that can be explained by changes in the labour
market institutions, Nickell et al. (2005) employ a long time series for the set of 20 OECD
countries. The proxies for institutions they use are the standard ones as outlined in Oswald
(1997), namely taxes, trade union power, benets and wage inexibility. They test the null
hypothesis of pure institutional capability to explain changes in unemployment against
the alternative that explanation of changes in unemployment requires interactions between
shocks and relatively stable institutions.
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Since the aim is to explain actual unemployment, they include determinants of short
run deviation of actual from structural unemployment such as aggregate demand, produc-
tivity and wage shocks. They proceed by rst analyzing how much of actual unemploy-
ment can be explained by pure institutional changes along with the shocks that drive the
deviation of actual from structural unemployment. Then they compare those results with
the ones obtained from a specication which allows for the interaction between the xed
institutional averages and shocks, captured by time dummies as in Blanchard and Wolfers
(2000).2 The main conclusion is that in the specication without interaction terms, the ex-
clusion of the institutional variables reduces the model t by 50%.3 The authors then argue
that "given that institutions are generally measured with errors, this level of impact is not
bad".4
Specically, employment protection and labour taxes are found to have positive im-
pact on unemployment, with the latter being overturned in the economies with coordinated
bargaining. Employment protection mostly operates by increasing the persistence of un-
employment. Furthermore, benets have a large and signicant impact on unemployment
as well as their duration. In order to determine the contribution of changes in institutions
across different countries, the authors conduct an interesting exercise in which they per-
form dynamics simulation of the model but x the starting level of the institutions. They
nd that only in Finland, Germany and New Zealand do changes in the institutions explain
2 Nickell et .al. (2005) also include country and time dummies as well as country specic trends and
lagged dependent variable. It is argued that this inclusion controls for the omitted trend variables in each
country or common shocks.
3 The goodness of t is meassure in terms of the average squared deviation, and in the model with
interaction terms and the institutional variables the average squared deviation equals to 0.32.
4 Nickell et. al. (2005), p.16.
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very little of the changes in unemployment. Furthermore, the combination of benets and
taxes explains two-thirds of the overall change in European unemployment captured by the
institutional changes. The authors than conclude that observed changes in labour market
institutions are important factors for the explanation of long-term unemployment rates in
the OECD countries.5
However, when extending the simple institutional change model with institution-
shock interactions, the overall t is by 26% larger relative to the case where only the
interaction terms are used, although the model solely based on the interaction terms also
performs well.6 But, the interaction terms turn out to be jointly insignicant, implying no
real importance for the explanation of the unemployment shifts. In other words, one can
conclude that institutional changes are able to explain overall movements in unemploy-
ment, whereas the additional explanatory power of the interaction terms between averaged
institutions and the shocks is absent.
1.1.2 The Effect of the Product Markets
It is evident that, by concentrating solely on labour market institutions, previous studies
ignored one important aspect of the reform process. As already claimed, one of the widely
accepted views is that beside labour market reforms European prospects depend on product
market deregulation. Since changes in product market regulations lead to changes in rents,
5 Moreover, they argue that increases in data quality would improve the results even further in favour
of the institutional importance for the explanation of the unemployment patterns.
6 R2 in the simple institutional change model with or without institution-shock interactions is 0.98,
whereas in the models' specication featuring only interaction terms R2 is reduced to 0.78.
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it is usually conjectured that the deregulation of the product markets should be conducive
to higher employment rates.
Before describing the advances on the theoretical side of the literature, let us rst
summarize several empirical studies. We should point that the empirical work aimed at
assessing the impact of product market regulations is surprisingly scarce. As pointed out
by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005), the main reason is the lack of adequate proxies express-
ing the intensity of competition, particularly in the cross-section context. Usual proxies
such as measures of market power are not widely available and are possibly endogenous
to labour market outcomes. Moreover, it can be argued that they are irrelevant for policy.7
In order to overcome these problems, Boeri et al. (2000) and Nicoletti et al. (2001) use
proxies that measure the extent to which product market policies are keen on competition.
Specically, they use a set of cross-country indicators of various regulations in the labour
and product markets compiled by the OECD, and by combining those measures of prod-
uct market competition with broader set of measures of labour market regulations they nd
positive effects of product market deregulation on employment. In a different study, Grif-
th and Harrison (2004) analyze the macroeconomics impacts of product market reforms
undertaken in the EU over the 1980s and 1990s. Using a two-stage approach, they rst
estimate the effect of product market reforms on the level of economic rents, and then in-
strument the markup with the obtained rents. They conrm the view that product market
reforms that ease entry, reduce tariff rates and regulatory barriers to trade, as well as elim-
7 There are at least two reasons why such measures have little policy relevance. The usual proxies such
as industry mark-up or industry concentration indices are of little importance for competition agencies,
whose interest is concentrated at the level of micro markets. At the same time, they are too specic to be
used for aggregate policy implications related to overall product market competition.
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inate price controls, have negative effects on economic rents and thereby generate positive
effects on employment.
However, by concentrating on the cross-country aspects of product market compe-
tition those studies are only partially able to capture the development of labour market
policies and their outcomes over time. Moreover, they abstract from various possible in-
teraction effects. In order to provide a deeper understanding of the time effects as well
as the interactions between labour and product market policies, Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2005) employ proxies that follow the developments in the regulation of several non-
manufacturing industries over the past two decades. They nd that deregulation has signif-
icantly raised employment rates in the non-manufacturing sector characterized by exten-
sive reforms. Furthermore, they estimate the impact of product market deregulation jointly
with the effects of the labour market institutional reforms and nd evidence supporting
the view of labour and product markets being political complements. Specically, they
nd that the product market regulations are relatively more detrimental to the employment
in the countries where the bargaining power is high and where the labour market institu-
tions are restrictive. Additionally, they results show that the labour market deregulations
are likely to be equally benecial for employment rates regardless of the level of product
market regulation.
What have we learned from those studies? Two things are important to point out.
First, there is little dispute that the initial increase in the European unemployment was
triggered by adverse and largely common shocks such as supply shocks caused by the
oil price increase or the slowdown in the total factor productivity. Second, it is plausible
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to argue that specic institutional shifts determined subsequent unemployment outcomes.
Specically, initial increases in unemployment has led most governments to implement
specic reforms aimed either to ease the unemployment burden or to prevent further neg-
ative unemployment movements. These measures ranged from generous unemployment
benets to employment protection measures nanced by large tax burdens. However, par-
tial success and the nancial pressures, as well as intellectual arguments, generated the
need to reconsider and potentially reverse these policies. The aforementioned studies pro-
vide important guidance on the potential supply-side effects on one important category,
namely unemployment, but remain silent on the potential effects of various reforms on the
other important macroeconomic variables, such as output and consumption, that certainly
need to be taken into account when addressing the consequences of potential reforms.
1.2 Theoretical Considerations
Although it would be unfair to downplay the importance of the empirical studies, they are
certainly only the part of the story. The reason lies in the fact that they can only capture
partial equilibrium effects but are unable to capture potentially very important general
equilibrium effects. Moreover, they document long run effects, whereas the short run is
neglected. Therefore, in order to assess the general equilibrium effects of both product and
labour markets on macroeconomic outcomes, deeper theoretical analysis is required. This
is the part where we aim to contribute with the analysis provided in this thesis.
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1.2.1 The Stock Approach
Several papers have addressed wage and employment determination by explicitly mod-
elling the bargaining process between rms and unions in an imperfectly competitive
setup.8 However, relatively few formal studies consider the joint effects of labour and
product market regulations on macroeconomics outcomes. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
and Spector (2004) were the only ones to develop a model based on imperfect competi-
tion in both product and labour markets to analyze the issue of labour and product market
regulations. The main premise is that deregulation fundamentally affects both rents and
their distribution and it is therefore likely to have strong distributional and dynamics ef-
fects. In other words, short and long run effects might differ. One important factor largely
neglected in the literature is the fact that the implementation of structural reforms may
be determined and affected by scal policy. Moreover, one type of reform that has been
largely advocated is the reform of the employment tax system, aimed at reducing the tax
burden on employers in order to increase employment and create new jobs without reduc-
ing wage levels. Neither Blanchard and Giavazzi nor Spector consider how such reforms
are to be nanced, how to overcome the potential costs and what might be the effects of
potentially important tax reforms.
In Chapter 2. we extend the Blanchard and Giavazzi by including distortionary tax-
ation, which so far has been neglected in the theoretical literature on market reforms. Our
hypothesis is that reforms turn out to be costly in terms of performance and in terms of
cost of nancing  at least in the short term. By extending the model to combine these
8 See Layard and Nickell (1990), Manning (1993) and for the book treatments of the setup see Layard
et. al. (1991).
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two types of reform, and then to include the effects of lowering tax distortions, we estab-
lish formally that reforms imply signicant short run costs as well as long run gains; and
that the nancing of such reforms will be the main stumbling block. We also nd that the
composition of the reform package, and the distribution of the tax burden, both matter.
Specically, we nd that the short run involves signicant costs or losses in employment
and welfare, but the long run effects are almost uniformly favourable. Structural reform
programmes are therefore likely to be avoided, or abandoned if undertaken, if policy mak-
ers become sensitive to their short run costs. Fiscal restraints, such as those imposed by
Europe's Stability Pact, exaggerate this effect and thereby make the reforms less likely.
Moreover, the choice of reform instrument matters. Tax reform almost always has a larger
effect than market liberalization or labour market deregulation.
1.2.2 The Flow Approach and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
The modeling framework used in Chapter 2 is based on the so called stock approach, and as
such abstracts from several important empirical regularities to be detailed in what follows.
Moreover, the dynamic modeling was rather limited, by allowing the clear cut difference
between short and long run induced by entry and exit. In addition, the impact of potentially
important expectational effects are neglected. In order to correct for those drawbacks
and to be able to analyze economic sensitivity to the particular shocks, we employed a
new modelling strategy based on a fully edged microfounded dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium framework enriched with search and matching frictions. Before describing this
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framework in more detail, let us rst discuss the development and the importance of the
partial equilibrium search and matching framework and its application for policy analysis.
The Flow Approach
As has been already pointed out, several important empirical facts led to the devel-
opment of a new and richer framework than was provided by the neoclassical competitive
labour market models. This framework is based on based on ows, search, matching and
bargaining. First, labour markets are characterized by large ows, that is by high rates of
hires by the rms and by large number of separations from rms. Specically, at the ag-
gregate level, we observe large number of worker and job ows between inactivity and
market production. Additionally, at the individual level, workers ows between labour
market states, and job creation and job destruction, determine the activity spells present
in the data, whose duration is in turn the consequence of the time spent searching for job,
lling in a vacancy and working in a particular job. It is obvious that the models based on
"stock" approach abstract from these important movements.
This has led to the development of a new stream of literature based on individual
search behavior which formed a part of the so-called ow approach. The current search-
matching models model unemployment and job spells, as well as wages, as an endogenous
outcome of mutually consistent forward looking job creation and job destruction decisions
made by workers and rms. In contrast to the previously developed search literature, which
concentrated on the individual workers' search, the new equilibrium search and matching
framework, as pointed out by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), "explicitly accounts for
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and emphasizes the role of employers on the demand side of labour markets".9 Further-
more, time and uncertainty are explicitly modelled whereby expectations are rational and
the gains from trade are privately exploited.
The complexity of the matching process has very important consequences for unem-
ployment. Specically, since the matching process is costly and complex there will always
be workers looking for a job determining unemployment as well as the jobs looking for a
worker, determining vacancies. As a consequence, there will always exist some positive
unemployment rate which is optimal. Additionally, search and matching frictions generate
match specic rents that need to be divided between workers and rms, which in turn re-
quires the specication of the bargaining mechanism to determine the wage. And it is the
characteristics of the specied bargaining mechanism which determine actual unemploy-
ment, and in turn imply that, although there exists an optimal rate of unemployment, the
actual one does not necessarily correspond to it.10
The fact that in this framework, unemployment has an explicit economic role allows
researchers to analyze the complex labour market implications of institutional changes in
a potentially much more detailed and careful way than was possible with the previously
available modelling tools. Furthermore, the explicit ow characteristic of this approach
allows identication of the complex channels thorough which specic economic policies
can affect the labour market. In other words, specic policy affects both unemployment
9 The early search literature was pioneered by Stigler (1961) and McCall (1970). The current search-
matching literature goes back to Phelps (1968) who shows the importance of search theory for the analysis
of the natural rate of unemployment and the ination-unemployment trade-off.
10 Although many possible wage setting mechanisms are allowed within this framework, Nash bargain-
ing is most frequently used.
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incidence and unemployment ow, which together with the two sided nature of the model
results in multiple channels of inuence. For the sake of completeness, let us illustrate the
comprehensiveness of the channels captured within this framework. Let us begin by notic-
ing that real world labour markets are characterized by some bargaining power in hands
of both workers and rms. Additionally, the outside option of the workers is strength-
ened by the existence of the unemployment benets. This unemployment benet certainly
inuences both the workers' willingness to work as well as the wage determined in the
bargaining process. The wage, on the other hand, determines the rms' willingness to
post vacancies and recruit workers, which implies the importance of both parties in deter-
mining unemployment duration. Moreover, the wages determine job destruction, which
denes additional channel through which benets affect unemployment. Several addi-
tional channels are important to point out. Specically, workers can threat to leave the job.
But nding another job is costly, and the cost increases with increases in the aggregate un-
employment rate. At the same time, rms can threaten to re workers, but nding another
worker is also costly, with the cost being higher the lower the unemployment rate. More-
over, the cost of quitting is lower the higher the benets are, whereas the cost of ring
is higher the higher employment protection is. All of this implies that a number of vari-
ous channels of inuence make the framework well equipped for the analysis of various
important policy issues.
In an empirical study, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) conrm the validity of several
important implications of the basic search and matching framework by analyzing the inu-
ence of employment protection. To detail the implications, let us assume that the increase
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in employment protection is translated into an increase of the cost of worker layoffs. This
allows us to determine three important channels of inuence. First, this increase by oper-
ating via rms' incentives is likely to reduce the number of layoffs and thereby decrease
the ow of workers into unemployment. Second, by directly increasing rms' costs, and
implictly strengthening workers' bargaining power, this might lead to increases in the bar-
gained wages and thereby to increases in unemployment duration. Third, since steady
state unemployment rate is the product of unemployment duration and the ow into un-
employment, the effects of changes in the employment protection are a priori ambiguous.
What Blanchard and Portugal show is that, at least for the Portuguese case, employment
protection works primarily through the reduction in the transitory employment variations
and much less through permanent ones, conrming the view that employment protection
regulation leads to lower rates of job creation and job destruction.
Application to Labour Market Policy Analysis
Despite the large potential for policy analysis, only a few papers have used the equi-
librium search and matching framework to formally analyze the impact of institutional
reforms on both the welfare and labour markets. Mortensen (1994b), building on the work
by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Millard and Mortensen (1995) performs com-
putational experiment on a model consistently calibrated to the unemployment and policy
characteristics of USA. He nds that provision of unemployment benets has important
disincentive effects on job creation as well as on the long run unemployment rate. More-
over, employment protection turns out to have strong negative effects on unemployment
incidence and a small positive effect on employment duration, which in aggregate results
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in a small negative effect on the unemployment rate. He also considers the effect of pay-
roll tax reduction and identies a small positive effect on the unemployment rate. Coe and
Snower (1996) employ a variant of search-matching model to analyze the complementar-
ities among labour market policies. They show that piecewise reforms are ineffective in
contrast to more "fundamental" reforms ,where the difference lies in the explicit account-
ing for the existing complementarities. Moreover, they argue that insufcient appreciation
of the importance of the complementarities could be blamed for the absence of effort to
implement fundamental labour market reforms.
Several studies have investigated the labour market effects of tax reforms. Pissarides
(1998) considers the effects of the employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages in
the four different equilibrium models, including the search-matching model. Addition-
ally, Pissarides (1998) analyzes the effect of revenue-neutral reform that makes the taxes
more progressive. He nds moderate effects of tax cuts when benets are indexed to the
post-tax wage in competitive and efciency wage models, but no effect in the unions and
search-matching models. But, if unemployment benets are xed in real terms, then tax
cuts can have substantial effects on unemployment in every model. He also nds a positive
effect of revenue neutral tax progression on employment under the union wage bargain-
ing and search-matching models. 11 Additionally, the effect of a revenue neutral switch
to progressive taxation under an initially regressive system is larger then the reduction in
the marginal tax rate. Sinko (2005) builds on Pissarides (1998) and analyzes the effects
11 The positive effect of tax progression on employment has been analyzed in Koskela and Vilmunen
(1996), who challenge the widely accepted wisdom within conventional labour supply analysis of nega-
tive effects of increase in tax progressivity on employment. By using the three most popular trade union
models, they show that under plausible assumptions the increase in the progressivity of the tax system
lowers wages but is good for employment in all three types of models.
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of labour taxation and tax progression in the search-matching model extended to include
the endogenous job destruction decisions with three alternative wage setting mechanisms:
Nash bargaining, monopoly union and efciency wages. He conrms the conventional
view of negative tax effects on long run employment regardless of the wage setting mech-
anism. Moreover, within the bargaining setup, the increase in tax progression has positive
effects on employment, which is a consequence of the positive tax effect on the emergence
of low productive jobs.
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
But all of the aforementioned studies employ partial equilibrium setups and consider
the long run consequences of specic reforms on labour market outcomes, thereby fully
neglecting their effects on macroeconomic uctuations. Recently, there has been an up-
surge in interest in the business-cycle implications of reallocations in the labour market
and the frictions generated by it. This interest has arisen mainly because of the inability
of standard real business cycle models to explain the stylized facts observed in the data re-
lated to important labour market characteristics. Additionally, the standard real business
cycle models produce output dynamics that are nearly identical to the dynamics of the un-
derlying exogenous shock and when the stylized facts related to employment volatility are
improved, such as in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), the persistence of employment
and output is worsened. Several studies such as Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1997) and den
Haan et al. (2000) extend the standard real business cycle models by including search
and matching approach to unemployment. Those studies show that the introduction of the
search-matching framework is successful in signicantly improving the performance of
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the real business cycle models and in providing an explanation for largely neglected issues
related to involuntary unemployment.
The incorporation of search and matching framework into standard real business cy-
cle models introduced real imperfections on the labour market side, but the product market
imperfections as well as the consideration of ination remained absent. The new gener-
ation of monetary dynamic general equilibrium models named New-Keynesian, incorpo-
rates product market imperfections as well as nominal rigidities in a Keynesian tradition
and is widely used to explain the joint dynamics of ination, output and employment.
Still, it was unable to explain the signicant and persistent uctuations in equilibrium un-
employment caused by aggregate shocks, in particular the monetary policy shocks. Addi-
tionally, New-Keynesian models have problems in explaining the sluggish response of real
wages and ination together with pronounced and persistent response of output to demand
shocks.12 Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) have introduced the search-matching frictions
with endogenous job destruction into standard New-Keynesian monetary model with nom-
inal price rigidities. They show that the explicit introduction of the extensive labour ad-
justment margin together with the imperfections generated by the search-matching process
improve the models performance in terms of ination volatility as well as both output and
ination persistence. Moreover, the model becomes increasingly capable of explaining
the overall response of US economy to monetary policy shocks as well as the observed
behaviour of employment . The main reason why the model is able to explain the joint
movements of output and ination is a consequence of its ability to explain labour market
12 For detailed survey of standard New-Keynesian models see Clarida et.al. (1999) and Gali (2002).
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dynamics. Trigari (2004b), in a similar model but with exogenous job destruction, addi-
tionally shows that search-matching frictions contribute to improve models' performance
with respect to wage responses.
Krause and Lubik (2007) have also introduced search-matching friction with endoge-
nous job destruction in a New-Keynesian model, albeit in a different way than the papers
discussed above. However, they show that the introduction of search-matching frictions
alone is not sufcient to generate the persistent effects of monetary shocks. Moreover, the
baseline model is not able to generate the Beveridge curve relationship. However, when
the wage is made rigid, as in Hall (2005) the ability of the model to explain labour market
facts is improved but the ination dynamics remains the same as in the baseline case. They
identify the explicit dynamics of marginal costs in the presence of search-matching rigidi-
ties which lies behind this result. Christoffel and Linzert (2005) extend the Trigari (2004a)
approach by including the wage norm as in Hall (2005) and show that wage rigidity to-
gether with the right-to-manage assumption of the bargaining process generates persistent
movements of aggregate ination. They also show that the institutional parameters that
inuence the volatility of wages also inuence the persistence of the ination. Similar
conclusions are obtained in the companion paper by Christofell et al. (2005).
As is evident from the previous discussion, either the literature was interested in long
run effects of specic reforms within a partial equilibrium setup or in improving the per-
formance of the standard real business cycle or New-Keynesian models by including more
elaborate labour markets through the search-matching framework. But surprisingly, only
the paper by Zanetti (2009), developed independently from ours in a different model in-
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corporating search-matching, has analyzed the regulatory effects on macroeconomic out-
comes as well as on the macroeconomic uctuations in a general equilibrium context,
even though the New-Keynesian setup extended with search-matching seems like a nat-
ural framework for this type of analysis. It is important to point out that scal issues, and
thereby the effects of the tax reforms, were completely neglected.
In Chapter 3 we develop the New-Keynesian model characterized by imperfect com-
petition, costly nominal price adjustment and search-matching frictions with endogenous
job destruction in the labour markets, to analyze the effects of product market and labour
market regulations on overall economic activity. Specically, we enrich our model with
explicit ring costs as well as explicit scal considerations. We introduce two types of dis-
tortionary marginal taxes, namely a wage tax paid by employees and the a payroll tax paid
by employers. Additionally, we assume the progressivity of the wage tax system. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the effect of product market reform aimed at increasing the
level of competition, as well as the effects of various tax reforms aimed to reduce the spe-
cic tax burden. We also investigate the effect of the specic tax reform aimed at reducing
the payroll tax burden but at the same making the necessary adjustment in the wage tax in
order for the marginal tax wedge to remain unchanged.
We conrm, within the general equilibrium model with endogenous job destruction,
the widely held view of a detrimental effect of marginal tax distortions on overall economic
performance. In addition, we nd a positive effect of product market reforms on the labour
markets and the economy as a whole. Furthermore, we also identify a positive effect
of the increase in the degree of progressivity regardless of the initial level. We also nd a
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positive effect of reduction of the tax burden on uctuations of macroeconomic aggregates.
However, we identify the negative inuence of tax reform aimed at increasing payroll
marginal tax rate but keeping the marginal tax wedge constant. Moreover, we identify the
mechanism through which this type of tax reforms works when anticipated one period in
advance.
1.3 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy and Labour Market
Frictions
The discussion developed in the previous two chapters analyzed aspects of various labour
and product market reforms without considering the optimality of policy makers' decision.
In the nal chapter we aim to complete the story by analyzing the consequences for the
optimal monetary and scal policy mix of various nominal rigidities as well as real labour
market rigidities generated by search-matching frictions so far not analyzed in the liter-
ature. Before describing our contribution, we summarize the important developments in
this eld of analysis.
Most of the standard models used for optimal policy analysis are highly stylized,
neglecting many theoretical and policy considerations. One can identify three distinct
approaches emerging in the literature. The rst, initiated by Lucas and Stokey (1983),
analyses optimal monetary and scal policy in the context of a perfectly competitive ex-
ible price environment where the government can issued fully state-contingent debt. The
government problem in this setup consists of choosing the least disruptive combinations
of ination and tax rates to nance the exogenous stream of government consumption.
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Although there is no real rationale for macroeconomic stabilization policy, several things
can be learned from this analysis. First, if there is a sufciently large set of state contin-
gent claims, optimal policy can be made time consistent, although in general the economy
will be characterized by time inconsistency. At the same time, if there are nominal claims
present even if there are real securities coexisting, the optimal policy in every point of time
has the incentive to use ination to erode the real value of the outstanding debt. The com-
mitment technology that would insure time consistency is required since, by behaving in
this way, the government would lose the ability to issue nominal non-state contingent debt,
which would in turn require the increased use of taxes and lead to a decrease in welfare.
The second important point emerging from this literature is that taxes and government debt
inherit the time series properties of the underlying shock.
By contrast, Calvo and Guidotti (1993) and Chari et al.(1991) analyze optimal policy
within a similar neoclassical setting but remove the assumption of the availability of state-
contingent claims and assume that the government can issue only non-contingent nominal
debt. They nd that the optimal tax rate is stable over time, and that it also inherits the
properties of the underlying shock. The stability of taxes is obtained via the use of un-
expected ination. In this way, by making nominal claims state contingent in real terms,
the need to use taxes to nance current and future debt obligations is reduced. In other
words, unanticipated ination serves as a lump-sum tax on nancial wealth and allows the
government to maintain highly stable tax rates over the business cycle.
While this literature can provide useful policy recommendations, the absence of a
real macroeconomic rationale for stabilization policies undermines its usefulness for the
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understanding of optimal policy behaviuor over the business cycle. More precisely, the as-
sumed neoclassical setting featuring the absence of any kind of nominal or real rigidities
is the basic driving mechanism behind some of the results. In other words, costless price
adjustment in the Chari et al. (1991) setting allows the policy maker to use ination to ren-
der the real debt state-contingent and thereby keep taxes stable, making ination volatility
and tax stability a feasible and optimal policy.
The second and more recent stream of literature abandons the neoclassical setting
and introduces market imperfections and nominal rigidities.13 Thus, the need for macro-
economic stabilization policy emerges. There are two important differences between the
two approaches. First, the neoclassical approach environment features distortionary taxa-
tion, while this recent approach assumes either implicitly or explicitly that the government
has access to the lump-sum taxes to nance its budget. This in turn removes the need for
the use of unanticipated ination, which acts as the lump-sum tax on nancial wealth. Sec-
ond, although the modelling environment is characterized by imperfect competition, most
of the literature assumes the existence of production or employment subsidies that would
eliminate the distortions arising from competition imperfections. Major optimal policy
implications are that ination should be set to zero or close to zero in every state and in
all times. The reason behind this result is rather intuitive. Costly price change requires
a constant price level to minimize inationary distortions associated with it. Fiscal con-
sequences of shocks play no role in optimal policy determination since the availability of
lump-sum taxes can easily deal with them.
13 For a interesting summary of major advances and implication of this approach see Clarida et. al.
(1999) and Woodford (2003).
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The methodological contributions of this literature, which combines the technical
rigor of the neoclassical setup with up to now somehow neglected, Keynesian views on
imperfect price and wage adjustment, are certainly large. Moreover lessons learned from
its policy implications constitute an additional dimension of its importance. Yet many
features incorporated in those models are far from being realistic and justiable on other
grounds then as the tools generating expositional and technical convenience. Additionally,
when compared with the neoclassical literature, this stream of literature provides com-
pletely opposite recommendation for the conduct of optimal monetary and scal policy.
As a reaction to the differences in policy implication between those two approaches,
the third stream of literature emerges, combining crucial featured of both approaches.
Specically, the unrealistic assumption of lump-sum tax availability is removed. Thus, the
tax instruments at policy maker disposal become distortionary. Moreover, markets for debt
are incomplete and the government can issue only one period nominal non-state contin-
gent debt. Neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition and exible prices are replaced
by monopolistic competition and some form of costly price adjustment. Thereby, Benigno
and Woodford (2003) analyze a model in which prices are set in a staggered fashion rst
introduced by Calvo (1983), whereas producer's price setting in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004a,2004b) is subject to convex price adjustment cost proposed by Rotemberg (1983).
In this setting optimal policy maker faces trade-off between distortions caused by ination
and tax rate volatility in response to unexpected shocks hitting the economy.
Several important implications arise under this modied setting. First, optimal mon-
etary policy features price stability even for a small degree of price rigidity. In other words
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when prices are sticky, the aforementioned trade-off is overwhelmingly resolved in favour
of price stability. The reason behind this result is again the consequence of costly price
setting. Second, when prices do not adjust costlessly, tax and debt do not inherit the time
series properties of the underlying shock, but are characterized by a near random walk be-
havior. In the opposite case when price are fully exible, but markets are still imperfectly
competitive, taxes and debt do inherit the time series properties of the underlying shocks.
Thus, the optimal ination process when prices are sticky is more in line with the second
stream of literature, which ignores the scal consequences of monetary policy actions by
assuming the availability of a lump-sum tax instrument. However, tax and debt proper-
ties are in line with the optimal neoclassical monetary and scal policy literature with real
non-state contingent debt as analyzed in Aiyagary et al. (2002).
However, most of the optimal monetary and scal policy literature abstract from any
real frictions in the labour market. In other words, regardless of whether the analysis is
conducted within the neoclassical setup or within more recent New-Keynesian setup, the
labour markets are assumed to be Walrasian. By introducing such an assumption, one
is neglecting the short run ination-unemployment trade-offs arising as a consequence of
labour market friction and certainly describing the real world economy. In Chapter 3. we
construct the model in New-Keynesian tradition characterized by imperfect competition in
the goods markets as well as costly price changes. But we depart from mainstream New-
Keynesian literature and replace the Walrasian labour markets with a search-matching
mechanism. Additionally, we introduce explicit scal considerations into our analysis,
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so far fully neglected in the New-Keynesian models which feature matching characteris-
tics of the labour markets.
We follow public nance literature in the spirit of Lucas and Stokey (1983) and
solve the constrained Ramsey problem which takes into account all of the constraints char-
acterizing competitive equilibrium in addition to all of the wedges inherent in the model
economy. Thereby we capture the positive aspects of the effects of search-matching ex-
ternalities. We resort to numerical techniques to illustrate the dynamic implications of our
setup. Specically, we consider the optimal policy responses in cases where the economy
is hit either by a positive neutral technological shock or by a positive government spending
shock.
We arrive at several important results. First, the increase in the technological level,
by leading to an increase in consumption and employment, allows the Ramsey planner to
reduce both ination and the tax rate to fully exploit the benets of productivity enhance-
ment. This in turn leads to an increase in demand and an increase in rms marginal prots,
thereby boosting vacancy posting and increasing employment. Thus, the optimal policy
is achieved by deviating from strict price stability, which contrasts with standard New-
Keynesian predictions. Second, the presence of unemployment benets and the expecta-
tional dynamic effects of tax rates on wages identify additional channels through which
the Ramsey planner can inuence efciency. More precisely, by using taxes, the Ramsey
planner can directly reduce inefciencies stemming from the presence of unemployment
benets as well as the wage, by affecting both current and the expected future tax rates
and thereby rms' marginal costs. Third, we nd that the optimal tax rate and optimal real
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government liabilities inherit the time series properties of the underlying shock, and again
contrast the results obtained in the standard New-Keynesian literature with sticky prices
and Walrasian labour markets. Finally, we also nd that optimal policy responses under
positive productivity shock show a certain degree of overshooting in ination and tax rates,
whereas under a positive government spending shock ination and tax rate are character-
ized by undershooting. This result comes out from the assumed commitment, whereby the
policy maker internalizes the effects of its current decisions on future expectations.
1.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have summarized the main empirical and theoretical literature which an-
alyzes the effects of labour and/or product market reforms. We use this review to identify
several important gaps and drawbacks present in the existing literature in order to moti-
vate the research conducted in the remainder of the thesis. Specically, we identify three
existing streams in the empirical literature trying to explain the European unemployment
experience and argue that, while the empirical literature provides useful lessons on the re-
form process, it is only part of the story. The main reason lies in its inability to capture
potentially very important general equilibrium effects. Therefore, in order to properly as-
sess the effects of both product and labour markets on macroeconomic outcomes, a deeper
theoretical analysis is needed. We also review the major developments in the theoreti-
cal eld and identify the neglection of several important theoretical and empirical aspects,
such as scal considerations or the ow characteristics of the labour markets, that need
to be taken into account when analyzing reforms' process. Furthermore, we identify the
1.4 Conclusion 34
scarceness of the literature analyzing the effects of various reforms on macroeconomic
uctuations.
We have also reviewed the developments in the optimal monetary and scal policy
literature and identify the absence of any real labour market frictions (which certainly char-
acterize the real world economy) in the analysis. Specically, the existing optimal mon-
etary and scal policy literature assumes the existence of Walrasian labour markets, and
by introducing such an assumption one is neglecting the short run ination-unemployment
trade-offs arising from labour market frictions. The analysis which corrects for the afore-
mentioned drawback is certainly important for both the deeper understanding of the reform
process as well as for the optimal monetary and scal policy conduct.
Chapter 2
The Impact of Tax and Market Distortions on
the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of
Unemployment 
Tax reform, market liberalisation and deregulation in the labour markets are widely
seen as the key to improved economic performance - particularly in Europe. As a result,
structural reform has become a leading policy issue in both Europe and the OECD. In
fact the European Commission has declared the coordination of structural reform to be
its top priority (EC, 2008). Yet the academic literature has provided very little formal
analysis of the reform process itself; or of how far structural reforms can be expected to
improve economic performance. At the same time, many countries have proved extremely
reluctant to embrace such reforms despite being keen to advocate their virtues in public.
Such inconsistencies require an explanation.
In Europe, arguments for market or institutional reforms have been made, and sup-
ported, at the political level under the heading of the Lisbon agenda (Sapir, 2004). Nev-
ertheless, despite these reforms having been advocated widely, governments often fail to
carry them out in practice (Dellas and Tavlas, 2005; Hughes Hallett et al., 2005). And
where they have been attempted, it has usually been a piecemeal effort and quickly aban-
doned in the face of opposition. The Hartz IV programme in Germany; or pensions, labour
 Part of this chapter has been released as Bokan and Hughes-Hallett (2006), and published as Bokan
and Hughes-Hallett (2008)
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market reform and the liberalization of services in France; and the reconstruction of social
security in Italy, are three obvious and specic examples. The usual conjecture is that such
reforms are costly in terms of economic performance and costly to nance in the short
term - a conjecture that we examine below.
Much of this debate has come to focus on reforms in the labour market. That is based
(loosely) on the analytic and empirical evidence of a negative link between economic per-
formance and wage rigidities in many countries (Bruno, 1986). Such a link has certainly
been observed in the labour and product markets of Europe (Koedijk and Kremers, 1996)
where performance is measured in terms of growth and employment; and deregulation is
measured in competition policy, merger codes and the liberalisation of employment prac-
tices. Yet, however powerful the case for structural reform, previous papers analyzing the
reform process have been forced to rely on ad hoc reasoning. The economics literature
does not have a model to describe the impact of tax distortions on economic performance,
nor the consequences and costs of structural reform (and hence of the incentives for under-
taking reforms in the rst place). Indeed, a leading OECD survey commented: "...because
there is neither a well-established model of the political economy of structural reform,
nor an extensive empirical literature on the topic...it is necessary to adopt a pragmatic,
ad hoc approach" (Høj et al., 2006). Most analysts have therefore found themselves re-
stricted to studies of the political economy factors that make reforms more likely, or that
show institutional or market distortions can go some way to explaining the persistence of
unemployment14.
14 Høj et al. (2006); or Blanchard andWolfers (2000); Daveri and Tabellini (2000); Nickell et al. (2005).
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Second, it is obvious that at least as much effort has also gone into arguing for re-
forms that reduce the distortionary effects of taxation, as has gone into market deregulation
programmes. Yet the literature also contains remarkably little analysis of the benets (or
costs) of tax reform, or of whether it could be more effective than market or institutional
reforms. In this paper, we try to redress that deciency.
To analyse these issues, we need a model of the reform process sufciently general
to encompass the usual reform instruments and the range of structural parameters found
in the candidate countries. Starting from a standard model of deregulation, we develop a
theoretical model of wage bargaining, with imperfect competition in the product markets
and different forms of tax distortions, in order to understand the likely incentives, costs
and potential benets of structural reform. We use the results to explain policy makers'
behaviour, and to derive certain conclusions about which reform measures are the most
effective.
We then trace out how the implicit ination-unemployment trade-offs have been af-
fected by different kinds of market distortions, and how far they could be eased by struc-
tural reform or deregulation. We also show how different tax or market distortions affect
the natural rate of unemployment, and which structural reforms would be the most effec-
tive from a welfare or employment perspective.
We nd that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is the removal of tax distortions
rather than market distortions which makes the greatest difference. Hence the answer to
our rst question: those countries that are scally constrained, or nd themselves unable to
nance the consequences of their reforms, are typically the ones that fail to carry them out.
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That in turn implies it is essential to provide an analysis that combines scal policy and
reform instruments. Nevertheless, the crucial conict remains the inter-temporal trade-off
faced by workers: lower real wages (welfare) in the short run vs. lower unemployment and
higher real wages in the long run.
2.1 The Model
In order to consider the impact of the tax system on wage bargaining behaviour, and hence
the consequences of tax reform, we extend the Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) model to in-
clude distortionary taxation. In addition to distortionary taxes, we consider two deviations
from perfect competition to generate the need for product and labour market reforms. The
rst arises from the assumption of the imperfectly competitive product markets. In this
case, we assume the presence of certain number of the monopolistically competitive rms
each of them producing a differentiated good. Then, on the labour market side, we intro-
duce an imperfection by assuming a formal wage bargaining process between rms and
their workers.
The presence of monopolistically competitive rms leads to the creation of rents in
the economy, the size of which is determined by the degree of monopolistic competition.
At the same time, the existence of a wage bargaining process leads to a certain distribution
of those rents between rms and workers. However, distortionary taxation is necessary
to complete the story since any reform programme that needs to be undertaken needs to
be nanced. And if scal expenditures are to be endogenous, potentially, then taxes must
ultimately be endogenous too.
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We do not model the dynamics of adjustment explicitly in this paper. But in order
to allow for differences in the effects over time we will follow Blanchard and Giavazzi by
imposing a clear cut distinction between the short term and the long term. This is achieved
by xing the number of producers in the market exogenously in the short run, whereas
we allow that number to be determined by a market entry condition in the long run. One
can think of this entry condition as a per unit entry cost, c, representing certain regulatory
or administrative entry barriers present in the product markets. Although there would be
no difference to the equilibrium outcomes if this cost were treated as a shadow cost, it is
perhaps better to think of it as real cost which is proportional to output. If this cost were
to be a shadow cost, rms present in the market would be able to earn pure prots in the
long run; whereas if it is a real cost, rms can earn "excess" prots only in the short run
since that excess would eventually be dissipated in the entry cost. Moreover, in order to
perform any numerical analysis, the entry costs would need to be treated as real and could
be thought as the cost of the time needed to satisfy all of the regulatory requirements plus
the cost of setting the rm up and licensing it as a legal entity.
2.1.1 The Consumer's Problem
To model consumption, we assume that the economy contains a xed number of workers-
consumers L, indexed by j, who can choose to either work, or not to work. If the worker
decides to work he must supply one unit of labour. If he does not work he is unemployed.
Labour is therefore indivisible.
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The utility function for worker j is given by following expression
Uj = [m
1 
mX
i=1
C
 1

i;j ]

 1 (2.1)
where Ci;j represents individual j's consumption of the i-th product; m represents the
number of rms or products present in the market; and  stands for the elasticity of (gross)
substitution between products which is dened as ( = f(m)). We assume this elasticity
to be an increasing function of number of products with f 0(m) > 0, and that  may be
xed by policy. This specication of  is crucial for disentangling the difference between
the short and the long run since, by imposing an exogenous number of rms present in the
market, we assume that the elasticity of substitution is constant and exogenous in the short
term. But in the long run, it will be endogenous and determined by the number of products
that emerge in the nal equilibrium.
This specication has three important features. First, assuming that all workers are
identical, the utility of the workers will not depend directly on the number of products, but
on the level of aggregate consumption instead. Second, an increase in the number of prod-
ucts increases the elasticity of substitution between them and thereby reduces monopoly
power of the individual producer. This may have indirect consequences for the utility of
the individual worker. Third, with a xed labour supply, employment generation and re-
ducing unemployment are synonymous.
When making consumption or labour market decisions, each worker maximises (2.1)
subject to the following budget constraint:
mX
i=1
PiCi;j = (1  tw)wjNi;j + Pwr(u)[1 Ni;j] (2.2)
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where Ni;j takes the value of one if worker j chooses to work in rm i, or zero if he or she
is unemployed; tw is the average tax rate on wages; and P is the price aggregator dened
in Section 2.1.3 below. wr(u) may therefore be interpreted as the real value of the unem-
ployment benets, or support received from government in the case of unemployment; or
equivalently as the worker's reservation wage.
2.1.2 Unemployment
We now show that the level of social support (unemployment benets), and hence the
reservation wage will increase with government expenditures and decrease with the rate of
unemployment in the economy as a whole: that is, w0r(u) < 0.
There are several ways to justify this assertion. Informally wr(u) may represent the
labour market institutions that affect wage bargains: minimum wages, ring costs, the size
and duration of unemployment benets, or the level of social support itself. Increases in
any one of those factors would increase the reservation wage when employment is high
(unemployment low) since they are funded by the public sector15. Or it might be that
market reforms create temporary unemployment, but lower the reservation wage since
workers know that their old jobs may not be preserved. Again, higher employment would
lead to higher wages and higher reservation wages and to lower unemployment since the
size of the labour force is xed (Spector, 2004)16.
15 There are no other outside income opportunities for the unemployed in this model.
16 Spector's argument is that the reservation wage will rise with employment. However if labour supply
changes, this result can be overturned: as shown by Fang and Rogerson (2008).
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More formally, it can be shown to be the natural outcome of an optimal wage bargain
between rms and wage bargainers, as dened by (2.10) below, when the government's
(social security) budget remains balanced17. Both Spector, and Fiori et al. (2007), show
that, in such circumstances, reservation wages will be proportional to the employment rate
with a coefcient that depends on the price mark-up, labour's bargaining power, and tax
rates. With the labour force xed, that means the reservation wage will vary inversely with
the unemployment rate. We accept that explanation here; the inverse relationship itself
being derived explicitly in Section 2.2.2 below.
However this w0r < 0 relationship only denes a direction of change; it does not
tie down a level of unemployment. To do that, and in order to be able to show how the
employment position is inuenced by labour market institutions and employment legisla-
tion, it is useful to link the unemployment outcomes to a search model with layoff risks,
wage changes once in a job, differential wage offers to insiders vs. outsiders, and wage
bargaining (Rogerson et al. (2005)). In those models, the equilibrium (natural) rate of
unemployment is given by
uN = =[+ w] (2.3)
where w = 0[1   F (wr)] describes the probability of receiving an acceptable job offer
in the current period, and F (w) is the cumulative probability distribution of all wage offers
made in that period. Hence 1 F (wr) describes the probability of the arrival of acceptable
job offers.
17 A constraint which has not been imposed in earlier tax reform studies: Bayoumi at al.(2004); Coenen
et al. (2008). Imposing it here means that the budget will remain in balance throughout our analysis.
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In this formulation 0 is the contact rate, reecting the probability of contact between
employers and employees. In that case, w describes the arrival rate of offers that actually
lead to employment. And  reects the layoff risk; that is, the separation rate implied
by the probability that a job will be terminated in the current period. Both probability
distributions remain unspecied in this paper, but are often taken to be independent Poisson
distributions in which case 0 and w become constants which describe the average rates
of contact and employment per period.
Given this, the short run movements in the rate of unemployment will be determined
by the difference between current separations and new hires:
@u=@t = (1  u)  0[1  F (wr)]u (2.4)
which, over time, converges to uN . This formula therefore ties down the speed at which
unemployment converges on uN .
2.1.3 Welfare Indicators
Finally P stands for the price aggregator obtained after solving the consumer's optimiza-
tion problem. It is given by:
P = [
1
m
mX
i=1
P 1 i ]
1
1  (2.5)
This expression is slightly different from the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator as a con-
sequence of the assumed form of the utility function at (2.1). Solving the consumer's
optimization problem, and using the fact that the problem is symmetric across all con-
sumers, we can obtain an expression for the consumption that would maximise utility for
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the individual consumer. It is given by
[(1  tw)wj
P
  wr(u)]Ni;j + wr(u) (2.6)
This expression is proportional to the individual's maximised utility level and can be used
to make welfare comparisons in what follows. All welfare comparisons that follow will
therefore be in terms of consumption equivalents.
2.1.4 The Firms' Problem
We assume that each rm produces a differentiated product indexed by i using the same
production technology which is linear in labour. Output is therefore given by18
Yi = Ni (2.7)
where Ni =
P
j Ni;j represents total employment in rm i. Since both individual and
aggregate demands are determined by the consumer's optimization problem, the rms'
problem consists of determining prices taking costs and demand as given. This allows us
to obtain the partial equilibrium demand function for each product market. It is given by:
Yi =
Y
m
(
Pi
P
)  (2.8)
18 Alternatively one can think of (2.7) as a production technology in which capital is xed and nor-
malized to one. Interestingly, Spector (2004) claims that capital plays a key role in the outcomes of
deregulation in the product and labour markets because unions and employers bargain over the rents
created by the irreversibility of capital investment, as well as over the rents derived from imperfect com-
petition. However, in a discussion paper version of this paper (Bokan and Hughes Hallett, 2006), we
show that the introduction of capital (via a Cobb-Douglas production function) complicates the analysis
but does not change the results. Hence it makes no difference if we include capital or treat it as xed.
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2.1.5 Wage Bargaining and the Government
Before describing wage bargaining problem, we need to introduce the tax system. We
assume rst that both workers and producers are obliged to pay certain taxes. Workers
need to pay a tax on the wages they earn. In our model, it is assumed that a common
average tax rate will be imposed on every working worker's wage. We also assume that
unemployment benets are not taxed.
Next, producers need to pay payroll taxes19, tp, dened as a certain xed percentage
of the workers gross wage. Both of these taxes are assumed to be at taxes. Extensions to
a progressive tax system are possible, but lead to very complicated expressions which limit
any insight into the scope for reform20. Our at tax specication meanwhile implies the
following government budget constraint, over and above any xed or lump sum elements
in taxation or expenditures:
B = (tw + tp)wi
X
Ni   Pwr(u)[L
m
 
X
Ni] (2.9)
We treatB as being constrained by a ceiling on government debt. That means any increases
in expenditures, or reductions in tax rates, must be matched by increases in tax revenues
elsewhere in the system. This is just an articial device which allows us to focus on the cost
of nancing any reforms. However, decits do have to be nanced by interest payments or
tax revenues. So B will always be limited in practice.
19 Or training costs, ring costs; or any prot or corporate taxes that vary in line with production costs.
20 Lockwood and Manning (1993) allow progressive taxes and then show that changes in the marginal
and average tax rates may have different effects. That is ruled out here. Note also that (2.9) implies equal
tax bases so we pick up none of the Koskela and Schoeb (1999) effects on wages when tax bases vary.
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Meanwhile each rm bargains with L=m workers over wages and employment in
that industry, in both the short and the long run. Intuitively, a fraction L=m of the workers
forms a union. That union then bargains with the rm over wages and the level of employ-
ment. Indivisibility of labour implies that workers can either be employed in the rm or be
unemployed.
In what follows, we consider a world of Nash efcient bargaining solutions. There
are three reasons for this. First, the efcient bargaining concept allows wages to be bar-
gained off the labour demand curve, which implies that an increase in wages could be
achieved without an immediate decrease in employment (stronger workers may obtain
higher wages without a decrease in employment). Second, empirical studies (Dobbelaere,
2004) have rejected The Right to Manage Model in favour of an efcient bargaining model
as the appropriate explanation of wage bargaining in many European countries. Since the
case for structural reform is particularly strong in Europe, it is important to have a model
that can capture that feature. Third, this assumption ensures incentive compatibility on
both sides of the labour market21.
Assuming risk neutrality for the unions, the wage bargaining problem can be written
as:
max
wi;Nj
f log[(1  tw)wi   Pwr(u)]Ni + (1  ) log[Pi   (1 + tp)wi]Njg (2.10)
where  is an exogenously determined index of union bargaining power; and where tw
and tp represent the average tax rates paid by employees and employers respectively (0 
21 Since the empirical evidence in favour of efcient bargaining is not conclusive, it is might be better
to rely on the rst and third of these reasons for adopting a Nash bargaining approach. However Spector
(2004) and Fiori et al. (2007) have stressed that essentially the same results emerge from the Right to
Manage model. So this distinction is actually unimportant here.
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tw; tp < 1). This formulation implies that unions will choose wi to maximize the net wage
surplus from employment, the rst term within the brackets, while rms will choose Ni to
maximize their net prot (the second term).
2.1.6 Regulatory Instruments
Several important consequences of market regulation now follow. On the product market
side we have c and  = f(m). Reductions in the entry cost, c, can be thought as the re-
moval of administrative restrictions; or the replacement of some state owned monopolies
by market rms. The degree of product substitutability in the markets is broken into two
parts. First, a policy component () whose increase could represent some market liberali-
sation measure, or a reduction in some domestic/external trade barrier which has the effect
of increasing product substitutability. These are matters which lie within government con-
trol. The second element, f(m), is an index of market competition which increases with
the number of rms. If we change  by policy, we change . Butm may then change. So,
in practice we speak of a net change to .
Finally, in the labour markets, we have  representing bargaining power whose in-
crease can be interpreted as the increase in the degree of the workers' power over wage
and employment decisions ranging from rights to strike, employment protection legisla-
tion, severance conditions, ring costs, or other collective matters. In addition both types
of taxes represent regulatory instruments under direct government control.
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2.2 Solving for Equilibrium Outcomes
In order to proceed, we solve the model in three steps. First we solve for short run partial
equilibrium values for relative prices and real wages. These will then be used to obtain the
short run general equilibrium prices and wages. After obtaining those values, we can solve
for the corresponding long run equilibrium values.
2.2.1 Short Run Partial Equilibrium Relationships
Equilibrium demand for each product, and hence employment, will be determined by (2.8).
Since workers and rms bargain over both wages and employment, and since employment
is already determined as a function of output, our bargaining problem can be resolved by
substituting (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.10), and then allowing workers and rms to bargain over
wages and prices. The solution to that problem is given by:
Pi
P
=
(1 + tp)wr(u)
(   1)(1  tw) (2.11)
which follows from the rst order conditions for relative prices and real wages:
Pi
P
=

 +    1
(1 + tp)

wi
P
and (2.12)
wi
P
=


1 + tp

Pi
P
+

1  
1  tw

wr(u) (2.13)
Using the expressions above, we can solve for short run partial equilibrium real wages and
relative prices as functions of the regulatory parameters in the model. In fact:
Pi
P
= [1 + ]wr(u) and (2.14)
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wi
P
=

1 + (1  tw)  (tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1  tp)

wr(u) (2.15)
where  represents the mark-up in relative prices22, dened as
 =
(tw + tp)
(   1)(1  tw) +
1
   1 : (2.16)
It is easy to see that this mark-up is an increasing function of both taxes on wages paid by
employees, and the payroll tax paid by employers. That is,
@
@tp
=

(   1)(1  tw) > 0;
@
@tw
=
(1 + tp)
(   1)(1  tw)2 > 0 and
@
@tw
>
@
@tp
> 1
(2.17)
when  > 1. This result is to be expected since, in the case of increases in payroll taxes, it is
optimal for producers to bargain for higher prices; whereas in the case of an increase in the
taxes paid by employees, the latter will demand higher wages. However, the latter would
lead producers to require an even higher mark-up in order to prevent prot margins from
changing too much  their ability to do so being limited only by the degree of inter-product
substitutability.
These results also show that  represents a mark-up in relative prices, reecting the
combined rents to the rm and the derived rents to the work force. However we can be
sure that  > (tw + tp)=(1  tw) holds for all   1; and that  is a decreasing function of
 which reaches its minimum at  = (tw + tp)=(1   tw) when  ! 1; a minimum value
which increases with tp and tw. Hence we can think of   (tw+ tp)=(1  tw) as the degree
22 This expression shows the composition of the mark-up. Note that (2.14) and (2.11) show that this
model solves for relative prices, not the price level, and requires the usual elasticity restriction   1 to
hold.
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of market distortion due to imperfect competition; and (tw + tp)=(1  tw) as the degree of
distortion due to the tax regime.
Thus there will always be some distortions, even under perfect competition, so long
as there are taxes. We are restricted to a second best world. Finally   1 is indeed
required, by (2.11), since otherwise prices will turn negative.
2.2.2 Short Run General Equilibrium
Since in a symmetric equilibrium all producers need to charge the same price, and since
not all of them can have relative prices larger than one in a general equilibrium, all relative
prices must be equal to one in the general equilibrium setting. Substituting that into (2.14)
provides us with the following condition for the reservation wage:
wr(u) =
1
1 + 
(2.18)
Taking tax rates as temporarily xed, this expression implicitly determines the short run
unemployment rate which is a consequence of the assumed xed short run coefcient of
the elasticity of substitution. Substituting (2.18) into (2.15) we obtain an expression for
the short run general equilibrium real wage in terms of :
wi
P
=
1 + (1  tw)  (tw + tp) + tp
(1 + tp)(1  tw)(1 + ) (2.19)
But real wages are proportional to the reservation wage: (2.15) and (2.19) both imply
wi
P
=

1 + [(1  tw)  tw] + (1  )tp
(1 + tp)(1  tw)

wr = Awr (2.20)
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where A > 0. So, if the social security budget is kept in balance, (2.9) with B = 0
becomes
(tw + tp)`Awr = (1  `)wr; or`[1 + (tw + tp)A] = 1
where ` =
P
Ni=L is the employment rate for the economy as a whole. Hence,
wr =
[1 + (tw + tp)A]
(1 + )
` and w0r(u) =  
[1 + (tw + tp)A]
(1 + )
< 0
since ` = 1   u. This is the negative relationship introduced in Section 2.1.223. Hence a
higher reservation wage, or a higher level of social support, will automatically lead to lower
unemployment, and vice versa (higher unemployment implies lower reservation wages),
both in the long and the short run  as claimed.
2.2.3 Comparative Statics in the Short Run
Proposition 1 Short run real wages are an increasing function of labour's bargaining
power if and only if the mark-up, broadly dened, is greater than the share of the total
tax burden on the per unit net wage received by employees: or, equivalently, as long as
the following condition (market distortions exist) is satised:
 >
tw + tp
1  tw (2.21)
Proof. The rst derivative of short run equilibrium real wage is positive if (2.21) holds,
since then @
wi
P
@
= (1 tw) tp tw
(1 tw)(1+tp)(1+) > 0 holds, given that   1 implies   0.
Notice that, whatever the tax system, (2.21) will hold as long as  < 1. But if
 ! 1, and product market competition increases, then (2.21) will become an equality
23 An extension to allow budget imbalances, B 6= 0, can easily be incorporated at some cost to the
algebra.
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and labour's bargaining power will have no impact on real wages. This conclusion is
new and shows that the composition of the mark-up matters. In addition, it conicts with
Spector's (2004) analysis which nds the effect of increasing competition to be ambiguous
for the reasons discussed in Section 2.2.5 below.
Next we consider the consequences of a change in the two types of taxes:
Proposition 2 The short run equilibrium real wage is always a strictly decreasing
function of payroll taxes, whereas it is unaffected by changes in wage taxes.
Proof. Substitute the broad mark-up, (2.16), into the solution for short run equilibrium
real wages, and take rst order derivatives with respect to tp and tw.
The intuition behind this conclusion comes from the effect of tax changes on the
mark-up. Evidently the mark-up is less responsive to changes in the payroll tax than it is
to changes in taxes paid on wages (see (2.17); tw < 1). Thus, in the case of an increase
in payroll taxes, real wages must fall because rms can always increase their mark-up by
more than enough to compensate for the increase in the payroll tax: see again (2.17). The
burden is therefore partly transferred to the workers. But if there is an increase in wage
taxes, workers will demand higher wages. Firms are able to compensate for this increase
by raising their mark-up by more than they could have done in the payroll tax case. But
that results in an increase in the general price level such that real wages remain unaffected.
Proposition 3 The short run equilibrium reservation wage is always a strictly de-
creasing function of both types of taxes.
Proof. (2.18) and (2.17) together imply the result.
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This result is also intuitive since the equilibrium reservation wage is inversely related
to the mark-up, and the mark-up is increasing in both types of taxes.
Corollary 1 Proposition 3 therefore implies that the equilibrium unemployment
rate will increase with increases in both types of taxes, in contrast to the competition
effect which causes the unemployment rate to fall (Spector, 2004). But the size of the
impact on reservation wages, and hence on the unemployment rate, will differ depend-
ing on which tax rate has been changed: (2.17) implies @=@tw > @=@tp in (2.18).
2.2.4 The Long Run: Entry and Exit
In the long run, rms can restructure or enter new markets. We assume that rms need to
pay a xed entry cost which is a fraction of the price per unit of output. This means that
rms will enter the market so long as rents cover those entry costs.
Since rms get a share 1   of the total rents from which taxes need to be paid, we
can dene the share of net rents available to cover per unit entry costs as follows24:
(1  )[1  (1 + tp)wr(u)] (2.22)
24 This expression denes the net rents going to rms from all sources: from price setting, wage setting
and tax distortions, over and above what they would receive with perfect competition in all markets and
no distortions. In that case, real wages would equal wr(u) as can be seen from (2.27) and (2.28) below.
Hence (2.22) represents net rents per unit, in excess of normal prots, and the scale factor (Y ) plays
no role once excess prots per unit of output are determined since the production function is monotonic.
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Substituting (2.18) for , we can now express the maximum acceptable entry cost as a
function of the mark-up, bargaining power and taxes. It is given by
c = (1  )

  tp
1 + 

(2.23)
However the mark-up itself is no longer exogenous since the elasticity of substitution co-
efcient will change because the number of rms, and the number and varieties of goods,
will change when rms enter and exit the market. In fact, the number of rms and the
degree of substitution between goods will adjust through entry and exit until the rents,
(2.22), are fully consumed by the entry costs (2.23). In other words the number of rms,
and thereby the degree of competition, must be such as to totally dissipate any excess
prots/rents over entry cost. Recall that we require   1. Hence:
Proposition 4 The number of rms, goods and employment will rise in the transition
from short to long run if tax rates of either type are increased; or if market regulation
lowers the degree of substitutability (or the degree of competition) between goods and
between producers.
Proof. The rst derivative of the maximum acceptable entry cost is positive:
@c
@
= (1  ) (1 + tp)
(1 + )2
(2.24)
Combining (2.24) with (2.17), or with @=@ < 0 from (2.16), gives the result.
Non-Monotonicity: It is important to see what is going on here. Increasing the tax
rates of either type increases the mark-up that rms can impose, and hence the costs (and
rents) they are prepared to pay in order to enter the market. Moreover, that mark-up will
have increased by more than the original increase in tax rates. That follows from (2.17).
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Hence, the number of rms and degree of competition has to fall in the medium term (the
rst phase of the long term), although prots and rents will rise as (2.24) shows. But if
rents rise, then new rms will enter the market and, in the longer term, the number of rms
and goods produced will rise again. In other words, there is a non-monotonic response.
Corollary 2 More rms (goods, employment25) enter the market in the transition
from short to long run than leave in the short term.
Proof. The changes in the short term mark-up, @=@j = j , are given by (2.17); and the
subsequent long term adjustments by the partial derivatives from (2.24), (2.26) below, and
from (2.16), once the new degree of substitutability has been established. Putting these
together, the total change is
d =

1 +
@
@
 @
@c
 @c
@

jdj; for j = tw; tp;  (2.25)
where the second term on the right represents long run changes. But, using (2.24), (2.26)
and (2.16), the product of the three partials in the bracket is negative. Given (2.17), that
result conrms Proposition 4. Since  falls if either tax rate falls or rises,entry cost fall
and  rises compared to the status quo ante, (2.23)-(2.26), which implies more rms and
more goods.
Corollary 3 In the long run, a policy of reducing wage taxes will be more effec-
tive than reducing payroll taxes for increasing the number of rms, goods or employ-
25 There is a possible exception here. If tw falls, unemployment is unaffected: (2.27). But if the partic-
ipation rate rises, requiring the participation ratio of <100% to ensure A>1, then employment will still
rise.
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ment. However, a policy of market liberalisation that raises the level of competition be-
tween producers will be more effective than either at low levels of competition (dened
by (   1) < 1   tw); but less effective if competition or taxation are already high.
Proof. Competition, and the number of goods and rms all increase if the allowable level
of entry costs increases. By (2.24), that requires the mark-up  to rise. The result now
follows by comparing the partial derivatives in (2.17) with each other, and with @=@
from (2.16). Note that (2.24) implies that the number of rms increases with the entry
costs they are prepared to pay in order to enter a new market, and with the ease with
which their goods can be substituted for others (). And employment increases because
@wr(u)=@c < 0 follows from (2.27) below.
Finally, by substituting (2.16) into (2.23) and rearranging, we can solve for the long
run elasticity of substitution as a function of the regulatory parameters. That solution is:
 =
(1  )(1  tw)
c  (1  )tw (2.26)
Using (2.23) and (2.18) in (2.18) and (2.19), we can now solve for the long run reservation
wage and the long run real wage. Their equilibrium values are given by:
wr(u) =
1  c  
(1  )(1 + tp) and (2.27)
wi
P
=
1  c  tw
(1 + tp)(1  tw) (2.28)
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The introduction of taxation in this model has therefore increased the complexity of the
solution, but it is straightforward to see the effects of the regulatory parameters on the
equilibrium reservation wage, real wages and employment.
2.2.5 Comparative Statics in the Long Run
Proposition 5 Long run equilibrium reservation wage (unemployment rate) is always
a decreasing (increasing) function of labour's bargaining power.
Proof. The rst derivative of wr(u) with respect to labour's bargaining power is always
negative:
  c
(1  )(1 + tp) < 0 (2.29)
Proposition 6 Long run equilibrium real wages are always a decreasing function of
bargaining power.
Proof. Taking rst order derivatives in (2.28), we obtain  tw=[(1 + tp)(1  tw)] which is
also negative.
To explain Propositions 5 and 6, consider a permanent increase in labour's bargaining
power. In the short run, this leads to a rise in real wages since the share of the prots (rents)
going to the workers will have increased. But that means the prots available to rms will
be reduced and it will become harder to satisfy the requirement imposed by the entry
condition . the more so, the greater is . Therefore the number of the rms present in the
market will decrease. A decrease in the number of rms implies a decrease in the elasticity
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of substitution faced by the remaining rms. That means that rms will charge higher
prices. Workers will demand higher wages to compensate. But, because rms have market
power (and because taxation increases the mark-up that this implies; and also because the
tax wedge increases the nominal wage claim workers have to make in order to preserve
their take home pay), these wage increases will be passed on in price increases. That leads
to a reduction in the real wage nally received by the workers. If taxation were to go to
zero, this effect would vanish as (2.28) would be independent of . It would also vanish
even if markets were to become fully competitive since  ! 1 implies c  (1   )tw in
(2.26), which makes wi=P independent of  in (2.28). Hence, either distortionary taxes
or imperfect competition, or both, is responsible for the decreasing value of bargaining
power.
Finally we consider the effects of a change in taxes on reservation and real wages.
Proposition 7 The long run reservation wage is not affected by changes in the taxes
paid by employees, but is a decreasing function of the taxes paid by employers. By
contrast, the long run equilibrium wage is an increasing function of the taxes paid by
employees and a decreasing function of the taxes paid by employers.
Proof. The rst derivative of wr(u) with respect to tw is zero, and with respect to tp is
  1  c  
(1  )(1 + tp)2 (2.30)
which is negative so long as c +  < 1. Similarly the rst derivative of the long run real
wage with respect to tw is
1  c  
(1 + tp)(1  tw)2 (2.31)
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whereas the rst derivative with respect to tp is given by
  1  c  tw
(1 + tp)2(1  tw) (2.32)
Of these two expressions, the rst is always positive and the second always negative so
long as c +  < 1. However, it is easy to check that c +  < 1 always holds if   1
(implying   0) since tp  026.
2.2.6 Business Tax Reform: An Example
Amuch discussed area of economic reform is to reduce tax distortions. Consider a scenario
in which a government plans to reduce the taxes faced by employers. Let us also assume
that the government is either required to keep the budget balanced, or needs to keep the
decit within some strict upper bound such as demanded by the Stability and Growth Pact.
Wage taxes would have to rise to compensate. What are the short and long run effects of
this policy?
According to Proposition 2, the short run increase in the wage taxes needed to keep
the budget in balance will not affect real wages, whereas the planned reduction in payroll
taxes would lead to an increase in the real wage through its favourable (lower) effect on
the mark-up. But the extra taxes paid by employees will have the opposite effect, increas-
ing the mark-up where the lower payroll taxes reduce it. This combination of tax changes
would therefore lead to a short run decrease in employment since the negative wage tax ef-
26 From Proposition 7, and its short run counterparts (Propositions 2 and 3), we can see that the ambigu-
ous effect of increasing competition on wages noted by Spector (2004) is in fact a temporal effect; not a
capital-labour conict since capital is not needed to obtain the result. In the short run wages fall due to
myopia in the wage bargains struck by workers. In the long run wages rise because competition in the
product markets reduces mark-ups and therefore increases consumption and employment.
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fect will be larger than the positive payroll tax effect on wr(u) (see Corollary 1). Thus the
short term impact of this type of policy would increase unemployment. It might have been
better to have just reduced wage taxes; or to have removed the short term requirement to
keep the budget balanced. In either case, these are disincentives which may block this kind
of structural reform programme. It entails a short run loss in economic performance, polit-
ical loss of face, and counter-productive outcomes if budget balance is enforced  although
abandoning the scal restraint altogether might have risked destabilising the budget.
But in the long term, the sequence of events is quite different. Indeed, the direction
of impact is reversed. By Proposition 7, the net long run effect of an increase in the wage
taxes needed to compensate for our reduction in payroll taxes, would lead to a reinforc-
ing increase in long run real wages; and to a decrease in the unemployment rate since the
reservation wage, which also increases, is negatively related to unemployment. This out-
come follows because a rise in wage taxes will not affect the reservation wage (Proposition
7). But the compensating fall in payroll taxes will increase the reservation wage, reect-
ing a fall in unemployment, even if tw has had no effect. The nal outcome is a fall in
unemployment therefore.
The outcome of this example is therefore summarised in Table 2.1. It highlights
the non-monotonicity property in Proposition 4, which arises here because the increase in
wage taxes has had a larger effect in increasing the mark-up [and hence real wages and the
reservation wage], than the decrease in payroll taxes has had in decreasing it.
2.2 Solving for Equilibrium Outcomes 61
Table 2.1. The Implications of Lowering Business Taxes
a) In the short run (by Propositions 2 and 3)
@wi=P
@tw
= 0;
@wi=P
@tp
< 0 and
@wr(u)
@tw
< 0;
@wr(u)
@tp
< 0
So tp # implies wi=P ", but also wr(u) " so u #. But tw " implies no change in wi=P , while wr(u) # so
u ". And of the two, tw has the stronger effect. Hence u rises overall.
b) In the long run (by Proposition 7)
@wi=P
@tw
> 0;
@wi=P
@tp
< 0 and
@wr(u)
@tw
= 0;
@wr(u)
@tp
< 0
So tp # implies wi=P ", and wr(u) " so u # as before. But tw " now implies wi=P ", and no change in
wr(u), which leaves u unchanged. And, as before, tw has the stronger effect (although we don't need that).
This time u falls unambiguously.
In other words, there is a demand side effect here despite the neutral budget changes,
and the distribution of the burden of taxation matters a great deal. This result therefore
rationalizes what the Scandinavians call their exicurity approach to scal reform.
Comment: This example conrms a widely accepted premise that structural reforms
(an easing of business taxes in this case) would be benecial in the long run; but would
induce short run costs, both in terms of economic performance (indicated here by the
increase in the short run unemployment rate) and in their political implications. This short
run-long run conict has been made all the sharper by the presence of the budget restraint
and that in itself might be enough to block the reform efforts altogether. But the long
term effects are entirely positive, as indicated by the falling unemployment. The question
therefore is whether the discounted long run benets will outweigh the short run costs.
To make that determination, we need a model with explicit dynamics. That is a topic for
further research. At this point we have only a comparative statics answer to that question.
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2.3 Unemployment, the Natural Rate and the Phillips Curve
The next step is to consider how structural reforms affect unemployment.
For a decade now, economists have been arguing that the traditional Phillips curve
has become atter or has shifted its position, and they have offered a remarkable variety
of explanations for why this might happen. It could be the result of transnational wage
bargaining; or the effect of locational competition and globalization on the slope and po-
sition of the Phillips curve (Demertzis and Hughes Hallett, 1998; Bean, 2006; Pain et al.,
2006). Or, as Razin and Binyamini (2007) show, it could be the result of trade, increased
competition and migration as product markets integrate. But equally it could be the re-
sult of reduced market frictions (Smets and Wouters, 2007); or of greater credibility and
effectiveness in monetary policy (Roberts 2006, Boivin and Giannoni, 2006), especially
as expectations become anchored (Williams, 2006). The next obvious question is: could
structural reforms not have a similar attening or shifting effect on the Phillips curve? In
this section, we nd that slope changes in the Phillips curve could be the result of reducing
business taxes, or wage taxes if the price margins of the imperfectly competitive rms are
sufciently sensitive. By contrast, reducing wage bargaining power, or employment pro-
tection, or hiring and ring costs, have little effect on the slope as opposed to the position
of the Phillips curve.
To summarise what we have so far:
In the short run: Proposition 1 does not extend to reservation wages or unemployment
since  is invariant to  in the short term: @wr=@ = 0 in (2.19). But wr and u do
change with both tax rates. Proposition 3 implies that short term unemployment will rise
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with both kinds of taxes, but more so with wage taxes than business taxes. These are the
reforms which could be used to improve the short run Phillips curve trade-off.
In the long run: Section 2.2.4 shows that wr and u change with , when the latter starts
to change with the entry of new rms. So taxes, competition policy and labour market
deregulation will all affect unemployment in the long run. Proposition 7 shows that uN
is unaffected by wage taxes tw, but increases with business taxes tp. Proposition 5 shows
that uN is also increasing in labour's bargaining power . These are structural reforms that
inuence the natural rate of unemployment by shifting the long run Phillips curve to the
left and to a lower uN value. Changing  will have the same effect.
Product market liberalisation: It is open to the government to increase  by increasing 
through competition policy or market deregulation. In that case the following hold:
@
@
=
 (1 + tp)
(   1)2(1  tw) < 0 from (2:17)
and
@wr
@
=
1
2(1 + tp)
> 0 using (2:27); (2:24); (2:17):
Thus, unemployment will fall in the short run if either tax rate is reduced: but by more
if wage taxes fall. It also falls if competition policy, , is applied more vigorously (recall
that the government cannot affect the f(m) component of  in the short run). And in the
long run, unemployment will fall with deregulation in the labour markets, ; with business
taxes tp (but not wage taxes); and with market liberalisation .
The Effects on the Phillips Curve and the Natural Rate of Unemployment: How
does this affect unemployment and its natural rate? In this standard framework, three
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things can happen. The slope of the short run Phillips curve's might change or be attened;
or the curve might be displaced downwards; or the (vertical) long run curve might shift to
the left.
The rst possibility implies an improvement in the short run Phillips curve trade off:
the inationary implications of any expansionary policy or events are reduced, even if the
unemployment consequences of a monetary contraction become more severe. The second
and third possibilities imply short and long run gains in that any given rate of monetary
expansion/ination will generate lower rates of unemployment in both the short and long
run. Conversely, targeting a lower rate of unemployment would trigger less ination in
the short run; and also in the long run if that the underlying rate of monetary expansion is
reduced at the same time.
The implications of structural reform for the natural rate of unemployment and the
Phillips curve are now clear. In the short term, the slope of the Phillips curve is given
by d _P=du where _P denotes the rate of price ination. Since _P is not determined in the
model, we will assume the underlying rate of monetary growth remains constant: _m say.
Then _P = _+ _m; and the mark-up falls with either tax rate, or if  increases. But the mark-
up can only change while the tax rates or  are changing. Thus there will be a temporary
decrease in ination while the reforms are being introduced. Thereafter it reverts to its
previous level.
Now to determine du. Notice that du = (du=dwr)=dwr=dx where x can be tp; tw
or  depending on the reform type chosen. Notice also that du=dwr is independent of the
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reform measure. Using the expressions above, (2.19) and (2.18), we nd:
@wr
@tp
=
 1
(1 + )2

(   1)(1  tw) ;
@wr
@tw
=
 1
(1 + )2
(1 + tp)
(   1)(1  tw)2 ;
or
@wr
@
=
f(m)
2(1 + tp)
respectively. Consequently du will become larger (in absolute value) if tp is reduced since
 has become smaller and the rest remains unchanged. Similarly du will become smaller
if  is increased. But, and by contrast, du will become either larger or smaller if tw is
reduced, depending on whether the  effect (larger) or the tw effect (smaller) turns out to
dominate.
Overall then, a temporary attening effect on the short run Phillips curve is possible.
But after that it is hard to make a general statement because the outcome depends on the
reform instrument used. If business taxes are lowered, the short run Phillips curve gets
atter unambiguously. If competition policy is increased, it gets steeper. And if wage
taxes are reduced, the outcome is ambiguous and will vary from economy to economy.
Meanwhile the wage bargaining arrangements have no short run effect.
In the longer term, the effect of these market based reforms is straight forward. A
reduction in either tax rate will reduce the natural rate of unemployment, both shifting the
short run Phillips curve down and shifting the long run curve to the left. At the same time,
the short run curve will be attened if the instrument is business taxes; possibly also if it
is wage taxes. And it will certainly be steeper if competition policy is used. In addition,
deregulating wage bargains and also the dynamic effects of the measures cited above will
reduce the natural rate by shifting the long run curve to the left.
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Sensitivity and Robustness: From (2.30) we can infer that uN will improve under
lower business taxes by more in those countries where tp is low, or where c is low or  large;
that is in countries that already have low business taxes, low entry costs and competitive
product markets. So it is the deregulated economies which have most to lose from a lack of
reform; and who would gain the most, at least in employment, from a reform of business
taxes. Trade union or wage bargaining power plays no role in that comparison.
Similarly, starting from (2.29), deregulating the labour market will reduce uN by
more in those countries with competitive goods markets, but strong wage bargaining power
or regulated labour markets: entry costs do not play a role in this comparison. Lastly, lib-
eralising the product markets will have a greater effect in reducing uN in those economies
where competition or taxes of either kind are low.
2.4 Which Reforms Will be Most Effective?
a) From a Welfare Perspective: It is natural to ask which reform strategy would be the
most effective in terms of increasing the number of goods and employment in an economy.
We dene effective to mean getting the mark-up or acceptable cost of entry to fall as taxes,
or labour and product market regulation falls because, if a measure is effective in that
sense, then it will raise real wages and the reservation wage at the same time (by (2.27)
and (2.28)). That implies an increase in welfare and a decrease in unemployment. Hence
one way to determine which reforms are most effective is to determine which instrument
has the largest impact on real wages and welfare.
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From Corollary 3, we already know that a reform of wage taxes, tw, will be the
more effective of the two tax instruments. We also know that deregulation of the product
markets will be better than tax reform if ( 1) < 1 tw; from which we can calculate the
maximum value of , max, such that market liberalisation would be the preferred option,
given the tax rate on wages. Following a similar approach, we can compare the size of the
partial derivatives of wi=P with respect to ,  and tw to determine the thresholds for the
most efcient instrument. After some algebra, this yields:
Corollary 4 (a) Product market liberalisation is more effective (welfare enhancing)
as a reform programme than deregulating the labour market if
 < 1 +
p
(1  )(1  tw)  tw  2; (2.33)
or if  > 1 + 1= where  is the measure of tax distortion dened in Section 2.2.
(b) Labour market deregulation is more effective than tax reform if
tw < (1  )(   1)= (2.34)
Proof. Compare @(wi=P )=@, @(wi=P )=@ and @(wi=P )=@tw in absolute size.
Corollaries 3 and 4 therefore provide a set of simple sufcient conditions to assess
the relative efciency of each type of reform programme, each condition being expressed
as the maximum  value that can hold if the given instrument is to be more effective for
increasing welfare.
b) From an Employment Perspective: The corresponding results for which reform
strategy is most effective for reducing unemployment are rather different. Because the
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structural and institutional reforms that affect employment take some time, we will only
consider the long run consequences of the different measures on uN . We also only consider
the case in which the relationship betweenwr and u is not changed: so the source of reform
does not alter the relationship between reservation wages and the rate of unemployment.
That may not always be true, but the results easily generalise.
From Proposition 7, business taxes tp are clearly a more effective reform instrument
than wage taxes tw as far as employment generation is concerned. Given that, we have:
Corollary 5 (a)Product market reforms are more effective than business tax reforms
as an instrument for generating employment if
 <
n
1 +
p
1 + 4	
o
=2 where 	 = (1 + tp)=(1  tw)2 (2.35)
(b) But business tax reforms are more effective for generating employment than labour
market deregulation if
 < (2 + tp)=(1 + tp) (2.36)
(c) Liberalising product markets is more effective than deregulating labour markets if
 < (1  )
p
(1  tw)=c (2.37)
Proof. Compare @wr=@tp, @wr=@ and @wr=@ in absolute size, using the results of
Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5. Note that (2.35) and (2.36) are sufcient conditions.
There is a clear ranking here if  is small. In the long run, unemployment is best
reduced and employment generated by liberalising the product markets; then by reducing
business taxes; and nally by deregulating the labour markets. That is for economies
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with imperfectly competitive markets. Reducing wage taxes would have no effect, either
positive or negative, except as a short term measure.
But in economies with competitive markets, the ranking will become reversed: dereg-
ulating the labour markets will be most effective, then reforming business taxes, and then
product market liberalisation.
Evidently the inequalities in (2.35), (2.36) and (2.37) are the crucial terms for deter-
mining which ranking applies in practice. It seems likely that the second ranking will apply
to the developed economies since, even with tax rates as high as tw = 0:5 and tp = 0:5,
and with unit entry costs as low as c = 0:1, the upper bounds on  will remain below 2 or
3. And that is what the data in our sample of OECD/EU economies shows (Table 2.4).
Corollary 6 The reform measures that are effective for reducing unemployment (gen-
erating employment) will, in general, be different from those that are most effective for in-
creasing welfare.
Proof. Compare Corollaries 5 and 4; they produce different rankings by effectiveness
for each objective, except for when  is very small.
Thus in core Europe, and in contrast to the welfare comparisons, the effective re-
forms for job creation will lie in deregulating the labour markets; then in reduced business
taxes; and then in market liberalisation. Could Mrs. Thatcher have been right after all?
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2.5 Empirical Results
To evaluate the practical signicance of our results, we have used the OECD's Tax Data
Base and unemployment gures from the OECD'sMain Economic Indicators. The former
supplies tw and tp dened as all in average tax rates on manufacturing wages and cor-
porate incomes, inclusive of social security contributions; the latter, unemployment rates
on a standard denition27. For the remaining parameters, we set  (the wage bargaining
parameter) at 0:25, being the mid-range estimate from the Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991) study, and then consider  = 0 and  = 0:5  decentralised and centralised wage
bargaining respectively  as alternatives.
Finally, and perhaps more controversially, we set  at 3:5 for the short run substi-
tutability between products28, and  = 10 for the long run substitutability. These gures
are based on the few within-period product substitutability studies in the literature and may
be compared to  =1 for perfectly competitive markets29. All data are for 2005.
Table 2.2 records the tax and price distortions, as they stood in 2005, for the 24
OECD economies and the EU as a whole. There is considerable variation, but three fea-
tures stand out.
27 The OECD gures agree with Eurostat's ESA95 data, except that the latter does not separate employer
from employee social security contributions. As a result, we don't have consistent data for the smaller
states of the EU (Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia) who are not yet members of the
OECD. Splitting those contributions 50-50 between employers and employees gives us rough estimates
of the gures in Tables 2.2 to 2.4 for those countries. Their gures are available on request.
28 We impose  = 3:5 to give a 20% mark-up on average, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
29 Ogaki and Reinhart (1998a,b) suggest 2:9   3:9 for the US, while developing countries have lower
gures which again suggests 2:9 3:9 would be about right for the OECD economies. Ravn et al. (2004)
prefer 2:0; Papadaki et al (2004) 3:0 5:0; and Gali et al. (2003) calculate mark-ups which imply  = 3:3
for the EU. Long run gures correspond to the midpoint US estimates in Duca and VanHoose (2000).
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First, all of Europe suffers greater tax and price distortions than the US. Ireland is
an exception. But outside Europe, only Canada does. Similarly, core Europe (Belgium,
France, Italy, Germany, and Sweden in this instance) are noticeably more distorted than the
EU as a whole. And the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Finland come
close. In most cases European tax distortions and price distortions are equally serious.
But in the Netherlands, Poland, Finland and Denmark, it is the price distortions which are
more serious (implied by the high values of c, reecting above average mark-ups), while
tax distortions are more serious in France and Italy. There is therefore a small vs. large
economy distinction in terms of competitive markets.
Second, countries can be grouped by the strength of their overall market distortions:
(i) Core Europe: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy Sweden and the EU-25 ( > 1:5).
(ii) The Hapsburgs: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Netherlands,
Austria, Denmark (1:5 >  > 1:35)30.
(iii) Periphery Europe: Greece, Spain, Norway, Portugal (1:35 >  > 1:07)
(iv) The Anglo-Saxons: the US, the UK, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia where
1:07 >  > 0:95; and
(v) Recovery Economies: Japan, Ireland ( < 0:95). The smaller transition economies
(not shown here) also t into this group.
This grouping, while arbitrary, remains unchanged for different values of  and .
30 With surprisingly little violence to history: the Netherlands was under Hapsburg rule for a limited
period, and Poland only partly, but Finland and Denmark never were.
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Table 2.2. Price and Tax Distortions, by Country, with  = 0:25;  = 3:5 and Variations
Country
tax distortion:  = 0:25  = 3:5  = 0:25  = 10:0  = 0:25  =1
 =
tw+tp
1 tw
price distortiton price distortiton price distortiton
    c     c     c
Belgium 1:183 2:050 0:873 0:431 1:426 0:243 0:348 1:183 0 0:304
Germany 1:032 1:845 0:813 0:431 1:258 0:226 0:348 1:032 0 0:304
France 0:899 1:659 0:760 0:357 1:110 0:211 0:355 0:899 0 0:273
Italy 1:018 1:825 0:807 0:363 1:242 0:224 0:263 1:018 0 0:208
Netherlands 0:773 1:482 0:709 0:399 0:970 0:197 0:307 0:773 0 0:258
Austria 0:708 1:391 0:683 0:368 0:898 0:190 0:269 0:708 0 0:216
Spain 0:612 1:257 0:645 0:316 0:791 0:179 0:203 0:612 0 0:176
Ireland 0:314 0:840 0:526 0:298 0:460 0:146 0:181 0:314 0 0:119
Portugal 0:484 1:078 0:594 0:303 0:649 0:165 0:187 0:484 0 0:124
Finland 0:779 1:491 0:712 0:377 0:977 0:198 0:280 0:779 0 0:303
Greece 0:536 1:150 0:614 0:303 0:696 0:170 0:184 0:536 0 0:125
Denmark 0:709 1:393 0:684 0:435 0:899 0:190 0:353 0:709 0 0:309
Sweden 0:923 1:692 0:769 0:380 1:137 0:214 0:284 0:923 0 0:232
UK 0:453 1:035 0:582 0:344 0:610 0:160 0:240 0:453 0 0:191
Czech Rep 0:774 1:484 0:709 0:342 0:971 0:197 0:236 0:774 0 0:179
Hungary 0:781 1:494 0:713 0:353 0:979 0:198 0:250 0:781 0 0:194
Poland 0:757 1:461 0:704 0:383 0:953 0:195 0:288 0:757 0 0:236
Slovakia 0:723 1:412 0:689 0:382 0:914 0:191 0:219 0:723 0 0:160
EU-25 0:811 1:535 0:724 0:376 1:014 0:201 0:279 0:811 0 0:226
US 0:421 0:989 0:568 0:343 0:573 0:158 0:238 0:421 0 0:182
Japan 0:362 0:907 0:544 0:308 0:513 0:151 0:192 0:362 0 0:131
Canada 0:477 1:067 0:590 0:347 0:641 0:164 0:242 0:477 0 0:185
Australia 0:400 0:960 0:560 0:344 0:556 0:156 0:239 0:400 0 0:182
Switzerland 0:405 0:966 0:561 0:326 0:561 0:156 0:216 0:405 0 0:154
Norway 0:584 1:219 0:638 0:368 0:761 0:176 0:269 0:584 0 0:215
Notes: a)  = 3:25 represents a consensus estimate of the average short run inter-product substitutability in the
advanced OECD economies, derived from the references given in the text. It corresponds to price mark-ups
which range from about 5% in the US or UK, to 55% in the EU-25, and 60% 85% in France, Germany or Italy.
 = 10 is a consensus estimate of the likely long run degree of within period substitutability, taken from esti-
mates for the US economy (Duca and van Hoose 2000, 2006). Finally,  = 1 represents perfect competition.
b) Further results for  = 0 and  = 0:5, representing decentralised and centralised wage bargaining respec-
tively, are available upon request. But those variations make little difference to our comparisons and are not
reported here.
Third, tax distortions are larger than price distortions in Belgium, the Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands Sweden, Austria, Finland, Poland,
Hungary and Slovakia. But price distortions are more important in Spain, Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, the UK and the non-EU economies. That may reect the size of the domestic
markets; but more likely a generally lower incidence of taxation.
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Tables 2.3 and 2.4 meanwhile give the upper bounds on , or the degree of competi-
tion in the markets, to show which different reform measures would be the most effective
for generating either welfare improvements or new employment opportunities.
In fact, Table 2.3 shows that tax reform is almost always the most effective instru-
ment for welfare purposes unless the labour market is very distorted. For the OECD and
EU members displayed in Table 2.3, we nd:
i) Product market liberalisation is more effective than tax reform if   1:5.
ii) Product market liberalisation is more effective than labour market deregulation
when   2 (if   0), or when   1:5 (if   0:25).
iii) Tax reform is better than labour market deregulation unless   1:3 (  0); or
unless   1:5 (when   0:25), and for  values above 4 or 5 if  = 0:5.
Thus tax reform is always the most effective type of reform unless  is very small,
which is unlikely in any of the advanced OECD economies31. An exception would be in
an economy with severe labour market distortions (  0:5). In that case, labour market
deregulation is likely to be the most effective instrument.
By contrast, Table 2.4 shows that market liberalisation will be the most effective
instrument for generating new employment, followed by business tax reforms, and then
labour market regulation  except in the case of core Europe (which, in this case, comprises
France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Czech
31 But governments are still free to use combinations of instruments to boost their reform packages.
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Table 2.3. Threshold Values for Policy Effectiveness for Improving Welfare, max val-
ues:
Country Market liberalisation betterthan tax reform if  <
max, for any  value
Market liberalisation beats
labour reform if  < max
Tax reform beats labour re-
form if  < max
a) b) c) a) b) c)
Belgium 1:42 2:00 1:20 never 1:68 2:17 5:26
Germany 1:54 2:00 1:68 never 1:20 1:28 1:50
France 1:49 2:00 1:53 never 1:36 1:55 2:15
Italy 1:49 2:00 1:51 never 1:39 1:59 2:25
Netherlands 1:45 2:00 1:38 never 1:50 1:85 3:21
Austria 1:48 2:00 1:49 never 1:40 1:62 2:36
Spain 1:53 2:00 1:65 never 1:23 1:34 1:61
Ireland 1:55 2:00 1:69 never 1:19 1:26 1:46
Portugal 1:54 2:00 1:68 never 1:20 1:28 1:50
Finland 1:47 2:00 1:47 never 1:43 1:68 2:54
Greece 1:54 2:00 1:68 never 1:20 1:28 1:50
Denmark 1:42 2:00 1:17 never 1:70 2:22 5:68
Sweden 1:47 2:00 1:45 never 1:45 1:70 2:63
UK 1:50 2:00 1:57 never 1:32 1:48 1:95
Czech Rep 1:51 2:00 1:57 never 1:31 1:47 1:92
Hungary 1:50 2:00 1:54 never 1:35 1:53 2:07
Poland 1:47 2:00 1:45 never 1:46 1:72 2:70
Slovakia 1:52 2:00 1:61 never 1:27 1:40 1:74
EU-25 1:47 2:00 1:47 never 1:43 1:67 2:52
US 1:50 2:00 1:57 never 1:32 1:48 1:94
Japan 1:54 2:00 1:45 never 1:21 1:30 1:53
Canada 1:50 2:00 1:56 never 1:33 1:49 1:98
Australia 1:50 2:00 1:57 never 1:32 1:48 1:94
Switzerland 1:52 2:00 1:62 never 1:26 1:39 1:72
Norway 1:48 2:00 1:50 never 1:40 1:62 2:35
Notes: a) with  = 0; b)  = 0:25; and c)  = 0:5 (never means max is complex).
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Table 2.4. Threshold Values for Policy Effectiveness in Lowering Unemployment,
max.
Country Tax reform is less effectivethan market liberalisation if
 < max, for any  value
Tax reform is more im-
portant than deregulating
labour markets if  < max,
for any  value
Market liberalisation beats deregu-
lating labour markets if  < max
a) b) c)
Belgium 2:48 19:81 1:18 never never
Germany 2:41 12:48 1:18 never never
France 2:19 4:85 1:43 1:08 never
Italy 2:24 5:60 1:41 1:06 never
Netherlands 2:22 5:55 1:28 never never
Austria 2:13 4:36 1:39 1:04 never
Spain 1:91 3:32 1:60 1:20 never
Ireland 1:84 2:65 1:68 1:26 never
Portugal 1:92 2:97 1:66 never never
Finland 2:17 4:86 1:36 1:02 never
Greece 1:94 3:06 1:66 1:24 never
Denmark 2:28 6:77 1:16 never never
Sweden 2:42 5:71 1:35 1:01 never
UK 1:97 3:25 1:48 1:11 never
Czech Rep 2:11 4:08 1:49 1:12 never
Hungary 2:13 3:13 1:45 1:14 never
Poland 1:92 4:93 1:34 never never
Slovakia 2:06 3:72 1:55 1:16 never
EU-25 2:19 4:99 1:36 1:02 never
US 1:96 3:17 1:48 1:12 never
Japan 1:89 2:79 1:64 1:23 never
Canada 1:99 3:33 1:47 1:10 never
Australia 1:95 3:12 1:48 1:11 never
Switzerland 1:92 2:99 1:56 1:17 never
Norway 2:07 3:90 1:39 1:04 never
Notes: a) with  = 0; b)  = 0:25; and c)  = 0:5; where never implies max < 1.
Republic and Poland) where labour market reform would be more important than lowering
business taxes.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
We have taken a standard model of the labour market in an economy with imperfect com-
petition in the product and labour markets, and extended it to allow for the endogenous
entry of rms, the implications for unemployment, distortionary taxation, and to show the
composition of the price mark-up. The main contributions have been to show how tax
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reforms can contribute to the reform process; how the composition of the price mark-up
determines the long run effects of structural reform; and how the effectiveness of differ-
ent reform instruments varies depending on whether welfare or employment creation is the
ultimate objective.
From the general equilibrium outcomes of this model, we nd:
a) There is a difference between the short run and long run consequences of reform.
The short run involves signicant costs or losses in employment and welfare, but the
long run effects are almost uniformly favourable. Structural reform programmes are
therefore likely to be avoided, or abandoned if undertaken, if policy makers become
sensitive to their short run costs.
b) Fiscal restraints, such as those imposed by Europe's Stability and Growth Pact,
exaggerate this effect and make it less likely that such reforms will be carried out.
c) The choice of reform instrument matters. Tax reforms tend to be most effective
for raising welfare; whereas labour market deregulation will be best for creating
employment if product markets are competitive, but product market liberalisation if
they are not. Thus reforms for welfare and for generating employment would not be
the same.
d) These instrument rankings are only intended to demonstrate comparative advantage
for different objectives. They do not rule out the possibility of creating optimal
reform packages for different objectives. But deregulating the labour market is only
effective where wage bargaining distortions are large.
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e) Business and wage taxes do not have the same effects on wages, output or
employment as is often assumed in the public nance literature32.
32 This result explains Prescott's (2004) claim that payroll taxes are the prime cause of poor growth and
high unemployment. This is true if business taxes are the only candidate for reform; but product/labour
market liberalisation would be better if employment generation and output growth is the objective.
Chapter 3
The Effects of Tax and Product Market
Reforms on Macroeconomic Performance
Product market regulation and labour market rigidities are widely blamed for the rel-
atively poor economic performance in Europe. As a result, structural reform has become
the leading economic policy issue in the European Union. Since the European Economies
appear to be less reformed and less exible than their American counterparts, efforts to re-
store economic performance vis-a-vis the US economy have been associated, in particular,
with the need for higher productivity, lower costs and more exible (or more competitive)
labour markets. In addition to the general institutional framework, particularly taxes, as
argued by Prescott (2004), are to be blamed for the relatively poor European economic per-
formance. Moreover, as documented by Stock and Watson (2005) the reduction in labour
and product market regulations are widely accepted to be an important component of the
reduction in the volatility of the business cycles.
In general, when designing reform policies, policy makers are constrained by various
trade-offs generated by a number of different objectives to be fullled. Those trade-offs
certainly depend on the institutional characteristics as well as on the equilibrium levels of
key macroeconomics variables. Specically, tax reform aimed at promoting employment
alters the long run level of some key macroeconomic variables, such as wages and output,
and changes the dynamic sensitivity of the economy to exogenous shocks. Furthermore, in
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the presence of a costly price setting mechanism, the effects of structural reforms on price
setting conditions affect the way in which real quantities uctuate.
Surprisingly, very little formal general equilibrium analysis has studied the effect
of either labour or product market reforms.33 Most of the papers analyze the effects of
the structural reforms either in a partial equilibrium setup characterized by certain real
labour market frictions, such as efciency wages or search and matching inefciencies,
but abstract from dynamic consequences, or in a dynamic general equilibrium setup with
Walrasian labour markets. The partial equilibrium setup obviously abstracts from general
equilibrium effects, whereas the peculiarity of the Walrasian market setup is the absence of
explicit modelling of employment choices, or in other words neglect of the extensive mar-
gin and thereby "real" or involuntary unemployment. Furthermore, even in this restricted
general equilibrium setup no papers have analyzed the effects of labour and product mar-
ket reforms on aggregate macroeconomic uctuations and hardly any papers have analyzed
the specic effects of the tax reforms.34
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we wish to analyze the effects of various
tax reforms on the labour market characteristics and overall economic performance. Since
the focus of most of the previous studies was the analysis of the effects of tax reforms solely
on the labour market behavior, we aim to investigate the effects of both the tax as well as
product market reforms on the labour markets as well as on the other macroeconomic
aggregates such as ination, consumption and output. Second, we analyze the effect of the
aforementioned reforms on aggregate uctuations.
33 Several notable and very recent exceptions are the papers Vanhalla (2006) and Zanetti (2009).
34 An exception is Coenen et.al. (2008).
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In order to fulll our goal we construct a New-Keynesian model characterized by im-
perfect competition and costly nominal price adjustment. We enrich the standard model by
introducing explicit scal and monetary considerations and most importantly replace the
assumption of Walrasian labour market with more realistic setup described by a matching
mechanism. This allows us to explicitly consider the effects of the reforms on employment
and on the dynamics of nominal as well as real variables.
Particular emphasis has been given to the quantication of the long run effects of the
labour market reforms originating in the specic tax structures. Specically, we focus on
long run effects of three tax instruments, notably the marginal wage tax rate, employers
social security contributions determining the payroll tax rate, and the degree of tax pro-
gression. How a specic tax reform, aiming to reduce the tax burden, will exactly affect
the labour market's characteristics and overall economic performance, crucially depends
on the prevailing characteristics of both labour and product markets determined by the
wage and price setting mechanism, but also on the way that the implied loses in govern-
ment revenues are nanced. We believe that the reasonably general model developed in
this paper, should provide us with the new insights regarding the effects of various tax and
product market reforms on the overall economic performance.
We conrm that in the context of a general equilibrium model with endogenous
job destruction, a widely held view that the reduction in the marginal tax distortions is
benecial both for the labour markets and the overall economic performance holds. This
is consistent with the results obtained in Coenen et al. although in the different setup with
Walrasian labour markets and without explicitly determined unemployment. In addition
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we nd that the increase in the product markets degree of competition is also benecial for
the labour market and the economy as a whole.
Furthermore, we nd that the increase in the degree of average tax progressivity is
benecial from the long run perspective for labour markets, consumption and output, re-
gardless of the initial progressivity level. The effects of the tax systems' progressivity have
already been analyzed in the literature, but mostly in the partial equilibrium setup. How-
ever, the existing literature is all but conclusive on its effects. Thus, Koskela and Vilmunen
(1996) nd that the increase in the degree of progressivity increases employment but re-
duces wages. Pissarides (1998) also nds a positive effect of the increase in progressivity
on employment when wages are determined by bargaining. Sinko (2005) generalizes the
Pissarides setup by endogenizing job destruction and obtains similar results. Furthermore,
Vanhala (2006) identies the dependence of the tax progression effect on the initial de-
gree of progression in the context of a general equilibrium model with matching frictions.
All of the aforementioned papers consider revenue neutral tax reforms such that tax instru-
ment pairs are changed correspondingly so to keep the government's budget balanced in
each period. In our setup we depart from this type of analysis justied by the fact that it is
unrealistic to expect the policy maker to have all of the necessary information needed to de-
termine the complex effects of the tax change on the tax base, such that the corresponding
tax instrument could be easily adjusted in order to keep the government budget balanced.
In our setup the implied changes in government revenues are nanced by the adjustment
of lump sum transfers (taxes) so to keep the calibrated government spending-to-GDP and
debt-to-GDP ratio unchanged in the steady state.
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Regarding the dynamic implications of the aforementioned reforms we nd that each
reduction in the particular marginal tax instrument leads to a decrease in the volatility of
output, consumption and employment. On the other hand, the increase in the degree of
tax progression generates the same results. Following a positive technology shock the
response of ination in a reformed economy is relatively large only on impact, whereas
following a positive government spending shock the ination response in the reformed
economy is larger along the whole adjustment path. These results hold for both the tax as
well as for the product market reforms although they work through different channels.
Recently, several OECD countries have reduced payroll taxes, while because of bud-
getary considerations, increasing the wage tax rate. We complete the analysis by consid-
ering a specic reform which implements a reduction in the payroll tax rate with a corre-
sponding increase in the wage tax rate, such that the marginal tax wedge remains constant.
In addition, we retain the assumption of lump sum transfers adjustment such that the gov-
ernment spending and debt to GDP ratios are consistent with the Maastricht convergence
criteria. Our results indicate that this type of reform would be detrimental for labour mar-
kets and the overall economic performance in the long run, since the negative effects of the
wage tax increase offset the positive effects of the reduction in the payroll tax rate for rea-
sonable calibration of our model. This result runs counter to those obtained in Heijdra and
Ligthart (2009) and call into question the conventional view of the payroll tax cut. Fur-
thermore, our results are consistent with empirical studies, such as Gruber (1997), Bauer
and Riphahn (2000), which suggest small or negligible effects of the payroll tax cuts on
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the employment. Finally, we show that if such reform is anticipated one period in advance
short run positive effect are also absent.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we detail the descrip-
tion of our model. Section 3.2 identies potential channels throughout which the tax and
product market reforms might impact the economic behavior. In Section 3.3, we dene
the functional forms and describe the calibration exercise. The long run effects of vari-
ous reforms are analyzed in Section 3.4, whereas the dynamic responses are considered
in Section 3.5. Long run effects of specic tax reform with the corresponding transition
dynamics are described in Section 3.6 and the Section 3.7 concludes.
3.1 The Model Economy
Extending the approach developed in Walsh (2005), Trigari (2009) and Lubik and Krause
(2007) we develop a NewKeynesian model characterized by numerous frictions in both the
labour and product markets. Broadly speaking, we depart from the widely adopted Wal-
rasian labour market assumption and introduce labour market frictions in the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) style, through application of the search and matching mechanism.
Furthermore, frictions in the product markets are modelled by introducing the monopolis-
tic competition in a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) fashion. In this section we describe our model
economy by specifying tastes, technology and the behavior in the labour markets, and de-
rive the agents optimal decision rules. After the decision rules are obtained we solve for
the steady state of the economy and linearize our model around the obtained steady state.
Following the calibration we consider the effects of various shocks.
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3.1.1 Households
Following Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1997) we assume continuum of innitely lived
families  of mass one populating our model economy. The families are assumed to be
uniformly distributed over unit interval and to have the ability to perfectly insure each
member against the potential uctuations in its income. This assumption, which effec-
tively introduces complete consumption insurance among the family members, is needed
to avoid potential distributional complications arising from agent heterogeneity. As a re-
sult, the equality of the marginal utility of wealth and consumption of the ex ante identical
consumers implies ex post equal consumption, and allows us to set up the problem in terms
of the representative family construct and ignore the index  denoting the family type.
Specically, every family consists of the workers employed across various rms as
well as of the unemployed workers representing population at large. Moreover, all families
have identical preferences over real consumption bundle Ct and real money balances MtPt ,
where Mt denotes nominal money holdings and Pt stands for the aggregate price level.
We also assume that the families form the habits over real consumption bundle and de-
scribe preferences by discount factor  and utility functions U(Ct; Ht) and (MtPt ), where
Ht denotes the habit stock. For simplicity, we consider simple time additive and non-
persistent habit specication proposed by Abbel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell
and Cochrane (1999), familiar as the "external" habits. In this case, habit stocks are pro-
portional to the aggregate consumption in the last period Ct 1 which denes Ht as hCt 1
To determine optimal decision regarding consumption bundle Ct, nominal money
Mt and bonds Bt holdings, representative family pools its members income and maxi-
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mizes expected present discounted value of a lifetime utility. Formally, the maximization
problem reads as:
max
fCt;Mt;Btg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t

U(Ct; Ht) + (
Mt
Pt
)

(3.1)
subject to budget constraint dened in real terms as
Ct +
Mt
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
= (1  w)Wt + Mt 1
Pt
+Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+ b(h;w)ut +t   Lt (3.2)
Wt stands for aggregate wage obtained by the representative family which will be
precisely dened in what follows whereas w denotes wage tax rate paid by employed
family members. Rt is the gross one period nominal risk-free interest rate paid to the
bond holders at the beginning of the period t and b(h;w)ut is the aggregate unemployment
income received by the unemployed family members ut such that b(h;w) > 0. Beside
wage, assets and unemployment income, representative family receives aggregate prots
t based on the diversied ownership stake in the rms. Moreover, the representative
family also receives pure government transfers (taxes) in a lump sum fashion which we
denote by  t. In what follows we abstract from participation decisions and assume that the
representative family's labour is supplied inelastically and normalize the labour force to
one.
As is standard in a Dixit-Stiglitz set up, the consumption bundle is represented by
the CES aggregate of the differentiated products
Ct =
Z 1
0
cit
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
(3.3)
where " > 1 denotes elasticity of substitution of various types of goods indexed by
i 2 [0; 1]. When optimizing, the representative family proceeds in two steps. First it
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determines the optimal demand schedules for every single type of differentiated product
by minimizing the costs of bundle purchases
min
cit
Z 1
0
pitcitdi := PtCt (3.4)
subject to (3.3) where cit denotes consumption level of the single differentiated product of
type i. Solution of the previous minimization problem results in a demand function for the
single product variety given by:
cit =

pit
Pt
 "
Ct (3.5)
where the aggregate price index Pt is such that the expenditures are at the minimum pos-
sible level, and is dened as:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pit
1 "di
 1
1 "
(3.6)
After determining optimal demand for the single product variety, the representative
family maximizes aggregate utility, which provides us with following rst order conditions
for aggregate consumption bundle and real money balances:
UC(Ct; Ht) = RtEt

UC(Ct+1; Ht+1)
Pt
Pt+1

(3.7)
M
P
(
Mt
Pt
) =
Rt   1
Rt
UC(Ct; Ht) (3.8)
The optimal behavior of the representative family is fully summarized by equations (3.7)
and (3.8). The former equation represents standard Euler condition which describes op-
timal intertemporal allocation of the consumption and also denes asset pricing kernel,
or stochastic discount factor, which will be subsequently used in the producer optimiza-
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tion problem. The latter condition is the standard money in utility models' solution for the
money demand equation.
3.1.2 Vacancies, Unemployment and Frictional Labour Market
We postulate the existence of a continuum of workers (jobs) j and rms i, each of measure
one. Aggregate output of every rm i depends on aggregate productivity At as well as on
the job specic productivity denoted by ai;j;t. This job specic productivity is a random
variable whose particular realization is drawn every period from a stationary distribution
described by a cumulative distribution function F (a), whose support lies in the [a; a] inter-
val. Each rm i employ in aggregate ni;t workers every period and posts vi;t vacancies. As
already stated, we model frictional labour markets, where the reduced form representation
of the labour market frictions is obtained by employing the concept of the matching func-
tion. In a general form, the aggregate matching function Mt;t+1  m(ut; vt) determines
the aggregate ow of new matches in the next period and it is a function of this periods'
aggregate number of unemployed or searching workers ut, and the total number of posted
vacancies vt =
1Z
0
vi;tdi. It will be concave, continuously differentiable, homogenous of
degree one and characterized by constant returns to scale. Moreover, it will satisfy the
following two properties:
@m(ut; vt)
@ut
> 0 and
@m(ut; vt)
@vt
> 0 (3.9)
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale two meeting rates, dened by the
probability of a worker nding a job and a rm lling in a vacancy in the next period,
depend only on the labour market tightness. Assuming that each rm is sufciently large
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the probability of a rm lling in a vacancy in the next period is given by:
q(t) =
m(ut; vt)
vt
= m
 
 1t ; 1

(3.10)
Similarly, the probability of a worker nding a job next period is dened as:
tq(t) =
m(ut; vt)
ut
= m (1; t) (3.11)
where t = vtut denes the labour market tightness. One can easily establish that the prob-
ability of a rm lling in a vacancy will be decreasing, whereas the probability of worker
nding a position will be increasing, function of labour market tightness. It is worthwhile
pointing out that both the workers and the rms take t as given when determining optimal
decisions.
The dependence of output on the jobs' specic productivity implies that individual
jobs will be endogenously destroyed if the jobs' specic productivity falls below the en-
dogenously determined threshold ~ai;t. We can therefore dene the endogenous probability
of destruction as ni;t = F (~ai;t). Consistently with the search and matching literature we
will assume that a constant fraction x of all the destroyed jobs i;t in the rm i is ex-
ogenously destroyed every period. Within this endogenous job destruction framework,
uctuations in unemployment will be the result of both the cyclical variations in hiring
in addition to the variations in the separations which are determined by the threshold ~ai;t.
Combining the previous denitions we can dene the total separation rate in the rm i as:
i;t  (~ai;t) = x + (1  x)F (~ai;t) (3.12)
It is important to point out that our matching function specication is characterized by the
implicit assumption of "time to hire". In other words we assume that the new hires do
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not become immediately operational. Intuitively, this assumption can easily be justied
on the grounds that there is usually some time needed to nd and train workers in order to
become fully productive. Moreover, we will assume that if the rm i posts vi;t vacancies, it
can expect to hire vi;t m(ut;vt)vt additional workers, which makes rm's i number of matches
proportional to the ratio of its vacancies to total number of vacancies posted such that
vi;t
m(ut;vt)
vt
= vi;tg(t). This assumption results in the following equation determining the
evolution of the employment at the rms level:
ni;t = (1  i;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1)) (3.13)
where the g(t)vi;t determines the inow of the new hires at the rm i:
3.1.3 The Firms
Each variety of good i is produced by a monopolistically competitive rm whose produc-
tion function is given by:
Yi;t = ni;tAt
aZ
~ai;t
ai;t
f(ai;t)
1  F (~at)dai;t = ni;tAtH(~ai;t) (3.14)
where H(~ai;t) denes the expected value of the idiosyncratic productivity ai;t. Evidently,
this function denes a constant returns to scale production technology that uses labour as
the sole input. As stated in the introduction one of our objectives is to analyze the effects
of a potential tax reform on economic performance. In order to accomplish our task we
introduce two types of distortionary taxes into the analysis in addition to the lump sum
transfers (taxes) entering the households aggregate resource constraint. More specically
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we assume that the rms bear the burden of the payroll tax  f whereas workers are sub-
jected to the wage tax w payments.35
Beside the incurred payroll tax and in addition to the costs corresponding to the to-
tal wage bill, we subject the rms to three additional explicit costs. First, as is standard
in the search-matching literature we assume that in order to open the vacancies the rms
incur certain vacancy posting costs. Second, in order to give the model New-Keynesian
avour, we assume that the rms bare a burden of price adjustment costs. As in Rotemberg
(1983) rms are assumed to face the quadratic adjustment costs of adjusting the nominal
price from the steady state ination . Expressed in terms of produced goods, the cost
function is given by t = 	2

Pi;t
Pi;t 1
  
2
Yt with parameter 	 > 0 determining the de-
gree of price rigidity. We have opted for the Rotemberg(1983) pricing as an alternative to
the widely used Calvo (1984) pricing scheme for the following two reasons. First, Calvo
price-setting mechanism results in the price dispersion among the rms, while Rotemberg
mechanism is consistent with the symmetric equilibrium which we subsequently consider.
All else equal, they both result in the same New-Keynesian Phillips curve and therefore
the implied dynamics of those two price setting mechanisms up to the rst order approx-
imation are equivalent. Second, Rotemberg's price setting mechanism implicitly assumes
that consumers prefer series of small price changes over a single large price change, which
is in line with empirical evidence recently reported in Chen et al. (2008).
Finally, we distort our model economy by imposing ring costs on the rms side.
As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) we assume that when the job
35 The payroll tax is equivalent to the social security contributions payed by the employer, and we will
therefore interchangably use the two terms in rest of the chapter.
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is destroyed the rms need to pay a xed cost D per worker being laid off. In practice,
this ring cost can be thought of as an implicit or shadow ring tax imposed on rms
by various legislative employment protection regulations. It mimics the effect of various
contractual obligations imposed by the government which distorts the rm ring process.
It is important to point out that this cost is not the severance payment going from the
rm to the worker, since such a transfer would have no allocative role as pointed out by
Lazear (1990) and Burda (1992). What is important for our analysis is that the ring costs
represent an additional policy instrument which can be used in the labour market reforms
programs.
When output Yi;t is produced it it sold to the families at the unit price Pi;t. Conse-
quently the rms' prot function reads as:
i;t =
Pi;t
Pt
Yi;t  Wi;t(1 +  f ) R(vi;t) i;t  t (3.15)
whereWi;t = ni;t
aZ
~ai;t
w(at)
f(at)
1 F (~at)dat is the total wage bill and R(vi;t) denotes the vacancy
posting cost function.36:
A rm's problem is to determine the optimal price of its product, the number of
vacancies, the number of employed workers, and the job destruction threshold by max-
imizing the expected present discounted value of the future prot stream subject to the
demand function (3.5), the employment evolution equation (3.13) and the production func-
36 It is important to point out that the wage bill dened in this way is the conseqence of different pro-
ductivities characterizing the individual jobs. This requires the total wage bill to be different from the
case in which all of the jobs have same productivity. In the latter case the total wage bill would simply
be equal to wtni;t:
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tion (3.14). Formally, each rm solves the following optimisation problem:
max
fni;t;vi;r;Pi;t;~ai;t;g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
Q0;ti;t (3.16)
subject to
Yit =

pit
Pt
 "
Yt (3.17)
ni;t = (1  i;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1)) (3.18)
Yi;t = ni;tAtH(~ai;t) (3.19)
t = (1  x)F (~ai;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1))D (3.20)
As a consequence of the assumed diversied ownership by families of the rms, the
rms discounts the revenues at the marginal utility of consumption UC(Ct;Ht)
UC(C0;H0)
. We dene
Q0;t = 
t UC(Ct;Ht)
UC(C0;H0)
to be the rm's stochastic discount factor for the real payoffs. After
substituting (3.17) into (3.16) and denoting, respectively, the Lagrangian multipliers on
employment evolution equation (3.18) and (3.19) by i;t andmci;t we obtain the following
rst order conditions with respect to ni;t; vi;t; Pi;t and ~ai;t which are respectively given by:
Et

Qt;t+1(1  i;t+1)i;t+1

+mci;tAtH(~ai;t) (1+ f )@Wi;t
@ni;t
 EtQt;t+1(1 x)F (~ai;t+1)D = i;t
(3.21)
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
= Et

Qt;t+1(1  i;t+1)i;t+1
  EtQt;t+1(1  x)F (~ai;t+1)D (3.22)
(1  )

Pi;t
Pt
 "
1
Pi;t
Yt  	(t   ) 1
Pi;t 1
Yt + mci;t

Pi;t
Pt
 "
1
Pi;t
Yt
=  Et

Qt;t+1	(t+1   )t+1 1
Pi;t
Yt+1

(3.23)
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i;t
(~ai;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1)) + (1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
= mci;tni;tAtH
(~ai;t)  (1  x)F 0(~ai;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1))D (3.24)
Standard interpretation of a Lagrange multipliers as a constrained resource marginal
value implies that, in our framework, i;t is the current period (marginal) average value
of workers with different job specic productivities, whereas mci;t is the current period
marginal value of the additional unit of production, or equivalently the rms' real marginal
cost.
Job Creation and Job Destruction Conditions
It is worthwhile spending several sentences on the interpretation of the above condi-
tions. Condition (3.22) is the rst order condition for vacancy posting, which equates the
marginal cost of posting a vacancy and adding a new worker with its discounted marginal
benet. Substituting (3.22) into (3.21) and rearranging gives us the job creation condition
dened as:
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
= (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~ai;t+1))

R0(vi;t+1)
g(t+1)
+mci;t+1At+1H(~ai;t+1)

 (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~ai;t+1))

(1 +  f )
@Wi;t+1
@ni;t+1

+ F (~ai;t+1)D

(3.25)
This condition relates the expected cost of vacancy posting with the expected discounted
future value of the rm's surplus from the marginal worker dened as a sum of two parts.
The rst part, given bymci;t+1At+1H(~ai;t+1) (1+ f )@Wi;t+1@ni;t+1 , denotes the net earnings on
the margin and the second part, dened as R
0(vi;t+1)
g(t+1)
; represents the savings on the adjust-
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ment costs. Moreover, the presence of the ring costs extends the job creation condition
relative to the standard case. The intuition behind this result comes from the fact that if
the workers are laid off next period, the rm will bear the burden of this layoff which is
taken into account when discounting the future value of the rm's surplus. It is easy to
see that rms will post more vacancies if expected productivity rises since in this case the
right hand side of (3.25) will rise, which in turn requires the fall in g(t) in order for the
optimality condition (3.25) to hold. Thus, (3.10) implies that in order for q(t) to fall the
number of vacancies must rise.
As in the standard search-matching literature, for a job to be destroyed the cost of
laying off the worker must be equal to the benets of this layoff. Combining (3.12), (3.13)
and (3.24), we obtain the job destruction condition which is given by:
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAtH(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t
@ni;t
= mci;tAtH(~ai;t) mci;tAt~ai;t   (1  F (~ai;t))
ntF 0(~ai;t)
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
 D (3.26)
Intuitively, if ~ai;t rises it leads to job destruction, because the job now becomes unproduc-
tive and the rm loses current and expected future prots that would occur if the job is not
destroyed. This is represented by the lower term of the equation (3.26). The upper part of
(3.26) represents the benets from this job destruction taking into account the costs that
need to be paid when the job is destroyed. This is the direct consequence of the fact that
the increase in ~ai;t leads to the increase in the expected value of the productivity once the
unproductive jobs have been removed.
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Using (3.12) and applying Leibnitz integral rule to the denition of the wage bill
we can obtain expression for @Wi;t
@~ai;t
and @Wi;t
@ni;t
which when substituted into job destruction
condition (3.26) gives us implicit solution for the endogenous threshold value of the pro-
ductivity. This implicit value below which the existing jobs will be destroyed is given by
following condition :
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAt~ai;t   (1 +  f )wi;t(~ai;t) +D = 0 (3.27)
In what follows we will consider a symmetric equilibrium which allows us to remove
the subscript i: Dening ination as t =
Pi;t
Pi;t 1
and setting Pt = Pi;t we can rewrite the
rst order condition for optimal price determination (3.23) as
(1  ") 	(t   )t + "mct + Et

Qt;t+1	(t+1   )t+1Yt+1
Yt

= 0 (3.28)
This equations explicitly denes the dynamics of ination (or ination law of mo-
tion) as a function of the real marginal costmct and represents a non-linear Phillips curve
condition. As in the standard monopolistic competitive framework, a producer with market
power sets optimal prices as a markup over marginal cost, with the size of the markup de-
termined by the elasticity of demand. In our framework, as in the standard New-Keynesian
models with Walrasian labour markets, in the case of no deviation of ination from the
steady state t = , the Phillips curve condition (3.28) simply reduce to standard condi-
tion ofmc = " 1
"
, implying that the marginal cost in the steady state would be equal to the
inverse of the markup.
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3.1.4 Bellman Equations and Nash Bargaining
This section outlines the details of the functional equations dening the rm's and worker's
values of the specic categories. Specically, the marginal value of an employment rela-
tionship at time t for a rm with realized productivity at is given by:
Jet (at) = mctAtat   (1 +  f )w(at)
+EtQt;t+1
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
Jet+1(at+1)dF (a)  (1  x)F (~at+1)D + i;t+1Jut+1
35
(3.29)
The rst two terms on the RHS of the upper part denote the real revenues of the marginal
worker, whereas the second line of (3.29) represents the continuation value of the existing
job reduced for the present discounted value of the future dismissal costs. With probability
t+1 the existing job is destroyed and would therefore generate a zero value for the rm.
In a similar fashion we can dene the marginal value of a job for an employed worker
characterized by a realized productivity at as follows:
Wet (at) = (1 w)w(at) +EtQt;t+1
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
Wet+1(at+1)dF (a) + i;t+1Ut+1
35
(3.30)
Moreover, the marginal value of unemployment for a worker can be written as
Ut = b(h;w)
+EtQt;t+1
24tg(t) (1  x) aZ
~at+1
Wet+1(at+1)dF (a) + (1  tg(t)(1  i;t+1))Ut+1
35
(3.31)
3.1 The Model Economy 97
Equation (3.30) implies that the marginal value of a job for the employed worker
with realized productivity at equals to the obtained wage (determined by this realized pro-
ductivity) plus the continuation value. The continuation value is dened as the sum of two
parts with the rst part representing the present discounted expected value of the continua-
tion of the existing job, which occurs with the probability
 
1  i;t+1

, and the second part
represents the discounted marginal value of becoming unemployed, which occurs with the
probability t+1. The marginal value of unemployment equals the certain constant income
b(h;w) plus the continuation value which is the sum of expected revenue from becoming
employed, and the expected discounted revenue obtained if she remains unemployed. As
already stated b(h;w) represents the aggregate value of the unemployed workers' income.
More precisely, we assume that b(h;w) is the composite of the value that workers receive
from the government if unemployed, determined through the replacement ratio R, and the
value of its own home production h. The precise functional form of the unemployment in-
come will be specied later. The probability of getting out of unemployment is the product
of the probability of lling in a posted vacancy tg(t) and the probability of the new job
not being destroyed because of an unfavorable productivity realization.
The matching of the worker and a rm leads to the removal of the search and match-
ing costs. This in turn generates the joint surplus relative to the continued search process.
In the standard search and matching literature, following Diamond (1982) and Mortensen
(1982), the representative wage is derived from Nash bargaining over the division of the
surplus between the workers and the rm. However, the presence of taxes and ring costs
slightly modies the standard form of the Nash bargaining problem as well as the solution.
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The general problem of bargaining over wages in terms of Nash product maximization can
be stated as:
wt(at) = argmax (W
e
t (at) Ut) (Jet(at) +D)1  (3.32)
whereWet (at) Ut  Swt is the workers and Jet(at)+D  Sft is the rm's surplus from the
match that is not destroyed as a consequence of the unfavorable productivity realization. 
denotes the share of surplus going to the workers and equivalently represents the workers'
bargaining power. Obviously, in order for the match to be benecial for each party, both
the workers' and rms' surplus must be positive. In other words, if Swt > 0 and S
f
t > 0
the Nash bargaining problem admits a solution of the following form:37
Swt =
(1  w)
(1  )(1 +  f )S
f
t (3.33)
To proceed with the model's solution we use the fact that the rms will open va-
cancies as long as they exhaust all of the prots stemming from the open vacancies, or
equivalently as long as the value of the open vacancy goes to zero. Therefore, using (3.27)
and (3.29) allows us to write:
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
= EtQt;t+1(1  x)
24 aZ
~at+1
 
Jet+1(at+1) +D

dF (a) D
35 (3.34)
Substituting the sharing rule (3.33) into Swt and using (3.34) provides us with the equation
determining the real wage w(at)
w(at) = b(h;w)
(1  )
(1  w) + 
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mctArat + tR
0(vi;t)]
+
1
(1 +  f )
[D   (1  tg(t))EtQt;t+1 (1  x)D] (3.35)
37 Detailed derivation is presented in Appendix 3.A
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The obtained wage depends on the real marginal costs, aggregate productivity and vacancy
posting costs, as well as on the job specic productivity, labour market tightness and the
workers outside option b(h;w): Furthermore, it depends on both the wage and payroll
tax rate and the parameter  governing the degree of the progressivity of the tax system.
Average (expected) real wage can be obtained by using (3.35) and substituting it into wt =
aZ
~ai;t
w(at)
f(at)
1 F (~at)dat, to obtain
wt = b
(1  )
(1  w) + 
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mctArH(~at) + tR
0(vi;t)]
+
1
(1 +  f )
[D   (1  tg(t))EtQt;t+1 (1  x)D] (3.36)
In order for the job to be destroyed the marginal value of employment at time t for a rm
with the productivity realized at at must be less than or equal to zero (Jet 6 0) Therefore,
the threshold (reservation) value of the individual productivity (~at) below which the jobs
will be destroyed can be obtained by using (3.34), (3.35) and the condition Jet (~at) = 0 to
get
~at =
1
mctAt
" 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ ) +
1
1  R
0(vi;t)

t   1
g(t)
#
  1
mctAt

1 +

1   (1  tg(t))EtQt;t+1 (1  
x)

D (3.37)
The obtained reservation productivity solution is a function of aggregate productivity, real
marginal cost, unemployed workers' total income, vacancy posting costs as well as labour
market tightness, surplus share, ring costs and tax instruments. It is positively related to
the unemployed workers total income, the parameter governing the progressivity of the tax
system, vacancy posting costs and the tax instruments. However, it is negatively related
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to the real marginal costs and aggregate level of productivity whereas the effect of the
labour market tightness can not be uniquely determined. Specically, on the one hand the
increase in the labour market tightness positively affects hiring costs R
0(vi;t)
g(t)
as it reduces
the probability of a rm nding a match and therefore reduces threshold level of individual
productivity. On the other hand, the increase in the labour market tightness induces the
pressures on the rms to increase the wage in order to attract new workers. This in turn
leads to an increase in the reservation productivity level in order to compensate for the
necessary increase in wage. Moreover, the effect of the ring costs is also ambiguous since
the increase in the ring costs reduces reservation productivity which is a consequence
of today's savings effect. But at the same time the reservation productivity is increased
because of the future potential ring cost payments.
3.1.5 Taxes and Government
The enrichment of the model with proportional payroll wage and payroll tax rates and the
progressivity of the tax system requires detailed specication of the scal side. Follow-
ing Pissarides (1998) and Sinko (2005) we assume progressivity in the wage tax scheme,
whereas we abstract from the progressivity of the payroll tax system. 38 We introduce
progressive wage tax system by specifying a linear individual labour tax schedule of the
following form
Ti;t =  + 
ww(ai;t) (3.38)
38 Absence of the progressivity of the payroll tax system can easily be justied for most of the European
countries.
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determining the total tax payments of an employed worker. By setting w = 0 this tax
specication results in pure employment subsidy (tax) if a < 0 (a > 0). Alternatively if
 = 0 and w > 0 the specied tax system will be proportional. If both  < 0 and w > 0
the specied tax system will be progressive in a sense that average tax rate is an increasing
function of income.39 Using the denition of the tax schedule (3.38) we can dene the
after tax wage of a worker with idiosyncratic productivity ai;t as (1   w)w(ai;t)    .
Goverment's' pure wage tax revenues per worker are equal to ww(ai;t) +  :
As in Pissarides (2000) we assume the following functional form for the aggregate
unemployment income which is linear in the value of home production or leisure h, and
the policy determined replacement ratio b 2 (0; 1)
b(h;w) = h+ bw (3.39)
whereby we link unemployment income to the gross average steady state value of wage w.
To simplify our analysis we assume that ring costs are simply transferred to the govern-
ment and consider the consolidated government constraint. Furthermore, we will consider
tax policy that involves both distortionary and lump-sum taxation. Specically, on the
liabilities side, the government is assumed to print money holdings Mt, to issue one pe-
riod risk-free nominal bonds Bt and to transfer benet payments to the unemployed in the
amount given by bwut. The government's real revenues consist of tax receipts collected
from both a at (constant) wage and payroll taxes wand  f , endogenous lump-sum taxes
Lt , transfers from the rm stemming from the ring costsD and  , as well as from the real
39 We should also point out that our specication of the tax schedule implies the wage subsidies are
exempted from taxation.
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seigniorage revenues dened as Mt Mt 1
Pt
. This allows us to dene the total tax receipts TRt
as:
TRt = (
w +  f )wtnt + nt + 
L
t + (1  x)F (at)(nt 1 + vt 1q(t 1))D (3.40)
We also introduce the exogenous stream of real per capita government spending gt where gt
denotes Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate government consumption bundle dened as gt =
R 1
0
git
 1
 di
 
 1 .
Government demand for the single variety of the intermediate good i is obtained by solving
a cost minimization problem same as the one previously dened for the consumers, which
determines demand for the individual good i as git =

pit
Pt
 
gt. Thus, the government
ow budget constraint is dened by following expression:
TRt +
(Mt  Mt 1)
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
= gt +Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+ bwut (3.41)
For ease of exposition let us introduce several notational shortcuts. Let us rst dene
aggregate government spending by st = gt + bwut. Let us also denote real government
liabilities outstanding at the end of the period t  1 in terms of the units of t  1 goods as
dt 1
dt 1 =
(Mt 1 +Rt 1Bt 1)
Pt 1
(3.42)
Finally, let us denote by At = TRt   Lt government tax receipts plus receipts on the basis
of ring costs but exclusive of the lump-sum taxes Lt and let real money balances MtPt be
denoted by mt. This allows us to redene the real government budget constraint in terms
of real government debt and write the process governing government debt as follows:
dt
Rt
=
dt 1
t
+ (st   At)  Lt +mt
(1 Rt)
Rt
(3.43)
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We will consider Ricardian scal policy in the sense that the government runs the
policy which satises its present value budget constraint at each date and in each state
of nature. It is important to point out that this does not imply that government necessarily
needs to run balanced budget. More specically, we use a simple scal rule which assumes
that every period a certain fraction of the outstanding debt is repaid. This rules breaks
down the standard assumption of period by period zero net bond supply usually found in
the literature. Following Chadha and Nolan (2007) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007)
we specify the following simple parameterization of the process governing the lump-sum
taxes:
Lt = 
L
ss + (dt 1   dss) (3.44)
where Lss and dss denote steady state level of lump-sum taxes and government liabilities.
This rule ensures that the tax receipts are sufcient to meet part of the outstanding liabilities
stemming out from the bond and money issuance. When substituted back into (3.43) we
obtain the following sequential government budget constraint:
dt
Rt
= (1  t)dt 1
t
+ (st   At)  Lss + dss +
mt
Rt
(1 Rt) (3.45)
3.1.6 Monetary Policy
In order to close down the model we are required to specify the monetary policy reaction
function. As it is standard in the literature we assume that the monetary policy maker
operates a short term nominal interest rate rule. There are at least two reasons why this
type of rule is plausible. First, as shown in Taylor (1999) these rules are empirically a good
approximate characterization of the actual conduct of monetary policy in a wide range
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of developed countries. Second, Woodford (2003) shows that in models with nominal
rigidities and imperfect competition those rules improve upon the macroeconomic stability
of the model.
Following Taylor (1993), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2007) we assume that nominal interest rate is set according to Taylor-type rules of
the following form:
log

Rt
R

= r log

Rt 1
R

+ pi log
t


+ y log

Yt
Y

(3.46)
where bar denotes steady state value of the variable, r is a measure of the interest rate
persistence and pi and y denote respectively the impact of ination and output on the
short term nominal interest rate. Moreover by specifying this type of interest rate rule we
postulate in fact, that, every period the monetary policy authority is eliminating a fraction
(1  r) of the nominal interest rate deviation from its steady state value.
3.1.7 Aggregate Conditions and Equilibrium
We complete the description of the economy by dening the aggregate conditions. Ag-
gregating over individual rms' employment evolution conditions we can dene the cor-
responding aggregate as:
nt = (1  t)(nt 1 + vt 1g(t 1)) (3.47)
Since in our setup the number of searching workers is equal to the number of unemployed
workers, the normalization of the labour force implies that the aggregate unemployment
rate equals to 1   nt: Moreover, because the separation occurs as a consequence of the
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exogenous forces at work and the endogenous conditions determined by the threshold
productivity level, the aggregate separation rate will be equal to t = x + (1  x)F (~at):
Using households budget constraint, government budget constraint and rms prot func-
tion we obtain aggregate demand which reads as
Y Dt = Ct + gt +R(vt) + t (3.48)
whereas aggregate supply is given by:
Y St = ntAt
aZ
~at
at
f(at)
1  F (~at)dat (3.49)
We can now dene the competitive equilibrium. Since wages in our model are determined
in a Nash bargaining process we refer to our equilibrium as a competitive bargaining equi-
librium.
Denition 1 Bargaining symmetric equilibrium of a distorted competitive economy is
list of stochastic processes for prices fPtg1t=0 = fw(at); tg and quantities fQtg1t=0 =fQFAt g1t=0; fQFWt g1t=0	 where
fQFAg1t=0 = fCt; Bt;Mtg1t=0 (3.50)
fQFWt g1t=0 = fYt; nt; vt; atg1t=0 (3.51)
such that given the process for the nominal interest rate fRtg, exogenous process for
fAt; g and initial holdings B0 andM0, the following holds:
(i) given sequences of prices fPtg1t=0 an allocation fQFAg1t=0 solves the house-
hold maximization problem (3.1) subject to (3.2)
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(ii) an allocation fnt; vt; atg1t=0 and price sequence ftg1t=0 solves the rms max-
imisation problem (3.16) subject to (3.17),(3.18) and (3.19) and satisfy (3.25),(3.26)
and (3.28)
(iii) Law of motion determining the number employed is given by (3.47)
(v) wages fw(at)g1t=0 are determined by Nash bargaining and sastify (3.35)
(vi) (3.41) holds, markets clear and Y Dt = Y St
3.2 Labour Market Frictions and Reforms
Presence of imperfect competition allows us to analyze the effect of product market re-
forms by considering a change in the parameter determining the elasticity of substitution.
Change in this parameter can be thought of as a policy component whose increase could
represent some market liberalisation measure, or the deregulation of some market prac-
tice, or a reduction in some trade barrier (domestically or externally) which has the effect
of increasing product substitutability. The increase in the elasticity of substitution leads
to a reduction in the markup and therefore to a reduction in market power (because of
the increase in the similarity of the products produced) and therefore in the price charged
by each monopolistic competitor. It is important to notice that there is a difference in
the marginal costs obtained under the Walrasian labour market setup and the ones in the
search-matching framework as rst pointed out by Krause and Lubik (2007). Therefore,
when analyzing the impact of product market reforms this difference should be taken into
the account. To see this formally let us consider rst order conditions for ni;t and vi;t as
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given by (3.21) and (3.22). By rewriting those two conditions we obtain the expression for
the marginal cost in the search-matching framework given by:
mci;t =
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@ni;t
AtH(~ai;t)
+
i;t   R
0(vi;t)
g(t)
AtH(~ai;t)
(3.52)
It is evident that the marginal cost within this setup is a combination of two compo-
nents. The rst component represents the marginal product of each single worker which
is equivalent to the marginal costs in Walrasian markets. The second component, specic
to the search-matching framework, arises from the labour market frictions and depends on
the difference between average current value of the employee and the expected average
costs of vacancy posting. It should be noticed that this costs is equal to the present value
of the expected contribution of the worker producing in the next period, which in turn im-
plies the dependence of the current value of the marginal cost on the future expected value
of the match.
To see the effect of the change in the elasticity of substitution on the relative price
we can rearrange equation (3.23) and substitute (3.52) formci;t to get
Pi;t
Pt
= 
(")
0@(1 +  f )@Wi;t@ni;t
AtH(~ai;t)
+
i;t   R
0(vi;t)
g(t)
AtH(~ai;t)
1A (3.53)
where 
(") = "
" 1 measures the markup. It is immediate to notice that the increase in
the elasticity of substitution " leads to a reduction in relative prices. Moreover relative
prices depend on the wages which in turn depend on both present and expected future
characteristics of the labour market. Intuitively, hiring costs generate a surplus for existing
matches which results in a long-term employment relationship which reduces the allocative
role for current real wages. Thus, even if real wages do not change, the presence of hiring
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frictions might induce the change in real marginal costs corresponding to the effect pointed
out by Goodfriend and King (2001). Moreover, this also implies that the estimation of New
Keynesian Phillips curve typically done in the literature, by using the unit labour costs as a
proxy for marginal costs, are inadequate in the presence of search frictions and might result
in non trivial consequences for the markup estimation.40 Thus, there are complex forces
at work which propagate the effects of the product market reforms on labour markets and
overall economic performance.
Before considering the effects of various parameters describing labour market reg-
ulations let us rst detail the wage equation (3.36) determined by Nash bargaining. It is
easy to notice that the wage consists of two parts. Specically, one is solely determined
by labour market regulatory conditions whereas the second is determined by pure market
conditions in addition to two policy parameters, namely the payroll tax rate and the level
of ring costs. Furthermore, the size of the bargaining parameter determines the relative
importance of those two parts in the wage solution. The larger is the share of the part de-
termined by regulatory conditions relative to the size determined by market conditions, the
smaller is the wage absorption of the exogenous shocks and more rigid the wage. All else
equal, the more rigid the wage, the rms can use less the wage channel as an absorbing
mechanism and therefore the shock absorption needs to go through job protability condi-
tions, or equivalently through the job creation and job destruction margin. In other words,
all else equal, the more rigid the wages are the larger is the effect of the exogenous shocks
40 For detailes of the standard approach to Phillips curve estimation base on the labour share, see Clarida
et al. (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). For estimation which controls for the presence of
search frictions, see Krause et al. (2007).
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on the protability of jobs and thereby on the employment and vacancy posting. And this
importance of market component of the wage is determined by the bargaining power. More
formally, when bargaining power  goes to one wage becomes
wt =
1
(1 +  f )
[mctAtH(~at) + tR
0(vi;t)]
+
1
(1 +  f )
[D   (1  tg(t))EtQt;t+1 (1  x)D] (3.54)
which implies that the worker is getting all of the surplus and there is no effect of unem-
ployment benets and tax progression parameter on the wage. In the opposite case where
the bargaining power goes to zero the wage would be constant and given by
wt =
1
1  w (b(h;w) + )
implying that pure market conditions are irrelevant for the wage formation and the only
things that matter are policy determined level of benets as well as the marginal labour
tax rate and parameter governing the degree of tax progression. The whole surplus goes to
the rm and the effect of exogenous shocks is fully absent from the wage considerations.
However as long as none of the parties in the bargaining process has all of the power, both
the market as well as policy determined conditions will be captured in the negotiated wage.
Then the bargaining power will determine to what extent pure labour market frictions
stemming from hiring and ring costs affect the wage. Although some bargaining power
on the worker side is required for the search frictions to affect the wage, because they are
always present in the rms marginal costs they always inuence the price formation, as
can be seen from the equation (3.53).
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3.3 Functional Forms and Calibration
We parameterize period utility function to be of CRRA form given as
U(Ct; Ht) =
(Ct  Ht)1    1
1   (3.55)
where  is parameter governing curvature of the utility function dening the coefcient of
relative risk aversion.
Preferences over real money balances are given by
(
Mt
Pt
) =  log(
Mt
Pt
) (3.56)
where  is scaling parameter and denotes contribution of the unit utility of real money
balances to aggregate households utility. Following most of the search and matching liter-
ature we postulate vacancy posting cost function to be linear in number of vacancies and
is given by R(v) = cvvt.
Motivated by empirical work as surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) we
assume Cobb-Douglas form of the matching function given by:
m(ut; vt) = !u

tv
1 
t (3.57)
! stands for the level or matching efciency parameter of the matching technology.41 The
parameter  determines the relative contribution of unemployment to the matching process
as well as the elasticity of the hazard rates with respect to the labour market tightness
which is dened as t = vtut .
41 An alternative would be to use a matching function of the form proposed by den Haan et al. (2000)
given by M(ut; vt) = utvt
(ut+u

t)
1

. The advantage of this specication is that it guarantees matching
probabilites between zero and one for all ut vt. But in a linearized form both specications would have
identical implications.
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Both exogenous government spending gt and aggregate productivity are assumed to
evolve according to univariate autoregressive processes respectively given by:
log(gt) = (1  G) log(gss) + G log(gt 1) + "Gt (3.58)
and
log(At) = (1  A) log(Ass) + A log(At 1) + "At (3.59)
We calibrate our model to reect the data properties of an average EU economy. The
time unit is assumed to be a quarter. Parameters of the model can be separated into six
broad categories reecting household preferences, labour market parameters, policy para-
meters, and parameters determining the behaviour of the exogenous stochastic processes.
Labour Market and Policy Parameters
Using OECD data and following Shimer (2005) we calculate average quarterly job
nding probability q() for the 14 EU countries to be 0.3. Steady state unemployment
rate u is set to 8% which is the sample average unemployment rate. Using the fact that
n = 1   u, substituting into (3.47) and rearranging we can solve for the steady state
aggregate job destruction rate  to get
 =
uq()
(1  (1  q())u) (3.60)
Calibrated values for the unemployment and job nding probabilities imply an ag-
gregate job destruction rate of 2.6%, which is in line with Christoffel et al. (2009) and
obtained by alternative direct calibration of the job destruction rate.42 In line with most of
the literature and based on the ECB (2002) and Weber (2000) calculations we calibrate our
42 This value is also in line with the values used in the literature ranging from 2 to 10%.
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vacancy lling rate to 0.7. Using our calibrated values for job nding probability q()
and vacancy lling probability q() we calculate labour market tightness  to be equal to
0.33, which together with the calibrated value of unemployment implies a value of steady
state vacancies of 0.034. We also need to calibrate endogenous job separation rate. Un-
fortunately there is no evidence on this parameter available for the EU countries. For US
den Haan et al.. (2000) set the ratio of endogenous to total job destruction rate 
n

to 0.32,
whereas Pissarides (2007) based on Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) and Farbers' (1997)
analysis of workers displacement rates sets this ratio to 0.6. We choose the mid-point of
0.46 as a reference in our calibration. This gives us endogenous job destruction rate of
0.0117. Using the denition of total job destruction rate (3.12) exogenous job destruction
rate is given by x =  
n
1 n and is accordingly calibrated to 0.0141. Regarding the elasticity
of matching function with respect to unemployment we follow Pissarides and Petrongolo
(2001) and set the value of match elasticity with respect to unemployment to 0.5. The
steady state number of matches m is given by 
1 (1   u) and is used to calculate match-
ing efciency !. As it is standard in the literature we set the bargaining power equal to 0.5
in order to satisfy Hosios condition.
Based on OECD "Taxing wages" data sets we set wage tax rate corresponding to our
sample average for the 14 EU countries to 0.24. The corresponding payroll (social security
contributions) tax rate is set to 0.219, whereas we calibrate  to -0.09.
As already stated job specic productivity shock is assumed to be independently and
indentically distributed over time. Following den Haan et al. (2000), Lubik and Krause
(2007) and Trigari (2006) we parameterize this distribution to be log-normal such that a s
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LN(a; a), where we normalize a to zero. Before calibrating a we need to calibrate
parameters describing potential labour market reforms. We model ring cost such that
D = Dw. As already pointed out, ring cost D in our model does not represent the
severance payment going from the rm to the worker, and lacking a reliable estimate on
its value we set D to 0.2. As previously explained we assume that benets are given by
b = h+ bw where h stands for level of home production, b for benets replacement rate
and w is the steady state value of wage. Using Nickell and Nunziata (2007) and OECD
datasets we calculate the average replacement ratio for 14 EU countries in the period from
1997 to 2007 to be 0.35. Now, given the values of a and a and the assumed distribution
of the idiosyncratic shock the steady state reservation productivity level is obtained as
~at = F
 1(n), where F 1() is an inverse of the cumulative distribution function F . We
are left with two additional parameters to calibrate, namely vacancy posting cost cv and
the value of the home production. In order to obtain those values we use the steady state
version of the equation determining the evolution of labour market tightness given by
R0(v)
g()
= (1  x)

(1  F (~a))

R0(v)
g()
+ (1  )mcAH(~a)

 (1  x)
"
(1  F (~a))
 
R0(v) + (1  )
 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ )
!
+ F (~a)D
#
 (1  x) [(1  F (~a)) (D   (1  g()) (1  x)D)] (3.61)
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as well as the steady state version of the wage (3.36) and reservation productivity equation
(3.37) which are respectively given by:
w = b
(1  )
(1  w) + 
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mcAH(~a) + R0(v)]
+
1
(1 +  f )
[D   (1  g()) (1  x)D] (3.62)
~a =
1
mcA
" 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ ) +
1
1  R
0(v)

   1
g()
#
  1
mcA

1 +

1   (1  g()) (1  
x)

D (3.63)
These three equations form a system in three unknowns, namely cv, h and w that we solve
for. Lacking more precise empirical evidence on this parameter for more countries we
follow Abowd and Kramarz (2003) who have calculated the value of ring costs for the
French rms to be about 2.4% of annual labour costs per worker. We calibrate a such that
solution of this system gives us value of cv consistent with this estimate and set is to 0.25.
Based on the observed data we postulate the steady state ratio of government pur-
chases to output to be 0.21. We also impose a steady state ratio of debt-to-GDP of 60
percent per year. This value is consistent with the Maastricht convergence criteria value
for the debt-to GDP ratio. We follow Nelson (2001) and set r, pi and y to 0.3, 2 and
0.3 respectively.
Household Preferences
We set  equal to 2, which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
1/2: This value is in line with the values used in the real business cycle literature. The
habit importance parameter, , is adapted from the existing empirical studies that suggest
plausible estimates to take values between 0.4 and 0.8. We choose the lower bound for
3.4 The Long Run Effects of Various Reforms 115
Table 3.1. Long run effects of various tax reforms.
Tax instruments
Wage tax Payroll Tax Progressivity
Output 1.80 0.76 2.464
Consumption 1.79 0.76 2.457
Employment 1.75 0.75 2.40
Real Wage -0.07 0.79 -0.10
After-tax Real Wage 1.25 0.79 1.48
Vacancies 8.27 0.28 11.69
Reservation Productivity -1.85 -0.98 -2.75
Tightness 38.57 10.62 59.59
Note: This table represents the steady-state effects of the selected variable
to one percentage permanent reduction in two marginal tax rates as well as
the change in the degree of progresivity from 0.09 to 0.1. Each column de-
notes the respective change in the case of single change in the respective tax
instrument. All of the variables except employment are reported as a per-
centage deviations from the initial steady-state, whereas the employment is
expressed as percentage point change.
 and set it to 0.4. The time discount factor  is chosen to match average annualized
quarterly real interest rate of 3.4% and is set to 0.99. The steady state markup in our model
is given by "
" 1 . Based on the estimation done by Martins et al. (1996) and Przybyla and
Roma (2005) we set its value to 17% which amounts to setting the elasticity of substitution
" equal to 7. This value is also in line with the US evidence as reported in Basu and Fernald
(1997) and Golosov and Lucas (2007). Finally, we set  to match money to consumption
ratio of 1.3, which is obtained using ECB data on money in circulation and overnight
deposits held by households in the Euro Area from 1999 to 2007.
3.4 The Long Run Effects of Various Reforms
In this section we analyze the long-run effects of various structural reforms. First, we pro-
ceed by analyzing the effects of permanent changes in tax rates as well as the changes
in the tax structure by varying the degree of tax systems' progressivity. Specically, we
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utilize our model in order to examine the long run effects of wage and payroll tax re-
duction which are widely suggested as a major source of poor European labour market
performance. Three alternative scenarios are considered, namely one percentage point re-
ductions in wage and payroll tax rates and one percentage point increase in the degree of
progressivity. Second, we analyze the long run effects of the increase in the degree of prod-
uct market competition by varying the elasticity of demand ", which captures the degree
of substitutability between specic rm and its competitors.
3.4.1 The Long Run Effects of Tax Reforms
Table 3.1 summarizes the steady-state effects of the aforementioned tax reforms. As pre-
viously mentioned we depart in our analysis from the usual assumption of the per period
balanced budget, and allow government to run a sustainable decit, making it distinct from
the previous scarce literature on policy reforms. In implementing each of those scenarios
we assume that the implied loss in the scal revenues is nanced by the change in the
lump-sum taxes such that the calibrated government spending-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP
ratio remain unchanged in the steady state. As it is evident from the table both the re-
duction in the wage tax rate as well as the reduction in the social security contributions
are benecial for the labour markets and overall economic performance. Reduction in the
wage tax rate leads to the reduction in the average real wage because of the decrease in the
relative value of the unemployment option to the workers as represented by the non-market
part of the wage equation. This in turn induces a decreases in reservation productivity and
the endogenous job destruction rate, which leads to the decrease in the unemployment rate
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and to an increase in vacancies and employment. Since employment rises, output and con-
sumption rise too. Moreover, the reduction in the wage tax rate leads to an increase in the
after-tax average wage received by the workers. Qualitatively, the fall in the job destruction
threshold of 1:85% leads to an increase in employment of around 1:75% and an increase in
the after tax wage of 1:25%. Output increases by 1:8%, whereas the consumption increase
is slightly lower at around 1:79%.
Decrease in the social security contributions has the opposite effect on the average
real wage because of the positive effect on the market part of the wage equation. However,
the reduction in the payroll tax (or the social security contributions) has a positive effect on
the reservation productivity leading to its reduction. This positive effect on the reservation
productivity dominates the negative wage effect of reduction in the payroll tax, leading to
an increase in employment or equivalently to fall in unemployment. In turn both output and
consumption increase. Qualitatively, reservation productivity decreases by 0:98%, whereas
the real wage increases by 0:79%. This reduction in reservation productivity leads to an
increase in the employment rate by 0:75%, and an increase in output and consumption by
around 0:76%:
Regarding the progressivity of the tax system we analyze the effect of a change in the
tax structure reected by a change in the value of  from  0:09 to  0:1, which represent
the approximate increase in the degree of progressivity of 11%. As can be seen from
the Table 3.1 an increase in the degree of progressivity is also benecial for the labour
markets as well as for the economic efciency. The more progressive tax system leads
to a decrease in the average real wage because of a fall in the non-market part of the
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wage. Moreover, the increase in the degree of progressivity leads to a fall in reservation
productivity which together with the fall in the average real wage leads to an increase in
employment, output and consumption. One can therefore conclude that promoting income
equality leads to positive employment, output and consumption effects. In other words,
increasing progressivity of the tax system turns out to be benecial for both labour markets
and the economy as a whole. Extensive sensitivity analysis reveals that this result is robust
to the assumption on the existence of tax progressivity in the initial benchmark steady
state, that is regardless of whether the progressivity is assumed to characterize the initial
steady state or it is assumed to be absent; this result always holds. Thus, it is consistent
with Pissarides (1998) in the context of a partial equilibrium search-matching model but
contrasts the general equilibrium ndings of Vanhala (2006) where the initial degree of
progressivity matters.
For the sake of completeness let us compare the effects of individual tax reforms.
One can see that reduction in the wage tax and social security contributions inuences
all of the variables except wages in the same direction, although with different magni-
tudes. This difference in magnitude can be explained by the differential effect that those
two type of tax reduction have on government revenue. The remarkable differential direc-
tion in the effect on real average wage is also noticed by Coenen et al. (2008) in standard
New-Keynesian setup with Walrasian labour markets. But the mechanism at work gen-
erating this effect is different. In our model the reduction in social security contributions
increases the surplus generated by a successful match to be equally shared by the rms
and workers because of the assumed bargaining mechanism of the wage determination.
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Table 3.2. The long run effects of the change in the degree of competition
Output Consumption Employment Real Wage Reservation Productivity
2.56 2.54 2.48 4.29 -2.52
Note: This table represents the steady-state effects of the selected variable to perma-
nent increase in the elasticity of substitution. All of the variables except employment
are reported as a percentage deviations from the initial steady-state, whereas the em-
ployment is expressed as percentage point change.
This results in the average real wage rising. Moreover, as previously explained, the payroll
tax reduction produces positive effect on the reservation productivity which overcompen-
sates the negative effect on the average real wage and thereby generates subdued positive
long-run response of employment. Additionally, the fact that the equilibrium average real
wage does react positively to the reduction in the payroll tax rate partially explains the
dampened response of employment relative to the case of wage tax reduction. Lastly, it is
worthwhile pointing out the same direction in the effects of wage tax reduction and the in-
crease in the degree of tax progressivity on both labour markets and the overall economic
performance, implying the isomorphic substitutability in their potential use as the policy
reform tools.
3.4.2 The Long Run Effects of Product Market Reform
Let us now proceed with the long run analysis of product market reform. Table 3.2 shows
the effects of a one-off permanent increase in the elasticity of demand represented by
the increase in " from 7 to 9:5. As already stated, the change in the elasticity of demand
implies a change in the degree of substitutability between different goods. It can be viewed
in a broader sense as a reection of the change in the overall market structure. As such,
this change in the market structure can reect, for example, the increase in the number
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of rms leading to a higher degree of competition, or the implicit pressure from foreign
competition. Increase in the elasticity of demand leads to an increase in aggregate long
run consumption because of the reduction in the markup caused by the reduced pricing
power of the competitive rms. This increase in consumption reects an increase in output
which leads to an increase in the demand for labour regardless of the subsequent increase
in the average real wage caused by the increase in the steady state marginal costs. This
is caused by the dominating negative effect that marginal costs have on the reservation
productivity, which leads to the pronounced fall in the endogenous destruction rate, causing
a fall in the unemployment and equivalent rise in the employment rates. Qualitatively, the
reservation productivity decrease by 2.52% relative to the benchmark steady state value,
which leads to the 2.48% increase in the employment. Output and consumption increase
respectively by 2.56% and 2.54%. Overall, these results suggest that the implementation of
the product market reforms in terms of increased competition have positive effects on the
mean levels around which the economy uctuates. In other words increased competition
is, not surprisingly, at least in the long run benecial for both the labour markets and the
economy as a whole.
3.5 Dynamic Impacts of Reforms
3.5.1 The Effects of Technology Shocks and Product Market Reform
Figure 3.1 shows the impulse responses of selected variables to a one standard deviation
technology shock for two different calibrations of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
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Fig. 3.1. Impulse responses to a positive technology shock for two different calibrations
of ".
tion ". The solid line represents the responses for the benchmark calibration with the value
of " set to 7, whereas the dashed line shows the responses where value of " is increased by
35%, implying the reduction in the markup of around 40%. Under the increased elasticity
of substitution, the volatility of ination relative to the benchmark case is dampened. Both
output and employment rise followed by the pronounced hump-shape adjustment path, but
the impact effect as well as the persistence is lower then under the benchmark case. The
real wage increases but again the increase is smaller relative to the benchmark case, which
implies that the productivity increase under increased competition leads, on impact, to a
reduction in real marginal costs. Furthermore, labour market tightness increases by less
under increased competition because the lower reduction in the reservation productivity
leads to relatively lower fall in unemployment. These results stand in contrast to the ones
obtained in Zanetti (2009). The explanation lies in the fact that, although increased com-
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Fig. 3.2. Impulse responses to a positive government spending shock for two different
calibration of ".
petition leads to a decrease in the required markup and would thereby imply an increase in
the marginal cost under the costly price change in the face of technology shock, the relative
cost of adjusting prices under increased competition becomes lower, allowing prices to ab-
sorb relatively more of the impact effect. It turns out that following a positive technology
shock the latter effect dominates and leads to a decrease in the real marginal costs.
3.5.2 The Effects of Government Spending Shocks and Product
Market Reform
Figure 3.2 shows impulse responses to a one standard deviation positive government spend-
ing shock for two different calibrations of ". In this case both output and employment
slightly increase and the increase is again lower under the increased competition relative
to the benchmark case. Moreover, the fall in unemployment under increased competition is
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Fig. 3.3. Impulse responses to a positive technology shock for two different calibration
of wage tax rate.
larger as a consequence of a larger reduction in reservation productivity. Moreover, this is
reected in a slightly lower fall in labour market tightness relative to the benchmark case.
However, following a positive government spending shock, and in contrast to the technol-
ogy shock, the expansion in economic activity leads to a somewhat stronger response of
ination relative to the benchmark case along the whole adjustment path as a result of a
slightly larger increase in the marginal costs and decrease in reservation productivity. Why
is this so? The expansion of economic activity puts upward pressure on marginal costs,
which is not offset by the increase in the aggregate productivity, causing an upward pres-
sure on ination. In this case the reduction in the relative cost of the price change leads
to the larger response of ination relative to the benchmark case, and keeps the response
always above the benchmark case.
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Fig. 3.4. Impulse responses to a positive government spending shock for two different
calibration of wage tax rate.
3.5.3 The effects of shocks and tax reforms
The effects of the tax reforms, in terms of a one percentage point reduction in the respective
marginal tax rates, on the impulse response functions to a one standard deviation positive
technology shock are respectively represented by the dashed lines in Figures 3.3 and 3.5.
The Figures 3.4 and 3.6 represent the impulse response functions to a one standard devi-
ation positive government spending shock with a respective reduction in the marginal tax
rates. For the sake of brevity we will only analyze the responses to a positive technology
shock since the analysis of the government spending shock closely follows that in the case
of product market reforms. The solid lines in each of the gures visualize the correspond-
ing responses for the benchmark calibration. It is easy to see that the reduction in both
the wage and payroll tax rates generally dampens the impulse responses of each variable.
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Specically, the peak effects as well as the persistence tends to be smaller. A notable ex-
ception to this general pattern concerns the behaviour of ination. The impact effect on
ination is larger when compared to the benchmark case, and the reason behind this is the
effect of the reduced wage tax rate on the average real wage and the marginal cost. Re-
duction in the wage tax rate leads to a decrease in the non-market part of the wage making
it less rigid relative to the benchmark case. However, this reduction in wage rigidity leads
to the smaller fall in the reservation productivity. This in turn decreases the response of
the endogenous job destruction rate relative to the benchmark case and thereby increases
the relative aggregate costs of workers layoff. As a result the unemployment as well as
the employment reaction is reduced. Moreover, the decrease in the non-market part of the
wage is not sufcient to offset the opposite effect of the reduction in reservation productiv-
ity, leading to a smaller response of the average real wage. The smaller fall of the marginal
costs leads to a larger impact response in ination. We can see that the effect of the reduc-
tion in the wage tax rate generates the same responses in the economy as does an increase
in the degree of competition, albeit for different reasons.
3.6 Constant Marginal Tax Wedge Reform
This section analyzes the effect of a payroll tax reduction partially compensated by a wage
tax increase which is widely advocated by policy makers and recently adopted by several
OECD countries. Instead of considering the revenue neutral tax reform which is widely
used in the existing literature we follow Heijdra and Ligthart (2009) and assume that the
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Fig. 3.5. Impulse responses to a positive technology shock for two different calibration
of payroll tax rate.
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Fig. 3.6. Impulse responses to a positive government spending shock for two different
calibration of payroll tax rate.
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policy maker is adjusting taxes such that the marginal tax wedge remains unchanged.43
The main reason is the practical simplicity of this type of reform, since the revenue neutral
tax change requires complete knowledge of the complex reforms' effects on the tax base.
In practice the policy makers lack all of the necessary information regarding the reforms'
tax base effect, whereas the reform which makes the marginal tax wedge unchanged only
requires the knowledge of marginal tax rates and it is therefore easy to implement it. We
maintain the assumption that all of the changes in revenues are compensated by the change
in lump-sum transfers so to keep the respective ratios of government spending and debt to
GDP same as in the benchmark calibration.
Let us rst consider the long run effect of a 3% increase in the marginal labour tax
rate which is offset by a decrease in the payroll tax rate of around 5%, thereby making
the marginal tax wedge constant. In our model characterized by search matching fric-
tion, imperfect competition and endogenous job destruction, this tax reform policy leads
to the decrease in employment of around 4% and to a slightly larger fall in output and
consumption of around 4.25%. These results pose a challenge to the conventional view
and contradict the ones obtained by Heijdra and Ligthar (2009) in the model with perfect
competition and exogenous job destruction.
What explains these results? In our setup there are two channels at work. First, an
increase in the wage tax leads to an increase in the non-market part of the wage, whereas a
decrease in the marginal payroll tax rate leads to an increase in the market part of the bar-
gained wage. Overall, the average real wage increases. Effectively, what is important is the
43 In our setting the marginal tax wedge is simply dened as 
w+e
1+e .
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impact of the reduction in the payroll tax on the producers after tax wage. In our model un-
der plausible calibration, the producer's wage slightly increases, by 0.6%. This implies that
the reduction in the payroll tax rate necessary to keep the marginal tax wedge unchanged
was not sufcient to offset the effect of the increase in the average real wage which in turn
reduces the rms' marginal value of an additional worker. As a result rms post less va-
cancies and the worker's probability of nding a job decreases. Second, in our model the
job destruction rate is endogenous and the change in the average real wage is interrelated
with the reservation productivity since the long run marginal cost is solely determined by
the degree of competition. Therefore in order to satisfy the marginal cost requirement, the
adjustment takes place through the job destruction rate as well as through the wage. More-
over, the wage and payroll tax rate have opposite effects on the reservation productivity
level and in principle the effect of tax reforms can go either way. It turns out that this spe-
cic type of reform, by leading to an average real wage increase, leads to an equilibrium
increase in reservation productivity level which in turn increases the job destruction rate
and decreases employment. 44As a consequence both output and consumption fall.45
3.6.1 Anticipated Reform and Transitional Dynamics
The anticipation of the increase in the producer's wage in the next period leads to the im-
pact decrease in the current period vacancy posting. It is the consequence of the "time
44 It is worthwile pointing out that this type of reform increases workers after tax wage but at the expense
of employment which is opposite to the results obtained in Koskela and Schob (1999) in the case of
revenue neutral tax reforms.
45 Extensive sensitivity analysis reveals that the tax reform scheme analyzed in the text can generate
positive but negligible changes in employment for unrealistically small changes in the wage tax rate (of
less than 0.3%). However, since such small tax changes are unimportant from the practical view we
abstract from their analysis.
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to hire" assumption which implies that the workers matched in current period become
operational in the next period. This in turn reduces labour market tightness which puts
downward pressures on the current period wage. The fall in the current period wage im-
plies in turn a reduction in marginal costs which leads to a decrease in ination and to a
decrease in the real interest rate. The ultimate employment consequences of this behav-
ior will be determined by the change in the reservation productivity. Figure 3.7 shows that
the reservation productivity increases which is the consequence of two effects potentially
working in opposite direction. The rst effect is attributed to the reduction in current mar-
ginal costs which leads to an increase in the reservation productivity, but the increase being
dampened by the inuence of hiring costs. The second effect, as already explained, de-
pends on the relative inuence of labour market tightness on the reservation productivity.
In our case when tax reform is anticipated one period in advance, the negative effects of
marginal costs and labour market tightness on the reservation productivity dominate the
negative effect of labour market tightness on average vacancy costs, and thereby positive
effect on the reservation productivity. As a result reservation productivity increases on im-
pact, which leads to an increase in unemployment and a decrease in employment caused
by an increase in the endogenous job destruction rate.
After the reform has been implemented, the average real wage increases quickly to-
wards the new steady state level in the next period, after which the increase becomes more
gradual. The increase in the wage leads to even further, albeit smaller, fall in labour mar-
ket tightness whereas the marginal costs increase because of the increase in the average
real wage. As a result reservation productivity falls, but the fall is not sufcient to com-
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Fig. 3.7. Transitional dynamics for anticipated one period preanounced tax reform.
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pensate for the previous deterioration of the vacancy postings and therefore employment
continues to fall until it reaches the new steady state level. The increase in marginal costs
is followed by an increase in ination, with the ination dynamics being much smoother
relative to the marginal costs as a result of the price stickiness. Furthermore, output and
consumption decrease all the way along the transition, with the smoothness in transition
being the consequence of the habit formation.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have developed the New-Keynesian model with imperfect competition,
costly price adjustment and labour markets characterized by search-matching frictions in
order to analyze the effects of specic tax structures and product market reforms on various
macroeconomic variables. On the modeling side, our setup differs from previous general
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equilibrium literature used to analyze the effects of tax and product market reforms by two
important aspects, namely by introduction of the search-matching framework with endoge-
nous job destruction and costly ring decisions into the standard New-Keynesian model
and by explicit scal considerations via the use of two types of distortionary taxes, that is
progressive wage tax and at payroll tax. This general setup allows us to analyze both the
long run effects of changes in tax and product market structures as well as their dynamic
implications. We conrm in the general equilibrium setup with endogenous job destruc-
tion the widely held view that the reduction in marginal tax distortions has positive long
run effects on labour markets and the economy as a whole. We also nd the positive long
run effects of the increase in the tax system's progressivity on employment, output and
consumption independent of the initial progressivity level. Furthermore, we nd that the
decrease in each of the marginal tax rates as well as the increase in the degree of pro-
gressivity leads to a decrease in the volatility of output, consumption and employment.
Following a positive technology shock only the impact response in ination in a reformed
economy is larger relative to the non reformed case, whereas following the positive gov-
ernment spending shock the ination response is larger along the whole adjustment path.
We also nd the positive effect of product market reform aimed at competition in-
crease on labour market and the overall economic performance. This type of reform also
leads to a reduction in the volatility of employment, output and consumption following the
positive technology shock. Following the positive government spending shock the volatil-
ity of ination increases but the volatility of employment, consumption and output again
decreases.
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To complete the analysis we consider the effect of a reduction in the marginal payroll
tax partial offset by an increase in the wage tax rate such that the marginal tax wedge
remains unchanged. We nd, contrary to conventional view, that this type of reform is
detrimental for employment in the long run. If this reform is anticipated one period in
advance the short run positive employment effects are also absent.
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3.A Appendix A to Chapter 3
3.A.1 The Firm's Prot Maximisation Problem
The Lagrangian for a rm's prot maximisation is given by:
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3.A.2 Further Analytics Needed to Solve the Model
Using
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
= (1  x)Et

t+1
t

(1  F (~ai;t+1))i;t+1   F (~ai;t+1)D

and
i;t = (1  x)Et

t+1
t
 
1  F (~ai;t+1))i;t+1   F (~ai;t+1)D

+mci;tAtH(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t
@ni;t
and updating the previous two equations for one period to get
i;t+1 = (1  x)Et+1

t+2
t+1
 
1  F (~ai;t+2))i;t+2   F (~ai;t+2)D

+mci;t+1At+1H(~ai;t+1)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t+1
@ni;t+1
(3.A.9)
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and
R0(vi;t+1)
g(t+1)
= (1  x)Et+1

t+2
t+1
 
1  F (~ai;t+2))i;t+2   F (~ai;t+2)D

we can rewrite the rst updated equation to get a solution for i;t+1 given by:
i;t+1 =
R0(vi;t+1)
g(t+1)
+mci;t+1At+1H(~ai;t+1)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t+1
@ni;t+1
(3.A.10)
We can than substitute (3.A.10) into (3.A.9) to obtain
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
= (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~ai;t+1))

R0(vi;t+1)
g(t+1)
+mci;t+1At+1H(~ai;t+1)

 (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~ai;t+1))

(1 +  f )
@Wi;t+1
@ni;t+1

+ F (~ai;t+1)D

(3.A.11)
Let us now rearrange the equation (3.A.8). Substitute for ni;t on the RHS of (3.A.8) to get
i;t
0(~ai;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1)) + (1  x)F 0(~ai;t)(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1))D
= mci;t(ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1))AtH 0(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t
@~ai;t
i;t
0(~ai;t) + (1  x)F 0(~ai;t)D
= mci;t(1  i;t)AtH 0(~ai;t) 
1
ni;t 1 + vi;t 1g(t 1)| {z }
ni;t
1 i;t
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
i;t
0(~ai;t) + (1  x)F 0(~ai;t)D = mci;t(1  i;t)AtH 0(~ai;t) 
1  i;t
ni;t
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
(3.A.12)
Recall that the total job destruction can be written as:
i;t  (~ai;t) = x + (1  x)F (~ai;t) (3.A.13)
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and
H(~ai;t) =
aZ
~ai;t
atf(at)
1  F (~ai;t)dat
Than the rst derivative of (~ai;t) is given by :
@i;t
@~ai;t
= (1  x)F 0(~ai;t)
By applying Leibnitz rule to the H(~ai;t) we obtain:
@H(~ai;t)
@~ai;t
=
aZ
~ai;t
@

atf(at)
1 F (~ai;t)

@~ai;t
dat + 0  ~ai;tf(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
=
f(~ai;t)
1  F (~at)
aZ
~ai;t
atf(at)
1  F (~ai;t)dat  
~ai;tf(ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
=
f(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)H(~ai;t) 
~ai;tf(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
= (H(~ai;t)  ~ai;t) f(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
We also use the condition derived from (3.A.13) and given by
1  t = (1  x)(1  F (~ai;t))
to get
i;t +D
=
1
(1  x)F 0(~ai;t)

mci;t(1  i;t)At(H(~ai;t)  ~ai;t)
f(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)  
1  i;t
ni;t
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t

i;t +D = mci;tAt(1  x)(1  F (~ai;t))(H(~ai;t)  ~ai;t)
f(~ai;t)
(1  F (~ai;t))
1
(1  x)f(~ai;t)
 (1  
x)(1  F (~ai;t))
nt(1  x)F 0(~ai;t) (1 + 
f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
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i;t = mci;tAt(H(~ai;t)  ~ai;t) 
(1  F (~ai;t))
ntF 0(~ai;t)
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
 D (3.A.14)
By combining (3.A.14) and (3.A.10) we obtain the following condition:
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAtH(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t
@ni;t
= mci;tAtH(~ai;t) mci;tAt~ai;t   (1  F (~ai;t))
ntF 0(~ai;t)
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
 D
Using the denition of the wage bill given by
Wi;t =
ni;j;tZ
0
aZ
~ai;t
wi;j;t(ai;t)datdj = ni;t
aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
1  F (~ai;t)dat
we can obtain:
@Wi;t
@ai;t
=
@
@ai;t
8><>:ni;t
aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
1  F (~ai;t)dat
9>=>;
@Wi;t
@ai;t
= ni;t
aZ
~ai;t
wt(ai;t)
f(at)
(1  F (~ai;t))2
f(~ai;t)dat   ni;twi;t(~ai;t) f(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
@Wi;t
@ai;t
= ni;t
f(~ai;t)
1  F (~ai;t)
0B@ aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
(1  F (~ai;t))dat   wi;t(~ai;t)
1CA
and
@Wi;t
@ni;t
=
aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
1  F (~ai;t)dat
Substituting previous results into
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAtH(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )@Wi;t
@ni;t
= mci;tAtH(~at) mci;tAt~at   (1  F (~ai;t))
ni;tF 0(~ai;t)
(1 +  f )
@Wi;t
@~ai;t
 D
(3.A.15)
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we can write
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAtH(~ai;t)  (1 +  f )
aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
1  F (~at)dat = mci;tAtH(~ai;t) mci;tAt~ai;t
 (1  F (~ai;t))
ntF 0(~ai;t)
nt
f(~ai;t)
(1  F (~ai;t))(1 + 
f )
0B@ aZ
~ai;t
wi;t(ai;t)
f(at)
(1  F (~ai;t))dat   wi;t(~ai;t)
1CA D
which after rearranging gives us
R0(vi;t)
g(t)
+mci;tAt~ai;t   (1 +  f )wi;t(~ai;t) +D = 0 (3.A.16)
Since the aggregate employment develops according to the following equation
nt = (1  t)(nt 1 + g(t 1)vt 1)
and we assume that all of the workers who are not employed are actively searching for a
job, unemployment in the model is given by
ut = 1  nt
In what follows we consider the symmetric equilibrium which allows us to ignore the
subscript i.
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3.A.3 The Bellman Equations
The marginal value of an employment for a rm is
Jet (at) = mctAtat   (1 +  f )wt(at)
+Et

t+1
t
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
Jet+1(at+1)dF (a)  (1  x)F (~at+1)D + t+1Jut+1
35
(3.A.17)
The marginal value of a job for a worker is given by
Wet (at) = (1  w)wt(at)  
+Et

t+1
t
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
Wet+1(at+1)dF (a) + t+1Ut+1
35
(3.A.18)
whereas the marginal value of an unemployment for a worker is given by
Ut = b+ Et

t+1
t
24tg(t) (1  x) aZ
~at+1
Wet+1(at+1)dF (a)
35
+Et

t+1
t

(1  tg(t)(1  t+1))Ut+1 (3.A.19)
Moreover, for what follows we can rewrite (3.A.18) and (3.A.19) as
Wet (at) = (1  w)wt(at)   + Et

t+1
t
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
 
Wet+1(at+1) Ut+1

dF (a)
+ (1  x)
aZ
~at+1
Ut+1dF (at+1) + 
xUt+1 + (1  x)
~at+1Z
a
Ut+1dF (a)
35
Wet (at) = (1  w)wt(at)  
+Et

t+1
t
24(1  x) aZ
~at+1
 
Wet+1(at+1) Ut+1

dF (a) + Ut+1
35
(3.A.20)
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and
Ut = b+ Et

t+1
t
24tg(t) (1  x) aZ
~at+1
 
Wet+1(at+1) Ut+1

dF (a)
+(1  tg(t)(1  i;t+1))Ut+1 + tg(t)(1  x)
aZ
~at+1
Ut+1dF (a)
35
Ut = b+ Et

t+1
t
24tg(t) (1  x) aZ
~at+1
 
Wet+1(at+1) Ut+1

dF (a) + Ut+1
35
(3.A.21)
It is also useful to obtain the expression forWet (at) Ut
Wet (at) Ut = (1  w)wt(at)     b
+Et

t+1
t
24(1  x) (1  tg(t)) aZ
~at+1
 
Wet+1(at+1) Ut+1

dF (a)
35
(3.A.22)
3.A.4 Nash Bargaining Problem and Wage Equation
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining over the match surplus which is assumed to
be shared between a rm and the workers according to the parameter  denoting work-
ers' bargaining power Formally, the problem of Nash product maximization is stated as
follows:
wt(at) = argmax (W
e
t (at) Ut) (Jet(at) +D)1  (3.A.23)
The rst order condition of the above problem is given by:

@ (Wet (at))
@wt(at)
(Wet (at) Ut) 1 (Jet(at) +D)1 
=   (1  ) @ (J
e
t(at))
@wt(at)
(Wet (at) Ut) (Jet (at) +D)  (3.A.24)
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Using
@ (Wet (at))
@wt(at)
= 1  w and @ (W
e
t (at))
@wt(at)
=  (1 +  f )
substituting into (3.A.24), dividing by (Wet (at) Ut) (Jet(at) +D)1  and rearranging
we obtain sharing rule as the solution of the Nash bargaining problem, which in our case
is given by:
Wet (at) Ut =
(1  w)
(1  )(1 +  f ) (J
e
t (at) +D) (3.A.25)
Using (3.A.25) we can than write
Wet (at) Ut = (1  w)wt(at)  b  
+Et

t+1
t
2664
(1  tg(t)) (1  x) 
aZ
~at
(1 w)
(1 )(1+f )
 
Jet+1(at+1) +D

dF (a)
3775
(3.A.26)
Using (3.A.16) and (3.A.17) evaluated at the reservation productivity level ~at we can obtain
the following condition:
R0(vt)
g(t)
= Et

t+1
t

(1  x)
24 aZ
~at+1
 
Jet+1(at+1) +D

dF (a) D
35
which allows us to obtain a solution for the wage function in the following way:
(1  w)wt(at)  b   + (1  tg(t)) (1  
w)
(1  )(1 +  f )
R0(vt)
g(t)
+(1  tg(t)) (1  
w)
(1  )(1 +  f )Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D
=
(1  w)
(1  )(1 +  f )

mctAtat   (1 +  f )w(at) + R
0(vt)
g(t)
+D

(3.A.27)
In order to derive the previous condition we have used the fact that
Jet(at) +D = mctAtat   (1 +  f )wt(at) +
R0(vt)
g(t)
+D
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It then follows that
(1  w)wt(at)(1  )(1 +  f )  b (1  ) (1 +  f )   (1  ) (1 +  f )
=  (1  tg(t))(1  w)Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D   (1  tg(t))(1  w)R
0(vt)
g(t)
+ (1  w)

mctAtat   (1 +  f )wt(at) + R
0(vt)
g(t)
+D

wt(at)(1  )(1 +  f )  b (1  ) (1 + 
f )
(1  w)    (1  )
(1 +  f )
(1  w) + (1  tg(t))
R0(vt)
g(t)
=  (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D + 

mctAtat   (1 +  f )wt(at) + R
0(vt)
g(t)
+D

wt(at)(1 + 
f )  b (1  ) (1 + 
f )
(1  w)    (1  )
(1 +  f )
(1  w)   tR
0(vt)
= 

mctAtat   (1 +  f )wt(at) + R
0(vt)
g(t)
+D

  (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D
wt(at)  b (1  )
(1  w)   
(1  )
(1  w)
= 
1
(1 +  f )

mctAtat + tR
0(vt) +D   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D

wt(at) = b
(1  )
(1  w) + 
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mctAtat + tR
0(vt)]
+
1
(1 +  f )

D   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D

(3.A.28)
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The average (expected) real wage now becomes
@Wt
@nt
 wt = b (1  )
(1  w) + a
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mctAtH(~at) + tR
0(vt)]
+
1
(1 +  f )

D   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D

(3.A.29)
3.A.5 Derivation of The Reservation Productivity Level
In order to derive the reservation productivity level we use (3:A:16) and the wage equation
(3:A:28). Evaluating (3:A:28) at the reservation productivity level ~at and substituting into
(3:A:16) we can write
mctAt~a = (1 + 
f )

b
(1  )
(1  w) + 
(1  )
(1  w) + 
1
(1 +  f )
[mctAtH(~at) + tR
0(vt)]

+

D   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D

 D   R
0(vt)
g(t)
(1  )mctAt~a = (1  )
 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ ) +
1
1  R
0(vt)

t   1
g(t)

 (1  )D   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)D
The nal solution for the reservation productivity level can then be written as:
~at =
1
mctAt
" 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ ) +
1
1  R
0(vt)

t   1
g(t)
#
  1
mctAt

1 +

1   (1  tg(t))Et

t+1
t

(1  x)

D
(3.A.30)
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3.A.6 Derivation of the Evolution of Labour Market Tightness Equation
Let us consider the condition (3.A.11) which by assuming symmetry can be rewritten as:
R0(vt)
g(t)
= (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~at+1))

R0(vt+1)
g(t+1)
+mct+1At+1H(~at+1)

 (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~at+1))

(1 +  f )
@Wt+1
@nt+1

+ F (~at+1)D

(3.A.31)
Using the denition of the conditional expectation of a random variable at given by:
H(at) =
aZ
~at
at
atf(at)
1  F (~at)dat (3.A.32)
as well as the solution for the wage equation (3.A.28) together with the solution for the
aggregate average wage (3.A.29) both updated for one period and substituting this one
period update into (3:A:31) we arrive at:
R0(vt)
g(t)
= (1  x)Ett+1
t

(1  F (~at+1))

R0(vt+1)
g(t+1)
+ (1  )mct+1At+1H(~at+1)

 (1  x)Ett+1
t
"
(1  F (~at+1))
 
t+1R
0(vt+1) + (1  )
 
1 +  f

(1  w)(b+ )
!#
 (1  x)Ett+1
t
F (~at+1)D
 (1  x)Ett+1
t
"
(1  F (~at+1))
D   (1  t+1g(t+1))Et+1

t+2
t+1

(1  x)D
 #
(3.A.33)
Chapter 4
Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the
Economy with non-Walrasian labour market
Most of the optimal monetary and scal policy literature abstracts from any real fric-
tions in the labour markets. Regardless of whether the analysis is conducted within the
neoclassical setup characterized by perfect competition and fully exible prices, or within
the more recent New-Keynesian setup with imperfect competition and costly price adjust-
ment, labour markets are assumed to beWalrasian. By assumingWalrasian labour markets,
one neglects an important short run ination-unemployment trade-offs. Beside this impor-
tant drawback, most of the standard models used for optimal policy analysis are highly
stylized, neglecting many theoretical and policy considerations. For example, even though
the New-Keynesian modeling environment is characterized by imperfect competition, the
vast majority of literature assumes the existence of the production and/or employment sub-
sidies that would eliminate distortions arising from this imperfection. Additionally, it is
either implicitly or explicitly assumed that the government has access to lump-sum taxes
used to nance its budget. As a result, the availability of lump-sum taxes implies no ex-
plicit role for scal policy in optimal policy determination. The major policy implication
is that is that the ination should be kept at zero or close to zero in every possible state and
in every time period.46 Moreover, since various subsidies are available, this policy of strict
price stability makes the exible price allocation feasible and implementable.
46 See Erceg et al. (2000), Khan et al (2000) and Woodford (2003a).
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There are notable exceptions in the New-Keynesian literature that depart from the
assumption of lump-sum tax and production subsidies availability initiated by Benigno
and Woodford (2003) and followed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b). This departure
requires in turn explicit consideration of scal policy consequences and provides valuable
lessons for optimal policy conduct, in many ways different from the previous literature.
More precisely and as detailed in the Chapter 1, it turns out that the optimal monetary
policy features price stability even for a small degree of price rigidity, whereas the optimal
scal policy should smooth out both tax rates and the outstanding debt.
However, the Walrasian labour market assumption and the related absence of the
short-run ination-unemployment trade-off still remains present. The search-matching
framework seems a natural way to allow the Walrasian auctioneer to be replaced by a
more realistic mechanism. But despite the long tradition and importance that the search-
matching partial equilibrium models have in labour economics, there are very few, very
recent attempts to incorporate their features in the general equilibrium New-Keynesian
macroeconomics setup.
Moreover, most of the literature takes a normative approach and analyzes quan-
titative features of the incorporation of the matching mechanism in the standard New-
Keynesian framework. To our knowledge there are only three papers which take the pos-
itive approach and analyze the effects of the matching externalities on optimal monetary
policy conduct. Moreover, all of the papers follow the previously mentioned tradition and
assume the availability of lump-sum taxes, thereby making their analysis moot with respect
to optimal scal policy considerations. We aim at lling this gap evident in the literature.
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In order to fulll our objective, we construct a model in the New-Keynesian tradi-
tion which incorporates various distortions in the short and long run. More precisely, we
maintain two key New-Keynesian ingredients by characterizing the goods market with im-
perfect competition and subjecting producers to costly price changes. But at the same time,
we depart from mainstream New-Keynesian literature and replace Walrasian labour mar-
kets with a search-matching mechanism. In addition, we introduce scal policy explicitly
into our analysis, which has been so far neglected in the few papers on New-Keynesian
models featuring matching characteristics of labour markets.
Specically we contribute to the existing literature in several ways. First, we dif-
fer from standard New-Keynesian literature by replacing Walrasian labour markets with a
more realistic setup captured within the search-matching mechanism characterized by an
instantaneous hiring process as recently proposed in Blanchard and Gali (2008). Second,
we assume that all government revenues are collected by the use of distortionary means.
In other words, we do not assume the availability of lump-sum tax instruments. This dis-
tinguishes our analysis from the existing New-Keynesian literature such as Trigari (2006),
Krause and Lubik (2007b) and Faia (2009) in which the government budget constraint
plays no explicit role for the policy analysis and can be therefore treated as a residual.
This assumption leads in turn to an endogenous evolution of the tax rate and denes an en-
vironment where the monetary and scal policies to be pursued by the distinct branches
of government are jointly determined in a coordinated fashion. In such a setup and as
identied by New-Keynesian models of optimal monetary and scal policy, ination plays
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a role in the satisfaction of the scal solvency requirements, whereas tax rate dynamics
affect ination through effects on marginal costs and markups.
Third, we abstract from the unrealistic assumption of production and employment
subsidies initiated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999b) and subsequently widely used in
the literature. As is known from standard New-Keynesian models, the absence of subsi-
dies used by policy makers to remove the distortions related to competition imperfections
leads to deviations from the hypothetical steady state arising in rst best economies. In our
case, the presence of matching externalities introduces a new and additional source of in-
efciency related to the deviation from the well known Hosios condition, which is absent
from models with Walrasian labour markets. Specically, we depart from the majority of
literature and analyze optimal policies in the situation where the Hosios condition is not
articially imposed, thereby allowing the policy maker to correct for its absence. More-
over, by explicitly considering the government budget constraint, we nd an additional
source of inefciency resulting from the presence of unemployment benets. This inef-
ciency has been so far largely neglected because it was masked by the assumption of the
availability of lump-sum taxes.
Fourth, we follow public nance literature approach in the spirit of Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and Chari et al. (1991), recently applied also by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b)
and Siu (2004) within the New-Keynesian setup, and solve a constrained Ramsey problem
which takes into account all of the constraints characterizing competitive equilibrium in ad-
dition to all of the wedges resulting from distortions inherent in the model economy. Thus
we provide the positive aspects of the effects that search-matching externalities have on the
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policy maker's behavior. Our methodology is similar to the one employed by Faia (2009),
but different from one employed by Thomas (2008) and Blanchard and Gali (2008), all
of whom analyze optimal monetary policy in a model with matching frictions but ignore
the scal aspects of the problem. Specically, Thomas (2008) and Blanchard and Gali
(2008) follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1999b) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003), and
use linear-quadratic method based on rst order approximations of the competitive equi-
librium conditions and second order approximations of the agent's utility function. The
peculiarity of this approach is that one needs to assume a non-distorted steady state around
which the conditions will be approximated in order for the methodology to provide the
correct welfare rankings of alternative policies. To fulll this requirement they impose
the Hosios efciency condition by assuming the availability of hiring subsidies which will
correct for the search externalities resulting from hiring costs and the congestion exter-
nalities arising when deviating from Hosios condition. Arguably, this assumption might
be valid when the policy maker has lump-sum taxes at his disposal. However, in a more
realistic setup with lump-sum taxes absent and the distortionary taxes present, this assump-
tion can not easily be justied. Therefore, as already stated, we depart from assuming the
availability of subsidies of any kind.
Before reporting the results, let us rst summarize the inefciencies present in our
model. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into three main groups. The rst group
contains the inefciencies resulting from monopolistic competition and the existence of
producer price adjustment costs. As it is already known that distortions caused by imper-
fect competition lead to an output level which is below the efcient one, this calls for a
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mild deviation from strict price stability. In contrast, the second distortion arising from
non-exible price changes calls for strict price stability in order to close the gap between
efcient and prevailing output. Thus, these two inefciencies impose a nontrivial decision
problem for the policy maker, who on one hand has an incentive to use unexpected ina-
tion and on the other hand needs to close down an ination gap that the policy maker has
herself generated. The second set of distortions is the product of inefcient employment
uctuations arising from the presence of a matching mechanism and related congestion
externalities which lead to the increase in labour market tightness. This important chan-
nel introduces an additional dimension to the trade-off that the policy maker faces. Thus,
when search-matching frictions are present, the policy maker needs to make an optimal
choice regarding the reduction in the costs stemming from costly price change, imperfect
competition and the costs arising from inefcient unemployment uctuations. Finally, the
third set of inefciencies is generated by distortionary taxation, or in other words by the
absence of lump-sum taxes in addition to the presence of unemployment benets.
We resort to numerical techniques to illustrate the dynamic implications of our setup.
Specically, we consider optimal policy responses in cases where the economy is hit either
by a positive technological shock or by positive government spending shock. The main re-
sults can be summarized as follows. An increase in the technological level, which leads
to an increase in consumption and employment, allows the Ramsey planner to reduce both
ination and the tax rate to fully exploit the benets of productivity enhancement. This
in turn leads to an increase in demand and increase in the rm's marginal prots, thereby
boosting vacancy posting and increasing employment. Thus, by exploiting the effects of
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the unexpected ination change, the Ramsey planner can correct for the inefciencies gen-
erated by matching externalities. Therefore we nd that, when search-matching frictions
characterize the labour markets, the optimal policy is achieved by deviating from strict
price stability. In other words, an optimal policy mix requires both ination and tax rate to
be volatile.
In addition, the presence of unemployment benets and the expectational dynamic
effects of tax rates on wages identify additional channels through which Ramsey planner
can inuence efciency. First, by using taxes, the Ramsey Planner can directly reduce
inefciencies stemming from the presence of unemployment benets. Second, tax changes
affect the contemporaneous wage through its effect on both current and the expected future
tax rates and thereby rms' marginal costs. We nd that the presence of distortionary taxes
allows the Ramsey planner to transfer part of the burden from using the ination changes
to tax changes, thereby making those two instruments complementary. In addition, we nd
that the optimal tax rate and the optimal level of real government liabilities inherit the time
series properties of the underlying shock, which is in contrast to the results obtained in the
standard New-Keynesian literature with sticky prices and Walrasian labour markets.
When the economy is hit by a positive government spending shock, optimality again
requires volatility in both ination and tax rates. However, under this shock, the optimal
deviation from strict price stability is smaller than in the previous case. But, the tax rate and
real government liabilities again inherit the time series properties of the underlying shock.
Moreover, the scal as well as price setting distortions turn out to be more important than
labour market inefciencies.
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We also nd that the optimal policy responses under a positive productivity shock
show a certain degree of overshooting in ination and the tax rate. In contrast to this case,
under a positive government spending shock, ination and tax rate are characterized by
undershooting occurring after several periods. This result is the consequence of the as-
sumption of commitment in policy maker behavior, whereby the policy maker internalizes
the current effects of its behavior on the agents' expectations regarding the future.
We organize the rest of the chapter as follows. In Section 4.1 we present the details of
the model subsequently used to analyze dynamic properties of the optimal policy. Section
4.2 sets up the Social Planner problem and discusses the specic differences between our
distorted economy and the socially optimal one. It also aims to provide additional intuition
for the Ramsey optimal behavior derived later on. In Section 4.3 we formally set out the
Ramsey problem and discuss the calibration issues in our model. Section 4.4 analyzes the
dynamic properties of optimal policy responses and Section 4.5 concludes. In Appendix
4.A, we provide a detailed account of the derivations underlying our model, whereas the
Appendix 4.B formally discusses the details of the numerical procedure employed to solve
for the Ramsey steady state.
4.1 The Model
Our model economy follows the recent literature by incorporating search and matching
frictions in the Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) tradition in an otherwise standard New
Keynesian DSGE framework. More precisely, we postulate the existence of a continuum
of innitely lived agents of total measure normalized to one who make decisions each pe-
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riod regarding consumption and non-state contingent securities. As is standard in most of
the search-matching literature, we abstract from labour participation decisions. In other
words, we assume that labour is inelastically supplied, whereby each agent can either be
employed or unemployed. This assumption can easily be justied on empirical grounds,
since most empirical studies suggest small uctuations over the participation margin at
business cycle frequencies. In particular, Elsby, Michaels, and Solon (2009) argue that be-
cause the adjustments in the participation margin over business cycles are small abstracting
from the intensive adjustment margin is a useful approximation which allows one to fo-
cus purely on labour market transition mechanisms. These arguments are widely used in
the theoretical work as a justication of the xed (over the business cycle) labour force
assumption.
We also assume that existing jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate and subject
transitions into employment to search and matching frictions. As the search and matching
externalities generate rents, the wage will be determined as a solution to a Nash bargaining
problem. Firms are assumed to act as monopolistic competitors producing differentiated
goods. To introduce a Keynesian spirit into the model and motivate the analysis of optimal
monetary and scal policy, price setting decisions are assumed to be affected by the convex
costs of price adjustment.
In this section we proceed by presenting the decision problems of the representative
rm and representative household. Moreover, we provide full characterization of the wage
determination problem via a Nash bargaining process as well as the decision problem of
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the government. We complete the section by dening the competitive equilibrium of our
model economy.
4.1.1 Production and the Firm's Problem
The production sector of our economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistically
competitive rms i each producing single variety of good whose measure is normalized to
one. Before production commences and in order to hire workers necessary for production
process, each rm must engage into the costly activity of vacancy openings. Following
Rotemberg (2006) each rm is assumed to be large in the sense that it employs many
workers who operate at different jobs indexed by j, in each individual rm. Each single
variety of good i is produced using labour as the sole factor of production. Moreover in
order to ll in the opened vacancies each rm must undertake a costly search activity in
order to match vacancy with a particular worker. After matches are formed, rms and
workers bargain over the pre-tax wage for every job j.
Based on our assumptions, we can write the total output in any job j within the
monopolistically competitive rm i as
yi;j;t = At (4.1)
where At denotes an aggregate technology process to be specied later. For simplicity we
will assume no heterogeneity among the employed workers with respect to their productive
capabilities. This allows us to suppress indexation over subscript j and write the total
aggregate output of a rm i as yi;t = Atni;t:
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We also assume that each rm i employs in aggregate ni;t workers and posts vi;t
vacancies every period. Following Blanchard and Gali (2008), Gertler, Sala and Tri-
gari (2008) and Krause, Lubik and Lopez-Salido (2008) we will depart from the stan-
dard search-matching literature assumption of time-to-hire. Instead we will assume that
the workers hired in period t start producing instantaneously. As argued by these afore-
mentioned authors, the assumption of "instantenous-hiring" is better description of labour
markets especially when prices are assumed to be sticky.
As in every search-matching model, the reduced form representation of the labour
market frictions is captured by an aggregate matching function. Under the instantaneous
hiring assumption general aggregate matching function is dened asMt  m(ut; vt)where
Mt denotes aggregate number of matches in period t; ut is the number of period t unem-
ployed and searching workers and vt is the total number of posted vacancies given by
vt =
1Z
0
vi;tdi. As previously stated matches are destroyed exogenously at the rate x
whereby we assume that this job destruction happens at the end of every period t. By
normalizing the size of the labour force to one we also make ut "before the separations"
unemployment rate.
The matching function is assumed to satisfy standard properties; that is to be con-
cave, continuously differentiable, homogenous of degree one and increasing in both of its
arguments. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale two meeting rates, that is
both the probability of a worker nding a job and a rm lling a vacancy will depend only
on the labour market tightness which we denote by t. We dene as t = vtut . Assuming
that each rm is sufciently large, the probability of a rm lling a vacancy in the next
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period is given by:
q(t) =
m(ut; vt)
vt
= m
 
 1t ; 1

(4.2)
Similarly the probability of a worker nding a job next period is given by:
p(t) =
m(ut; vt)
ut
= m (1; t) (4.3)
Under our assumptions the probability of a rm lling a vacancy will be a decreasing
(q0(t) < 0), whereas probability of a worker nding a vacancy will be an increasing
function of labour market tightness (p0(t) > 0). Intuitively, the tighter the labour market
is, the more likely a worker is to nd a job, and less likely a rm is to ll in the vacancy. It
is worthwhile noticing that both workers and rms take t as given when making optimal
decisions. Moreover, one should also notice that p(t) = tq(t).
We can now dene the law of motion for the rm's i workforce as
ni;t = (1  x)ni;t 1 + vi;tq(t) (4.4)
This law of motion implies that the number of workers employed in the rm i in period t
equals the number of workers employed in period t  1 who did not exogenously separate
in addition to the ow of new workers matched in period t.
Beside distortions arising from search-matching process, dening the crucial feature
of our model economy, we subject the rms to the costly price adjustment. Stickiness
in pricing behavior is modeled as in Rotemberg (1983). More precisely, we assume that
rms face a quadratic costs when changing prices; dened as t = 	2

Pi;t
Pi;t 1
  1
2
, with
parameter 	 > 0 representing the degree of sluggishness in the price adjustment process.
When 	 = 0 price changes are costless and we are back in the situation of perfect price
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exibility. We are fully aware that, by modelling price setting behavior as in Rotemberg
(1983), as opposite to the widely used Calvo (1984) mechanism, price dispersion is absent.
However, we opt for this setup since it implicitly assumes that consumers prefer series of
small price changes over a single large price change. And it is this type of behavior which
ts best the recent empirical evidence as reported in Chen et al. (2008).
When making optimal decisions, our representative rm i chooses number of vacan-
cies to post vi;t, current employment stock ni;t and prices pi;t in order to maximize the
expected present discounted value of its future real prot stream taking as given wages,
aggregate labour market conditions and consumers' demand for its differentiated product.
Formally, our rm i solves the following optimization problem
max
fni;t;vi;t;Pi;tg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
Qt;0

Pi;t
Pt
Yi;t   wi;tni;t   chvi;t  i;t

(4.5)
subject to
Yit =

pit
Pt
 
Yt (4.6)
ni;t = (1  x)ni;t 1 + vi;tg(t) (4.7)
whereE0 denotes a conditional expectation dened on all the available up to and including
time t = 0, and Qt;0 = t u
0(ct)
u0(c0)
represents the stochastic discount factor which rms use in
order to discount its real payoffs. Notice also that this stochastic discount factor is period
zero value of the rm's real prot ow to the representative family. The assumption of
a diversied ownership in every rm i, which makes families the ultimate owners of the
rms, explains why rms use this discount factor in order to discount its prots.
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Let us substitute the individual demand solution (4.6) into (4.5), and denote respec-
tively with mci;t and i;t the Lagrangian multipliers on the demand constraint and the
employment law of motion. Then the rst order conditions with respect to employment
and vacancies read as
i;t =  wi;t +mci;tAt + Et

Qt+1;t(1  x)i;t+1

(4.8)
and
ch
g(t)
= i;t (4.9)
By rearranging two previous equations we arrive at the standard search and matching job-
creation condition
ch
g(t)
=  wi;t +mci;tAt + Et

Qt+1;t(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)

(4.10)
where Qt+1;t =  u
0(ct+1)
u0(ct) is the prots discount factor between periods t + 1 and t. This
job creation condition implies that, by optimally choosing the number of vacancies to
post and number of workers to employ, the expected cost of vacancy posting must be
equated to the expected discounted value of the prots arising from marginal worker's
match. As implied by the right-hand side of (4.10), prots contain both wage cost and
marginal revenue product determining net earnings of the match on the margin, plus the
asset value of the pre-existing employment relationships which represents adjustment costs
savings.
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Taking the derivative of the objective function (4.5) with respect to individual prices
we obtain the following rst order condition:
(1  )

Pi;t
Pt
1 
1
Pi;t
Yt  	

Pi;t
Pi;t 1
  1

1
Pi;t 1
+ "i;t

Pi;t
Pt
1 
1
Pi;t
Yt
=  Et

t+1
t
	

Pi;t+1
Pi;t
  1

Pi;t+1
Pi;t
1
Pi;t

(4.11)
Additionally, by assuming symmetry among the rms which allows us to set Pt = Pi;t and
dening ination as t =
Pi;t
Pi;t 1
, we can rewrite the rst order condition for optimal price
determination and obtain a non-linear expectational Phillips curve of the following form
Yt [(1  ) + mct] = 	 (t   )t   Et [Qt+1;t	(t+1   )t+1] (4.12)
It is useful to point out, at this stage, the difference in markup solutions between the
models featuring search-matching externalities and the markups usually obtained under
the Walrasian labour markets assumption, rst noticed by Krause and Lubik (2007b). In
order to do so let us simplify the analysis and consider zero ination situation which allows
us to rewrite (4.12) and obtain the following expression for the marginal costs
mct =
wt
At
+
ch
g(t)
  Et
h
Qt+1;t(1  x) chg(t+1)
i
At
(4.13)
There is an evident difference between this marginal cost solution and the one de-
rived in the standard New Keynesian models with Walrasian labour markets. The rst
term in the marginal cost equation (4.13) represents the marginal (unit) cost of an em-
ployed worker and corresponds to the standard expression for the marginal cost obtained
under Walrasian labour markets assumption. The second term on the right hand side is a
direct consequence of the existence of long-term labour relationships in a search-matching
setup; the matches formed today, if not destroyed, will also have a positive value tomor-
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row. Therefore, there are cost savings present, arising from the absence of the need to
hire an additional worker next period. Thus, this second term on the RHS represents the
difference between average vacancy posting costs and the cost-savings stemming from
the long-term labour relationship. Moreover, these cost savings equivalently represent a
present discounted value of the worker's future marginal contributions.
4.1.2 Households
We assume the existence of a continuum of innitely lived identical households (families)
on the unit interval living in our economy. Each household is populated by a large number
of individuals who, as already stated, can either be employed or unemployed. In addition,
we also assume that all of the unemployed individuals are actively searching for the job
during their unemployment spell. In order to abstract from heterogeneity complications
arising from the difference in the employment status of particular family members, we fol-
low Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) by assuming that family members perfectly insure
each other against potential uctuations in income. This perfect consumption insurance
allows us then to analyze the behavior of the innitely lived representative family.
Representative family is characterized by preferences dened solely over real con-
sumption bundle denoted by ct and described by a single period utility function U(ct). The
utility function U is assumed to be continuous, strictly concave, twice continuously differ-
entiable and strictly increasing in its argument. The consumption bundle is dened as the
Dixit-Stiglitz CES aggregate of intermediate differentiated goods i
ct =
Z 1
0
cit
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
(4.14)
4.1 The Model 162
where " > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution
Besides making decisions regarding consumption, we allow families to invest but
restrict investment opportunities to one-period state contingent nominal assets. Every unit
of nominal asset pays a random amount Dt+1 if in the period t + 1 a particular state has
occurred. Then the problem of the representative family is to choose the consumption
and nominal assets sequences by maximizing the present discounted value of its future
consumption stream
max
fCt;Dtg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tU(ct) (4.15)
subject to their budget constraint dened in real terms as
ct + Etrt+1
Dt+1
Pt
= (1   t)wtnt + Dt
Pt
+ b(1  nt) + t (4.16)
wt stands for individual wage bill obtained by the employed representative family member
and b is the individual unemployment benet received by the unemployed family members
ut.  t is labour income tax paid by the employed workers and rt+1 is the period t price of
one unit of currency delivered in particular state of period t+ 1 divided by the probability
of that state's occurrence conditional on information available in period t. t denotes
aggregate prots received by the representative family based on their diversied ownership
stake in the rms. In addition to the budget constraint (4.16) households must satisfy the
constraint (4.17)
lim
j!1
Etpt+j+1Dt+j+1 > 0 (4.17)
which prevents them from engaging in Ponzi schemes at all dates and in all states, where
pt denotes period zero price of one unit of currency delivered in a particular state in period
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t, again divided by the probability of that state's occurrence conditional on information
available at time zero. Formally, pt =
tY
i=1
ri and p0  1.
When optimizing, the representative family proceeds in two steps. First it deter-
mines the optimal demand schedules for every single type of differentiated product by
minimizing the costs of bundle purchases
min
cit
Z 1
0
pitcitdi := PtCt (4.18)
subject to
Ct =
Z 1
0
cit
" 1
" di
 "
" 1
(4.19)
which results in the standard demand function for the single product variety i given by:
cit =

pit
Pt
 "
Ct (4.20)
Pt denotes the aggregate price index such that expenditures are at the minimum possible
level and is dened as:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pit
1 "di
 1
1 "
(4.21)
Let t denote the Lagrangian multiplier on the representative family budget con-
straint (4.16). The rst order conditions of the household's optimization problem can then
be written as:
U 0(ct) = t (4.22)
t
Pt
rt+1 = 
t+1
Pt+1
(4.23)
These two conditions can be combined in a single consumption Euler equation
U 0(ct) = RtEt

U 0(ct+1)
t+1

(4.24)
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which describes optimal intertemporal allocation of the consumption and also denes the
asset pricing kernel or stochastic discount factor explained earlier in the text. In order to
derive (4.24) we have used the fact that the Etrt+1 is the (average) price of the period-t as-
set paying one unit of currency in period t+1 in every state of the world. Therefore,Etrt+1
represents the inverse of the risk-free nominal interest rateRt, which when substituted into
(4.23) gives us (4.24).
4.1.3 Bellman Equations and Nash Bargaining
In what follows we dene the value functions characterizing both the rm's and worker's
decisions processes as well as the Nash bargaining problem of surplus sharing. A rm's
marginal value of employment relationship at time t is dened by:
Jet = mctAt   wt + Et

t+1
t

(1  x)Jet+1 (4.25)
The rst two terms on the LHS denote real revenues of the marginal worker whereas the
rest represents the continuation value of the existing job. With probability x the existing
job is destroyed and would therefore generate a zero value for the rm.
In similar fashion we can dene the marginal value of a job for an employed worker
as
Wet = (1   t)wt + Et

t+1
t

(1  x)Wet+1 + xUt+1

(4.26)
and the marginal value of unemployment for the same worker by
Ut = b+Et

t+1
t

t+1g(t+1) (1  x)Wet+1 + (1  t+1g(t+1)(1  x))Ut+1

(4.27)
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Equation (4.26) implies that the marginal value of a job for the employed equals
to the sum of the obtained wage and the continuation value. The continuation value is
dened as the sum of the part representing the expected present discounted value of the
continuation of the existing job, which occurs with the probability (1  x), and the part
that represents the discounted marginal value of becoming unemployed, which occurs with
the probability x. The marginal value of unemployment equals the unemployment ben-
ets plus the continuation value which is the sum of expected revenue from becoming
employed, and the expected discounted revenue obtained if she remains unemployed.
Externalities inherent in the search-matching process imply that successful matches
generate positive surplus relative to the continuation of the search process. This generated
surplus requires the specication of the wage setting mechanism. We follow most of the
literature and assume that the wages are determined by Nash bargaining (surplus sharing)
between both the newly-hired as well as the existing workers and rms. It is important to
stress that this bargained wage is taken as given by rms when making decisions regarding
employment and vacancies. That might seem to be a strong assumption, especially when
rms are assumed to be large. It might appear more natural to assume that large rms
take the employment effects on wages into account when determining the same. And this
would certainly be true in the cases where the wage is a function of the workers marginal
product, which is the condition that holds within the Nash bargaining setup. But, it can
easily be explained why the absence of the employment effect on bargained wages does
not inuence our results. The reason is that even if the rms believe they could manipulate
wages by either over- or under-hiring, the constant returns to scale assumption and the
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consequent independence of workers marginal product from the total employment prevents
them from doing so. In other words, although the holdup problems would be in principle
present in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides setup with exogenous productivity, there is
no lever at rms' disposal to strategically react to them. Additionally, as shown in Krause
and Lubik (2007a), the effect of the intra-rm bargaining on the search-matching process is
negligible. Thus, without loss of generality, we can deviate from the intra-rm bargaining
process, assumed for example in Rotemberg (2006), and trade it for greater analytical
convenience.
The presence of taxes slightly modies the standard form of the Nash bargaining
solution. In this case the problem of bargaining over wages in terms of Nash product
maximization can be written as:
wt(at) = argmax (W
e
t (at) Ut) (Jet(at) +D)1  (4.28)
whereWet (at)  Ut  Swt is the workers, and Jet(at)  Sft is the rms surplus from the
match. We dene  2 (0; 1) to be the share of the surplus going to the workers. Obviously
in order for the match to be benecial for both parties in the bargaining process, both
surpluses must be positive, that is Swt > 0 and S
f
t > 0 must be satised. In this case the
Nash bargaining problem admits a solution of the following form:47
Swt =
(1   t)
(1  ) S
f
t (4.29)
47 Detailed derivation are presented in Appendix 4.A at the end of this chapter.
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Substituting for Swt and S
f
t into the sharing rule (4.29) we derive the equation for the real
wage wt given by:
wt = mctAt + b
(1  )
(1   t)
+

(1   t)Et

t+1
t

(1  x) [ t+1    t + t+1g(t+1)(1   t+1)] c
h
g(t+1)
(4.30)
Several comments are useful in order to provide the intuition behind this wage solution.
The rst two terms of the bargained wage represents a convex combination of the total
contemporaneous payment to a rm from a marginal employment relationship (marginal
revenue product) and a minimum value obtained by the household in case of unemploy-
ment. The remaining terms are the consequence of the benets arising from the long term
employment relationship. More precisely, they capture forward looking aspects of those
relationships which are naturally capitalized in the period t wage. One should also notice
an additional important feature of our wage solution: the expectations of future wage taxes
determine the current wage and it is precisely this feature of wage equation which is the
novelty relative to the ones obtained in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. This ef-
fect of future taxes on current expectations generate dynamic effects on contemporaneous
wages and provide an additional incentive to analyse the optimal monetary-scal policy
mix.
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4.1.4 The Government
To complete the model description we need to characterize the government's behavior. In
every period the government generates exogenous stream of stochastic, unproductive pub-
lic spending of the government's consumption bundle gt.48 As in the households case,
the government consumption bundle is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of intermediate goods git
given by gt =
R 1
0
git
" 1
" di
 "
" 1 . The demand for a single variety of the intermediate good
i is obtained by solving cost minimization problem resulting in individual goods' demand
functions given by git =

pit
Pt
 "
gt. In addition to the unproductive spending, the gov-
ernment must nance the exogenous stream of unemployment benets b per unemployed
worker each period .
The total government expenditures are nanced by levying the endogenous wage
income tax at the rate  t and by issuing one-period state non-contingent nominal bonds
denoted by Bt. This allows us to dene the government budget constraint in real terms
as:
Bt
Pt
+  twtnt = Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+ gt + b(1  nt) (4.31)
It is important to point out the specics of the search-matching model with endoge-
nous taxation with respect to the treatment of the government budget constraint. In most of
the New-Keynesian search-matching literature, the government budget constraint can be
treated as a residual object due to the availability of lump-sum taxes which automatically
48 We do not maket government spending enter the utility function here. By doing this we do not
imply that the government spending is truly wasteful, which is certainly not true. It is pure analytical
convenience justied by the fact that our results would not be changed if the government spending entered
additively in the utility function.
4.1 The Model 169
adjust as needed.49 In that case unemployment benets would enter the household budget
constraint, but are excluded from the economy wide resource constraint. However, in our
case, the inability of government to use lump-sum taxes prevents us from treating (or in
other words ignoring) the government budget constraint as a residual object and requires a
precise specication of the government budget constraint as well as the economy wide re-
source constraint. This is necessary since, in the Ramsey problem subsequently analyzed
either the household or the government budget constraint, in addition to the aggregate re-
source constraint, enters as an optimisation object. Therefore, we assume that the benet
payments are simply the insurance transfers from the government to the unemployed. By
introducing such assumption our setup is also in line with most of the standard literature
on optimal monetary and scal policy.
4.1.5 Equilibrium
We are now ready to dene an equilibrium. As already pointed out, we concentrate our
analysis on symmetric equilibria. Aggregating the employment evolution conditions (4.7)
over individual rms we can dene aggregate employment as:
nt = (1  x)nt 1 + vtg(t) (4.32)
Since all of the families are alike, in equilibrium there will be no borrowing or lending
between them. This in turn implies that all of the interest-bearing asset holdings by families
49 See Krause and Lubik (2007b), Faia (2008, 2009) and Krause, Lubik and Lopez-Salido (2008) among
others.
4.1 The Model 170
must be in the form of government issued bonds. Formally
Dt = Rt 1Bt 1 (4.33)
must hold at all dates and in every state of the world. Using the households budget con-
straint, the government budget constraint and rm's prot function we obtain aggregate
demand which reads as:
Y dt = ct + gt + c
hvt +
	
2
(t   1)2 (4.34)
whereas the aggregate supply is given by:
Y st = ntAt (4.35)
Since wages in our model are determined in a Nash bargaining process we refer to our
equilibrium as a competitive bargaining equilibrium and dene it as:
Denition 2 Competitive bargaining equilibrium of a distorted competitive economy
is list of stochastic processes for prices fPtg1t=0 = fwt; tg and quantities fQtg1t=0 =fQFAt g1t=0; fQFWt g1t=0	 where
fQFAg1t=0 = fct; Dtg1t=0 (4.36)
fQFWt g1t=0 = fYt; nt; vt;mctg1t=0 (4.37)
such that given the process for the nominal interest rate and taxes fRt;  tg, exogenous
process for fAt; gtg and initial holdings R 1B 1, the following holds:
(i) given sequences of prices fPtg1t=0 an allocation fQFAg1t=0 solves the house-
hold maximization problem (4.15) subject to (4.16) and (4.17)
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(ii) an allocation fnt; vt;mctg1t=0 and price sequence ftg1t=0 solves the rms
maximization problem (4.5) subject to (4.6) and (4.7) and satisfy (4.10) and (4.11).
(iii) law of motion determining the number of employmed is given by (4.32).
(v) wages fwtg1t=0 are determined by Nash bargaining and satisfy (4.30).
(vi) markets clear, (4.17), (4.33) and (4.31) hold and Y dt = Y st = Yt.
4.2 Social Planner's Problem
In order to gain some intuition for the optimal scal and monetary policy results and be-
fore proceeding to the analysis of the Ramsey problem, we will rst analyze the conditions
of the constrained-efcient allocation chosen by a benevolent Social Planner. As already
described there are several distortions characterizing our model economy. Beside ones
present in the standard New-Keynesian models, such as imperfect competition and costly
price adjustment, we introduce distortionary proportional labour taxation and most impor-
tantly search-matching frictions. Those frictions together with distortionary labour taxa-
tion impose additional restrictions on the decentralized economy which to our knowledge
have not been analyzed before in the literature on the optimal monetary and scal policy.50
Before formalizing the Social Planner's problem it is worth noticing the irrelevance
of unemployment benets for the efciency conditions. This is because unemployment
benets do not enter the economy wide resource constraint, since they represent transfers
between families and the government. In other words, efciency is determined solely by
50 Possible exceptions include Faia (2009) who ignores scal considerations; and Sanya and Chugh
(2008) who ignore price adjustment costs but introduce "time to hire" assumption.
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the characteristics of the preferences and technology and, under our assumptions, benets
characterize neither of them.51
Let us slightly simplify the analysis by abstracting from price adjustment costs and
monopolistic competition distortions in order to concentrate on the labour markets mech-
anism. In this case Social Planner's problem can be stated as
max
fct;nt;vtg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tu(ct) (4.38)
subject to aggregate resource constraint and employment evolution condition represented
by following two equations
ntAt = ct + gt + c
hvt (4.39)
nt = (1  x)nt 1 +M(ut; vt) (4.40)
Let us denote with 1t and 2t Lagrangian multipliers on the previous two constraints.
Then the following three equations represent the rst order conditions for consumption,
employment and vacancies
ct
  = 1t (4.41)
t
 
At
1
t   b  2t

+ t+1Et

2t+1(1  x +Mnt+1((1  (1  x)nt); vt+1))

= 0
(4.42)
 1t ch + 2tM vt ((1  (1  x)nt 1); vt)) = 0 (4.43)
51 The same condition holds within the Walrasian labour markets setup.
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where M vt and Mnt denote the rst derivatives of the aggregate matching function with
respect to vacancies and employment. Motivated by the empirical studies summarized in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) we follow most of the search-matching literature and
postulate the aggregate matching function to be of a Cobb-Douglas form:
m(ut; vt) = mu

tv
1 
t (4.44)
Here m represents the efciency parameter of the matching technology and  determines
relative contribution of unemployment to the matching process (as well as the elasticity
of the hazard rates with respect to the labour market tightness). Under the Cobb-Douglas
assumption the following two expressions deneM vt andMnt :
M vt = m(1  ) t
Mnt =  (1  x)m1 t
Rearranging (4.42) and substituting forMnt+1, we get
At
1
t   b  2t + (1  x)Et
h
2t+1(1  m1 t+1 )
i
= 0 (4.45)
Using (4.43) and the denition of the matching function, the following interim condition
emerges
ch
m
t =
2t
1t
(1  ) (4.46)
By substituting (4.46) into (4.45) and rearranging we nally obtain the optimality condition
(rst best solution) for the Planner's problem in terms of the optimal evolution of labour
market tightness
ch
m
t = (1  )At + (1  x)Et

ct+1
ct
  
ch
m
t+1(1  m1 t+1 )

(4.47)
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We are now in position to determine the conditions which allow the decentralized
solution to be supported as Pareto efcient one. Thus, we proceed by comparing the So-
cial Planner solution for the evolution of the labour market tightness with the decentral-
ized Nash bargaining solution. One can immediately notice that four necessary conditions
emerge:
 marginal costsmct must be equal to one in all states and 8t
 unemployment benets must be set to zero
 proportional tax rate  t must be some positive constant in all states and 8t
 bargaining power  must be equal to the elasticity of matching function 
There are several important point to notice. First, it is easy to see the equivalence be-
tween our rst condition and the condition obtained under Walrasian labour markets in
standard New-Keynesian models which renders perfect competition in both settings. Sec-
ond, our last condition is equivalent to the Pareto efciency condition obtained by Hosios
(1990) in a partial equilibrium setting and in the absence of proportional taxation. How-
ever, the difference in the assumed labour market mechanism, as well as the addition of
distortionary taxation, result in the two extra conditions which are absent from both the
standard New-Keynesian models with Walrasian labour markets as well as from partial
equilibrium search-matching models. Both of the conditions are a direct consequences of
the search-matching framework with distortionary taxation.
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Before proceeding, let us slightly depart from the rest of the analysis and point out
an interesting result which arises in a situation of zero unemployment benets and per-
fect competition, which shows, somewhat surprisingly, that the Ramsey planner is able to
implement the socially efcient outcome with positive proportional wage tax. In what fol-
lows we will combine several simplifying assumptions in order to shed some light on the
incentives imposed on the optimizing policy maker.
4.2.1 Socially Efcient Allocation and Proportional Labour Tax
As already said, let us consider the simple case where the economy is characterized by per-
fect competition. We will also assume that the Hosios condition is satised and abstract
from the benets otherwise accruing to the workers. In this setting and under positive gov-
ernment spending, the Ramsey Planner has only the labour wage tax as policy instrument
at his disposal. Because of the assumed positive government spending, the wage income
tax must be set at the rate different from zero. Yet, the Ramsey planner can still imple-
ment steady state socially-efcient allocation even with a positive labour tax. This result
might come as a surprise, but it can easily be explained. The intuition behind this result
lies in the way the Ramsey planner implements its policy. It is well known that a Ramsey
planner will typically implement his policy by inuencing the allocations by affecting the
prices. Within our simplied setup real wage is the "price" to be manipulated in order to
achieve the desired result. Therefore the question to be answered is how wages react to the
changes in wage tax rate. This in turn provides the intuition behind our result.
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By inspecting the steady state solution for the Nash bargained wage derived from
(4.30) it is easy to see that, within our simplied setup, the steady state wage is independent
of the labour income tax rate. On the other hand, the wage is crucial for determining the
number of vacancies posted by rms, which in the case of invariance of the wage with
respect the change in the tax rate implies independence of vacancies' margin on wage
taxation. Furthermore, since labour supply by households is inelastic, no other decision
is affected by the changes in tax rates. That implies that no allocation will be affected by
the fact that labour income tax is non-zero positive number. In this case labour tax can be
thought of as lump-sum labour levy which allows Ramsey to attain the rst best solution
even with positive wage tax rate.52
However the case of zero unemployment benets is clearly unrealistic and empir-
ically irrelevant one. Moreover, by introducing imperfect competition and sticky prices
considerations even with endogenous time varying taxation the Ramsey planner will in
general not be able to implement socially efcient outcome even if the Hosios condition is
satised. In what follows we will concentrate on the case in which unemployment benets
are strictly positive and the economy is characterized by the all of the previously detailed
distortions.
52 The zero benets assumption is crucial for the derivation of our previous result. Alternatively, one
can think of zero benets assumption as the situation which mimics the indifference between working
and not working in the economy with perfect consumption insurance. In this case, that is if individuals
are truly indifferent between working and not working, taxes will not affect steady state wage and or any
other allocation. This in turn allows Ramsey planner to implement socially efcient allocation even with
positive labour tax but conditional on the search-matching distortions being neutralized via the Hosios
condition.
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4.2.2 Policy Maker's Trade-Offs
Let us rst consider the case where Ramsey planner is confronted with sticky prices but
government spending is assumed to be absent and the Hosios conditions is satised. In
this case the Social Planner achieves optimum by setting t = 1 at all times that is by
following the policy of strict price stability. The reason that drives this behavior is simple.
Price stickiness implies loss of real resources in the process of costly price adjustment and
therefore the best thing policy maker can do is to prevent prices from changing.
However introducing scal considerations into the analysis changes the results. It
is clear that policy maker faces a dynamic trade-off along several dimensions within our
setup. First, as it is the standard case in the models with state non-contingent debt, the
government would like to use unanticipated ination as an non-distortionary tax on the -
nancial wealth. By behaving in such way, the policy maker's need to vary distortionary
taxes over the business cycle would be minimized. Furthermore, the presence of the mo-
nopolistic competition implies suboptimal level of production and demand and, as shown
by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a), provides additional motive for the policy maker to
deviate from strict price stability. However, the abandonment of strict price stability would
not be costless. The presence of price adjustment costs implies that the use of unantic-
ipated ination imposes an additional cost on the rms facing nominal rigidities. This
in turn generates the standard trade-off between tax smoothing and price stability which
is present both in the standard Walrasian setup as well as in under the search-matching
mechanism.
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As already stated the most important distinction between standard New Keynesian
models used for the optimal monetary and scal policy analysis and the one presented
in this paper is the replacement of Walrasian auctioneer with the matching technology.
But, this departure from the standard setup, in addition to providing the more realistic
description of labour markets, introduces additional distortions which are caused by the
costly search-matching process. As previously shown, the presence of search-matching
externalities generates deviations from the Pareto efcient outcome which are caused by
the government nanced unemployment benets and the deviation from the well-known
Hosios condition. Therefore, these inefciencies (in addition to the ones caused by the
imperfect competition and sticky price adjustment) introduce an additional dimension in
the trade-off faced by policy maker choosing path of ination and labour tax rates.
In order to gain some intuition on the specics of particular trade-offs, let us rst
concentrate on the situation which arises in the case of deviation from Hosios efciency
condition. When the Hosios condition is not satised and the bargaining power is low, the
rms protability of forming a match is large. This induces excessive vacancy creation and
the unemployment rate falls below the socially efcient level. In the opposite case, when
the bargaining power is larger than the matching function elasticity, vacancy creation falls
below socially efcient level which results in the unemployment rate above the Pareto
efcient rate. And, as shown by Hosios, any deviation from the equality of bargaining
power and the matching elasticity requires some kind of hiring subsidy in order to restore
efciency. If no hiring subsidy is available (which is the case in our model), both monetary
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policy through ination and tax policy in hands of scal authority can be used in order to
steer the economy towards socially efcient outcome.
The intuition for the effects of labour taxes can be provided by considering the steady
state wage equation. In the steady state with positive unemployment benets, even if the
Hosios condition is satised, the rms are creating vacancies below the socially efcient
level which implies that the extensive margin is inefcient. This costly vacancy creation
crowds out private consumption which is the consequence of the imposed resource con-
straint. Furthermore, positive government spending nanced via labour income tax leads
to even bigger increase in the bargained wage which again lowers the steady state vacancy
creation. In this case, the Ramsey planner would like to nd the optimal mix of efciency
and government budget nancing and has the incentive to create negative steady state in-
ation and to reduce the tax rate since this would increase demand and thereby prots
and increase the number of vacancies created. But again the presence of sticky prices and
monopolistic competition implies a trade-off for this kind of policy.
In a dynamic setting, the price change incentives of a Ramsey policy maker can
be understood by forward solving equation representing the job creation condition (4.10)
which yields
ch
g(t)
=
1X
k=0
((1  x))k EtQt+k;t (mct+kAt+k   wt+k) (4.48)
As in the standard New-Keynesian model, the real leverage at the disposal of mone-
tary policy is a result of imperfect competition and costly price adjustment process. More-
over it is known that the presence of monopolistic competition implies positive markup
over marginal cost which generates the inefciency since the marginal cost of good pro-
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duction is now below the marginal utility of consuming the same. Therefore, as pointed
out by Mankiw (1990) and Romer (1993), if feasible policies exist it would be desirable to
use them in order to expand aggregate economic activity. It is the price stickiness that pro-
vides the monetary policy with certain ability to alter the markup and thereby to expand
or to contract the economic activity. In our setup, this mechanism will also allow mone-
tary policy to affect labour market inefciencies again by affecting the markup as well as
marginal costs through the change in demand.
Conversely, by increasing ination above zero the Ramsey planner would decrease
demand and thereby prots. The reason is that, in the sticky prices setup, costly price
adjustment makes the markup countercyclical. In other words, a decrease in the demand
leads to a decrease in the marginal cost which, because of the slow price adjustment,
increases the price markup and thereby reduces prots. By inspecting the equation (4.48)
one can easily see that this would in turn lead to a reduction in the number of vacancy
posted, an increase in the congestion externality and a reduction in inefcient employment
level. In addition, the incentives for excessive use of ination will certainly be dampened
because of the costly price adjustment. This will contribute to the aforementioned policy
trade-offs.
On the other hand scal policy impacts the decisions by directly affecting wages. By
inspecting the wage equation (4.30) one should notice that the time-varying tax rate in-
troduces an extra wedge in the bargaining process. This dynamic effect of the taxes on
wages is the channel through which scal policy can affect and correct the inefciencies
in the labour market and as far as we know it is the channel that has yet not been ana-
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lyzed in the literature. However in order to determine optimal responses of both monetary
and scal policies in the presence of various shocks, as well as to explain which of the
aforementioned channels dominate requires resorting to numerical techniques which we
subsequently do.
Specic Monetary Policy Trade-Off in the Presence of Real Imperfections
Before proceeding to the numerical analysis is it worthwhile elaborating on the re-
sults rst noticed by Faia (2009) regarding the trade-off facing monetary policy. It is
widely known that the design of optimal monetary policy depends on the implementability
of a exible price allocation with constant mark-up in the presence of monopolistic com-
petition. Most of the literature in the New Keynesian tradition concludes that it is optimal
to set the deviation of the output gap and ination from its exible price level to zero. This
holds under both technology and government spending shocks.53 The necessary condition
for this condition to hold is that exible price allocation with constant markups is always
implementable. which will indeed be the case in the presence of Walrasian labour mar-
kets and no cost-push shocks caused by real imperfections. However it is easy to show this
condition can no longer be satised when search-matching frictions are present. In order
to show impossibility of the implementation of the exible price allocation with constant
markup, let us compare the expectational Phillips curve under the assumption of Walrasian
labour markets with the corresponding condition in the presence of search-matching ex-
ternalities. Within the Walrasian labour markets assumption the Phillips curve is given
53 For a textbook treatment of the optimal monetary policy issues see Gali (2008), and for more advanced
exposition see Woodford (2003a).
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by
(1  ) +  wt
At
 	(t   ) t
Yt
+ Et [Qt+1;t	(t+1   )t+1] 1
Yt
= 0 (4.49)
It is easy to see that if the monetary policy is following the rule of strict price stability at
every date and in every state, the exible price equilibrium with constant markup, which
also coincides with the socially optimal one, will be implemented. In this case the wages
move one to one with the corresponding move in the productivity implying no change in
the marginal costs as well as no change in the average markup which coincides with the
desired one.
Let us now consider the Phillips curve (4.12) derived under the assumption of search-
matching labour markets and assume that the monetary policy is following the rule of strict
price stability. By substituting job creation condition (4.10) into (4.12) and rearranging we
get
(1  ) + 
0@wt
At
+
ch
g(t)
  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h
Qt+1;t(1  x) chg(t+1)
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= 	(t   ) t
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+ Et [Qt+1;t	(t+1   )t+1] 1
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(4.50)
where
mct =
wt
At
+
ch
g(t)
  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h
Qt+1;t(1  x) chg(t+1)
i
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(4.51)
Comparing equation (4.50) with (4.49) it is easy to see that in the presence of search-
matching externalities the policy maker following the rule of strict price stability can never
implement exible price allocation with constant markup. The reason lies in the fact that
the future asset value of pre-existing employment relationships, which as already stated,
represents the savings on the adjustment costs, makes the marginal cost variable in re-
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sponse to the changes in productivity. This in turn prevents the policy maker from imple-
menting the exible price allocation with constant markup. To gain additional intuition,
let us suppose that At increases. From the job creation condition this change implies in-
crease in the ch
g(t)
which in turn leads to the increase in the second term on the RHS of
the marginal cost equation (4.51) that is to overall increase in marginal costs. But this in-
crease in marginal costs needs to be accompanied by the increased prices. Under quadratic
price adjustment costs, rms prefer to smooth out the price changes over time, but in-
ation would still immediately rise implying that exible price allocation is not feasible.
This inherent variability of the marginal cost in the search-matching setup represents a real
imperfection which is caused by a term equivalent to the time varying endogenous cost
push shock. Moreover, it generates dynamic trade-off for the monetary policy between
stabilizing prices and stabilizing employment.
4.3 The Ramsey Problem
We dene optimal monetary and scal policy as the process for fRt;  tg such that the
choice of Rt and  t results in the competitive bargaining equilibrium associated with the
highest level of utility for the representative family. In other words, it is the optimal pol-
icy determined by monetary and scal authority which jointly maximizes the present dis-
counted value of representative family's utility, conditional on the constraints imposed by
the competitive bargaining economy.
We conduct our analysis by using the "semi" primal approach in the spirit of Lu-
cas and Stokey (1983). As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b), in a setup
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with sticky prices and state non-contingent debt (in contrast to the setup with either ex-
ible price or the one with sticky prices and state contingent debt) it is no longer possible
to reduce equilibrium conditions to a single period zero implementability constraint and
feasibility constraint holding in every period.54 This impossibility carries over to the setup
with search-matching frictions and sticky prices which is also pointed out by Faia (2009).
Thus we need to nd a minimum number of constraints' describing a competitive bargain-
ing equilibrium involving, in as much as possible, only a real allocation. It turns out that
following set of constraints in addition to (4.22) and (4.23) is sufcient to fully describe
competitive bargaining equilibrium
ch
g(t)
= (1  )mctAt   b (1  )
(1   t)
+Et
t+1
t
(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)

1  
(1   t)( t+1    t + t+1g(t+1)(1   t+1))

(4.52)
Yt [(1  ) + mct] = 	 (t   )t   Et [Qt+1;t	(t+1   )t+1] (4.53)
nt = (1  x)nt 1 +mutv1 t (4.54)
dt = Rt
dt 1
t
+Rt(st   Tt) (4.55)
ntAt = ct + gt + c
hvt +
	
2
(t   1)2 (4.56)
54 For details see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b).
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The rst equation determines the evolution of labour market tightness and it is obtained
by substituting Nash bargained wage (4.30) into the job creation condition (4.10). The
last equation determines the evolution of government liabilities and can be obtained by
substituting dt = Rt BtPt , st = gt + b(1   nt) and Tt =  twtnt into government budget
constraint (4.31).
We can therefore dene the Ramsey problem as the one to choose fct; t; nt; vt;mct; t; Rt;  t; ltg1t=0
that maximize E0
P1
t=0 
tU(ct), subject to (4.22), (4.23), (4.52), (4.53), (4.54), (4.55) and
(4.56), taking as given fgt; Atg1t=0 and values of the choice variables listed above dated
t < 0, and values of the Lagrange multipliers associated with the above constraints dated
t < 0. In order to derive this reduced system we rst eliminate the wage from (4.56)
by using (4.30) and then cast t in terms of nt 1 and vt only by substituting for the rela-
tionship between labour market tightness and employment as well as for the relationship
between employment and unemployment. Those two relationships are given by t = vtut
and ut = 1   (1   x)nt 1 respectively. In this way we eliminate t and ut and rewrite
the problem solely in terms of nt and vt. However we deliberately leave the interest rate
Rt and the tax rate  t as Ramsey choice variables and thereby depart from the pure pri-
mal approach which casts the Ramsey problem solely in terms of quantities. We name
our specication "semi" primal because of mixing the allocation and policy variables as
Ramsey choices.
It is known that Ramsey problem will be time inconsistent in general. We solve
the problem of time inconsistency by following most of the literature and assume that the
government has the ability to fully commit to the state contingent plans announced at date
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t = 0. Moreover, our formal denition of the Ramsey problem implies an assumption that
the government has been operating for an innite number of periods in the past. This in turn
implies that the government is honoring its past promises when making optimal decisions,
which is referred in the literature as "timeless-perspective" optimality, rst introduced by
Woodford (2003). In addition, we assume also that the rst order conditions of the Ramsey
problem are necessary and sufcient and that all of the allocations are in the interior of the
feasible set.
4.4 Functional Forms and Calibration
As it is standard in most of the New-Keynesian literature we parameterize per period utility
function to be of CRRA form which is given by
U(ct) =
c1 t   1
1   (4.57)
where  determines the curvature of the utility function and also denes the coefcient
of relative risk aversion. Following most of the real business cycles literature we set this
parameter to 2.
The employment rate is calibrated to 0:9 which falls well within the range of val-
ues used in the search-matching literature. Following den Haan et al. (2000) we set rms
matching rate to 0:7 and the exogenous probability of job destruction to 0:1. Motivated
by the empirical work surveyed by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) we set the match-
ing elasticity with respect to unemployment to 0:4. Using the denition of the matching
function, and the condition determining number of searching workers, we can obtain ex-
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pression for the steady state number of matches. This allows us to derive the expression
for the value of the search efciency parameterm and the expression for the labour market
tightness calibration which are given respectively by:
m =

x
n
u

(q())1  and  =

m
q()
 1

(4.58)
In calibrating the model we deliberately deviate from the assumption of Hosios efciency
in order to confront the policy maker with labour market distortions as previously ex-
plained and set the value of bargaining power to 0:6.
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) we assume that the deterministic steady
state of our competitive economy is characterized by the ination rate of 4:2% which is
the average growth rate of U.S. GDP deator between 1960   2008. We calibrate annual
interest rate at 4% which results in the subjective discount factor  of 0:9902. Moreover
we postulate the steady state value for the markup of prices over the marginal cost to be
10%, which implies the value of the constant elasticity of substitution parameter " of 11:
The steady state value of government spending share in GDP is set to 17% which is
in line with most of the literature on optimal monetary and scal policy. We also assume
that all of the government revenues are collected from wage taxation. Moreover we devi-
ate from the simplifying assumption of balanced budget widely used in the literature and
assume the steady state of government debt to GDP to be 44%. This number is in line with
the U.S. empirical facts and widely used across most of the literature. Using the steady
state version of (4.31) we can calibrate the steady state value of government receipts. We
also normalize the steady state value of technology to one.
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We are left with three additional parameters to calibrate which are the value of va-
cancy posting costs, unemployment benets and the steady state wage tax rate. In order to
calibrate those parameters we postulate the value of unemployment benets to be 40% of
the steady state wage. This value is in line with empirical observations by Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2003). We proceed by solving the three equation system determined by (4.30),
(4.52) and the steady state version of expression for scal revenues and obtain the values
required for calibration.
Exogenous processes for the government spending gt and aggregate productivity are
assumed to evolve according to univariate autoregressive process given respectively by:
log(gt) = (1  G) log(gss) + G log(gt 1) + "Gt (4.59)
and
log(At) = (1  A) log(Ass) + A log(At 1) + "At (4.60)
where "Gt and "At are iid shocks with standard deviations Gt and At . Following the esti-
mation by Lambertini et al. (2007) we set the value of autoregressive coefcient for the
government spending process to 0:9 and for the technology progress to 0:88. Standard
deviations of "Gt and "At are set to 0:016 and 0:0064. Time unit is assumed to be a quarter.
4.4.1 Dynamic Responses of Optimal Policies
To analyze the optimal behavior of the government benevolent in the Ramsey sense we
examine the optimal responses of both monetary and scal policy instruments when sub-
jected to neutral technology as well as to government expenditure shocks. Following
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), we dene the Ramsey equilibrium as an equilibrium that
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maximizes lifetime utility of the representative family with respect to the competitive equi-
librium constraints, as detailed in the section describing the Ramsey problem. We should
point out that the difference between our equilibrium denition and the standard Ramsey
equilibrium is purely technical. Under the standard Ramsey equilibrium denition, the op-
timality conditions in the rst period are different from the ones in the subsequent periods.
In our case and under the "timeless-perspective" assumption, the structure of optimality
conditions is time invariant.
In order to obtain the dynamic responses of the Ramsey policies we solve for the rst
order conditions of the Ramsey problem using MATLAB's symbolic solver and compute
second order approximation of the conditions obtained around the Ramsey steady state.55
We dene the Ramsey steady state as long run (stationary) allocation that characterizes the
non-stochastic steady state of the Ramsey's rst order conditions.
Let us rst consider dynamic responses of the optimal policy to the 1% positive tech-
nology shock. Impulse responses of the selected variables are showed in Figure 4.1. As can
be seen from this gure, positive increase in the productivity leads to the increase in both
consumption and employment. This allows a Ramsey benevolent government to reduce in-
ation as well as the wage tax rate and thereby fully exploit the benets of the productivity
increase. As previously explained, the inefciencies resulting from the search-matching
process imply a natural trade-off between ination, tax stabilization and inefcient em-
ployment uctuations. Under the positive productivity shock, reduction in the inefcient
employment uctuation can be accommodated easily by this improved productivity. It is
55 We use perturbation algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004c). The details of the
numerical procedure used to obtain the Ramsey steady state can be found in Appendix 4.B.
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Fig. 4.1. Impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% positive productivity shock.
All variables except the interest rate, the tax rate and the ination are expressed as a
percentage deviation from the Ramsey steady state. The interest rate, the tax rate and
the ination rate are expresed in terms of percentage points.
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therefore reasonable for the policy maker to reduce ination and wage tax rate in order
to boost the consumption and thereby increase aggregate demand. Given sticky prices,
this would lead to an increase in marginal costs and a decrease in the markup. Moreover
marginal prots increase and labour demand increases. It is worthwhile emphasizing that
employment volatility would not sub-optimal in our setting since the family members are
fully insured against changes in employment status. It turns out that the price volatility
is also not sub-optimal. The explanation for this result is pretty simple, and one can eas-
ily see the similarity of this result to the corresponding result which arrises in the standard
New-Keynesian model with exogenous cost push shocks. It is a pure consequence of the
search-matching imperfections which introduce endogenous real cost push shock into the
expression for marginal cost, making the marginal cost, and thereby optimal ination, time
varying.
Moreover, introducing the scal policy into the story provides two additional reasons
for the policy maker to deviate from strict price stability. Firstly, as already pointed out,
the inability to issue nominal state contingent claims, as well as the absence of lump-sum
taxes, makes the use of the unexpected ination as an implicit lump-sum tax on privately
held government debt particularly attractive for the policy maker. Secondly, the presence
of unemployment benets as a rent accruing to the families, and the absence of the di-
rect instrument to tax these transfers, induces the Ramsey planner again to use ination
as an implicit lump-sum tax. All of those distortions call for volatile ination when con-
sidered separately. In the model with matching frictions this turns out to be true even
when considering these distortions jointly. More precisely, and somewhat in contrast to
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New-Keynesian literature on optimal monetary and scal policy, the presence of matching
frictions calls for ination volatility by optimal policy maker. This result is more in line
with the exible price case optimal policy recommendations.56 However, under plausible
parameter calibration it turns out that the optimal policy in our setup calls for volatile wage
taxes which now contrasts the exible price literature where the ination takes the role of
a shock absorber of unexpected innovations in scal decit. In addition, the optimal pol-
icy requires larger tax response to the positive productivity shock then is the response of
real government liabilities which implies greater role of tax rate as a scal shock absorbers
relative to the liabilities.
Let us provide more intuition behind this results. As already noted, we can cali-
brate our model such that the workers bargaining power is above social planner efcient
condition which implies low producers incentive to post vacancies. In this case the unem-
ployment rate is above Pareto efcient one, and as already explained the presence of un-
employment benets implies an even greater deviation from Pareto efcient employment.
Since the policy maker has two instruments at its disposal, the inefcient unemployment
uctuations can be offset by using both ination and wage tax. But the use of ination is
not without its costs, whereas there is no direct real cost of using taxes. It turns out that re-
gardless of the costly ination change it still pays the Ramsey planner not to give up the
ination instrument completely, but to combine the use of both unexpected ination and
tax rate deviation in order to dampen the inefcient employment uctuations. Neverthe-
56 For the analysis within a New-Keynesian paradigm see Goodfriend and King (2001) and Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004a,b and 2005) among others; and for the RBC exible price optimal monetary and
scal policy analysis see Chari et. al. (1991).
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less, this reduction in inefcient unemployment uctuations, together with lower interest
rates and the deation induced, leads to a higher level of real government liabilities. In
other words, the reduction in the tax rate in addition to the deation actually boosts the
real value of government liabilities.
Why is it then optimal to reduce tax rate in response to positive productivity shock?
Again, the Ramsey planner wants to take full advantage of technological improvement and
the reduction in the tax rate has the same implication on marginal costs as ination. By re-
ducing tax rates the policy maker reduces the inefciencies generated by the presence of
unemployment benets and induces the rms to increase vacancy posting and thereby em-
ployment. This in turn leads to an increase in marginal costs and a decrease in markup. The
reduction in tax rates is nanced by the increase in the real government liabilities which
allows policy maker to reduce the ination change (as well as ination costs) needed to re-
duce the inefciency generated by the search-matching friction. In other words reduction
in tax rate offsets the part of the deation burden the policy maker would need to under-
take in the absence of this instrument. In short, the optimal policy mix requires the use of
both deation and decrease in the tax rate in response to the positive neutral technological
shock thereby making deation and reduction in the tax rate complementary.
It is important to notice the overshooting of both ination and tax rate, with the tax
rate overshooting happening later then the ination. This is the result to be expected for
the policy maker that acts under commitment. The explanation is that under commitment
the policy maker is taking into account its ability to inuence future expectation. Thus, by
overshooting the planner is compensating for the initial changes thereby internalizing the
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Fig. 4.2. Impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% positive government spending
shock. All variables except the interest rate, the tax rate and the ination rate are ex-
pressed as a percentage deviation from the Ramsey steady state. The interest rate, the
tax rate and the ination rate are expresed in terms of percentage points.
effect of its policies on the future paths of available instruments. Additionally, one should
notice that our results contrast the New-Keynesian optimal policy literature with respect to
the time series properties of both taxes and government debt. In our case neither tax nor
public liabilities smoothing is optimal. In other words, neither of variables is characterized
by a near random walk behavior. The intuition behind this result lies in the inelastic labour
supply assumption. Under this assumption taxes are distortionary only to the producers
since they affect the wages and thereby incentive to post vacancies, whereas the families
decisions on labour supply are invariant to the changes in tax rate.
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Figure 4.2 presents the optimal dynamics of the variables of interest under the 1%
positive government spending shock. We can see that the unexpected increase in the gov-
ernment spending has an opposite effect on all of the variables of interest. Namely, employ-
ment, consumption and real liabilities now decrease, implying crowing out of private by
government consumption. In contrast to the optimal policy following unexpected technol-
ogy change, the policy maker now increases both ination and wage tax rate. Moreover, the
optimal behaviour is again somewhat in contrast to the prediction of the New-Keynesian
literature with Walrasian labour markets. More precisely, perfect price stability is again
sub-optimal as is tax smoothing as well. However, the optimal deviation from price stabil-
ity in this case is much smaller than under an unexpected technology shock of comparable
size, which is in line with the standard New-Keynesian literature. In our setup the tax in-
crease and the deviation from price stability induce a fall in the value of real government
liabilities. The reason is that the increase in taxes reduces the burden of newly issued li-
abilities and by deviating from price stability the Ramsey planner is inating away the
part of the real value of government outstanding debt. In other words, despite the costly
price change, an optimal policy maker would nd it optimal to inate away the part of
real government liabilities and would be helped in doing so by the increase in tax rate. It
turns out therefore that under an government spending shock, the scal with price adjust-
ment distortions taken together are larger then the ones induced by the search-matching
inefciencies.
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Simple Implementable. Policy Rules
The outcomes of the Ramsey-type welfare-maximizing framework are important the-
oretical constructs, but they remain silent on the issue of what policy regime can implement
them. Specically, the solution of the Ramsey problem provides information only about
the equilibrium behavior of the policy variables such as ination, tax rates or interest rates
which is of limited practical relevance for the real world policy maker. As pointed out by
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), the fact that the Ramsey equilibrium processes for the
policy variables are function of all of the state variables and exogenous driving forces im-
poses serious problems for the practical monetary and scal policy conduct for at least two
reasons. First, it is extremely difcult to extract the information regarding the state of those
variables. Second, even if the policy maker had all of the information needed regarding
the state of the economy, using the equilibrium processes of the policy variables to dene
a policy regime would not guarantee a Ramsey outcome as the competitive equilibrium,
since such a regime can lead to equilibrium multiplicity.
It would be outside the scope of this chapter to resolve this implementability issue,
but it is useful to compare the implications of the Ramsey plan with the simple imple-
mentable rules approximating real world policy conduct. Therefore, in this section we
contrast the Ramsey policy with simple interest rate and tax rate rules whose simplicity
lies in the fact that everything that is required by policy maker in order to implement them
is contained in the information provided by several observable macroeconomic variables.
We follow most of the literature to specify the Taylor type interest rate rule of the following
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form:
log(
Rt
R
) =  log(
t

) + y log(
yt
y
) (4.61)
A simple scal rule following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) and Chadha and Nolan
(2007) can be written as:
Tt = T
 + {(dt 1   d) (4.62)
Superscript  denotes the Ramsey steady state value of the respective variable, whereas ,
y and { represent the response parameters. According to this interest rate rule, monetary
policy adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to a log deviation of ination and output
from their respective Ramsey steady state values. Fiscal policy reacts by adjusting the tax
revenues in response to a deviation of the real value of government liabilities from its
Ramsey steady state. Based on the large empirical evidence showing that many central
banks follow the policy of strong ination targeting we set  = 3. Following Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999b) y is set to 0:125. Furthermore, we set { to 0:5 which implies that
in each period 50% of the real liabilities deviation is accommodated by the tax revenue
change and insures that the real liabilities grow at the rate lower then the real interest rate.
Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses of selected variable to a 1% neutral tech-
nology shock. Several observations are worthwhile pointing out. First, optimal Ram-
sey policy implies lower volatility of employment, interest rate and ination but larger
volatility of consumption relative to two other policy regimes. These results are consis-
tent with Faia (2009) in a model with absent scal policy and are the consequence of
the ination-unemployment trade off. Second, the simple policy rule implies almost no
volatility of the tax rate, whereas the Ramsey plan is characterized by signicant volatil-
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Fig. 4.3. Impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% positive productivity shock.
All variables except the interest rate, the tax rate and the ination rate are expressed as
a percentage deviation from the Ramsey steady state. The interest rate, the tax rate and
the ination rate are expresed in terms of percentage points.
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ity of the same. Moreover, in contrast to the Ramsey plan, the real level of government
liabilities reacts strongly when simple policy rules are used. Somewhat similar results are
obtained by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005) in the standard New-Keynesian setup. The
non-responsiveness of the tax rate is the consequence of the expected increase in output
which implies increase in the expected tax revenues. Ination falls in order to support the
increase in the consumption which translates into the fall of nominal interest rate. The de-
crease in the nominal interest rate and the ination together with negligible response of
the tax rate imply signicant fall in the real level of government liabilities. The differ-
ence in responses between Ramsey plan and the simple rules is generated by the fact that
the policy maker employing the simple rules react only to the subset of endogenous vari-
ables, while the Ramsey planner takes into account all of the endogenous variables plus
the shocks. As a consequence, the Ramsey planner uses the tax volatility in addition to the
ination volatility in order to fully exploit the increase in productivity as well as to miti-
gate the inefcient employment uctuations. Third, the overshooting effect is absent. This
is so since the simple rules do not take into account the future effects of the current policy
moves.
Figure 4.4 shows the impulse responses of selected variables to a 1% government
spending shocks. Following a 1% positive increase in government spending the volatility
of ination and employment is again larger under simple rules relative to the Ramsey
case, while the consumption volatility is smaller. Moreover, the response of the tax rate
is again negligible while the liabilities reaction is large. Ination goes up, as it is typical
in response to the positive demand shock which in turn increases the interest rate. Larger
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response of the interest rate relative to the ination in addition to negligible response of the
tax rate leads to the increase in the real level of government liabilities. We can conclude
that in this case, same as it was under positive productivity shock, the difference between
the Ramsey plan and the simple rules lies in the fact that simple rules do not react to all
of the endogenous variables and the shocks. This in turn partially ignores the inefcient
unemployment uctuations as well as the future effects of the current policy.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have analyzed optimal monetary and scal policy in the New-Keynesian
model with monopolistic competition, sticky prices, distortionary wage taxation and labour
markets characterized by the search-matching frictions. In order to analyze the optimal
policy maker's behavior we follow public nance approach used in the New-Keynesian
literature, and construct a constrained Ramsey problem. Dynamic properties of the opti-
mal responses are obtained by numerically solving for the equilibrium conditions under
commitment. We nd that, when search-matching frictions are present neither perfect
price stability nor tax smoothing is optimal, though the required degree of deviation from
price stability is reduced with a scal policy in hands of the policy maker, since deation
and tax reduction act as complements.
All of those results stand in contrast to the proposals in the New-Keynesian literature
where the optimal policy maker's behavior requires either strict price stability or negligible
deviations from it, as well as tax smoothing. Deviation from strict price stability is more
in line with the exible price perfect competition RBC optimal policy analysis, whereas
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the tax volatility stands in contrast to both of the approaches. Moreover, we nd a certain
degree of ination and tax overshooting or undershooting, depending on the type of shock
considered. This is a consequence of the assumed commitment in the policy maker's
behavior which allows him to internalize the effects of his current actions on the future
expectations.
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4.A Appendix A to Chapter 4
4.A.1 The Firm's Prot Maximisation Problem
The Lagrangian for the rm's prot maximization is given by:
L = max
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The rst order conditions of the above problem with respect to fni;t; vi;t; Pi;tg read as
follows:
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In a symmetric equilibrium, which we subsequently consider, the aggregate price level
equals the individual prices (Pt = Pi;t) which allows us to rewrite (4.A.6) as
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From (4.A.5) we have
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Combining (4.A.9) and (4.A.10) we get
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Rearranging (4.A.11) we can obtain the expression for the marginal costs as in the text,
given by
mct =
wt
At
+
ch
g(t)
  Et
h
t+1
t
(1  x) ch
g(t+1)
i
At
(4.A.12)
4.A.2 The Bellman Equations
The marginal value of an employment for a rm reads as
Jet = mctAt   wt + Et
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whereas the marginal value of a job for a worker is given by
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Marginal value of an unemployment for a worker is given by
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which can be rewritten in a similar fashion as (4.A.14), to get
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It is also useful to obtain the expression forWet  Ut which is given by
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4.A.3 Nash Bargaining Problem and wage equation
The wage is determined by Nash bargaining over the match surplus, which is assumed to
be shared between rms and the workers according to the parameter  denoting workers'
bargaining power. Formally the problem of a Nash product maximization can be stated as
follows:
wt(at) = argmax (W
e
t  Ut) (Jet )1  (4.A.18)
The rst order condition for the above problem is given by:
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Using
@Wet
@wt
= 1   t and @J
e
t
@wt
=  1
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substituting into (4.A.19), dividing by (Wet  Ut) (Jet )1  and rearranging we obtain a
sharing rule as the solution of the Nash bargaining problem, which is in our case given by:
Wet  Ut =

1   (1   t)J
e
t
Substituting this solution into (4.A.17) we get
Wet  Ut = (1   t)wt   b
+Et

t+1
t

(1  x) (1  t+1g(t+1))


1  

(1   t+1)Jet+1

(4.A.20)
Since Jet = t and c
h
g(t)
= t we can write:
(1   t)wt   b+ Et

t+1
t

(1  x) (1  t+1g(t+1))


1  

(1   t+1) c
h
g(t+1)

=

1   (1   t)

mctAt   wt + Et

t+1
t

(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)

It than follows that:
(1   t)wt(1  )  b (1  ) + Et

t+1
t

(1  x) (1  t+1g(t+1))(1   t+1) c
h
g(t+1)
= (1   t)mctAt   (1   t)wt + (1   t)Et

t+1
t

(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)
(1   t)wt + Et

t+1
t

(1  x) [(1  t+1g(t+1))(1   t+1)  (1   t)] c
h
g(t+1)
= (1   t)mctAt + b (1  )
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wt = mctAt + b
(1  )
(1   t)
+

(1   t)Et

t+1
t

(1  x) [(1   t)  (1  t+1g(t+1))(1   t+1)] c
h
g(t+1)
wt = mctAt + b
(1  )
(1   t)
+

(1   t)Et

t+1
t

(1  x) [ t+1    t + t+1g(t+1)(1   t+1)] c
h
g(t+1)
(4.A.21)
4.A.4 Derivation of the evolution of labour market tightness equation
Using job creation condition given by
ch
g(t)
=  wt +mctAt + Et

t+1
t
(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)

(4.A.22)
as well as the solution for the wage equation (4.A.21) we can obtain equation dening the
evolution of labour market tightness which is given by:
ch
g(t)
= (1  )mctAt   b (1  )
(1   t)
+Et
t+1
t
(1  x) c
h
g(t+1)

1  
(1   t)( t+1    t + t+1g(t+1)(1   t+1))

(4.A.23)
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4.B Appendix B to Chapter 4
The numerical solving of the Ramsey optimal policy problem is not an easy task to ac-
complish. There is no guarantee that the equilibrium exists, and the set of good initial
conditions is of crucial importance. As already stated in the description of the Ram-
sey problem, we have derived a minimum number of necessary conditions for this prob-
lem in order to reduce its numerical complexity. Specically, by performing this sys-
tem reduction we are left with six equations in eight unknowns, whereby our system
now comprises of equations given by (4.22), (4.23)and (4.52)-(4.56), to be solved for
fct; t; nt; vt;mct; t; Rt;  t; ltg1t=0. If in addition to the previous 7 equations, we had two
more equations describing monetary and scal policy rules, we could solve for our 9 en-
dogenous variables. But, when solving the Ramsey optimal problem one is not endowed
with them unfortunately. In this case, the system can be augmented with the rst order con-
ditions associated with a Lagrangian representation of the Ramsey optimal policy problem.
This is precisely what we do which expands our system by 7 additional endogenous vari-
ables dening the set of Ramsey Lagrangian multipliers. They are represented by 1  7
row vector t = fR1t ;R2t ;R3t ;R4t ;R5t ;R6t ;R7t g _t 2 [0;1]. We implement our so-
lution algorithm by using both symbolic and numerical features of the MATLAB package.
In what follows we will briey describe our implementation strategy.
Let t denoted the set of endogenous variables in a dynamic model whose cardinality
is given by N . Let the agents equilibrium conditions be represented by N   2 equations
given by
Etf(t;t+1) = 0 (4.B.1)
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whereEtfg denotes conditional expectation operator such that, if st = (st; st 1:::s0) is the
particular set of historical events up to and including time t then, Etfg =
X
st+1
p(st+1 j st).
Here pt denotes date zero probability of observing a history st, and the initial event s0 is
assumed to have occurrence probability equal to one. f(t;t+1) denotesN 21 column
vector of the agents' rst order conditions. Let the preferences over t be implicitly given
by
E0
1X
t=0
tU(t) (4.B.2)
Then the Ramsey problem consist of choosing every t 2 t subject to (4.B.1). Formally,
we can write this problem as
max
ft;tg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t fU(t) + tf(t;t+1)g (4.B.3)
The rst order conditions of the above problem can than be written as
U1(t) + tEtf1(t;t+1) + 
 1t 1f2(t 1;t) = 0 (4.B.4)
where U1 is 1  N , t is 1  N   2 and 0 is 1  N row vector and f 0 2 ff1; f2g is
N   2  N matrix. Thus, our system comprises of (4.22), (4.23), (4.52)-(4.56) and N
equations represented by (4.B.4). which makes total of N + 7 equations in 13 unknowns,
out of which 7 are the Lagrangian multipliers. We solve for the N rst order conditions of
the Ramsey problem by using MATLAB's symbolic solver. The complete system dened
by N + 7 equations is then solved for the rational expectation equilibrium by using the
perturbation method implemented in algorithm developed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004c).
4.B Appendix B to Chapter 4 211
As the perturbation methods are local approximations they need to be supplied with
the point around which the approximation will be performed. In our case this point is
the Ramsey equilibrium deterministic steady state, comprising from the steady state val-
ues of the 7 Lagrangian multipliers in addition to the steady state values of 9 endogenous
variables. The complexity of the problems lies in the fact that we need to determine the
steady state values of the Lagrangian multipliers. In order to accomplish this task we use
nonlinear search algorithm implemented in MATLAB's fminsearch function.57 Roughly
speaking we proceed in two steps. First, we start our nonlinear optimization by provid-
ing the initial guess for two policy parameters, namely the interest rate R and the wage tax
rate  : We then solve for the remaining N   2 endogenous variables. Because of the in-
herent nonlinearity in the labour market tightness conditions which makes it impossible to
obtain the closed form solution for , we incorporate additional numerical nonlinear solver
within the fminsearch procedure and solve in every numerical search iteration for the new
value of labour market tightness, vacancies and employment. This task is accomplished by
employing MATLAB's fsolve function, which uses trust-region-dogleg algorithm to nd
the zeros of the nonlinear system. In each iteration, and after obtaining the values for the
endogenous variables, we solve for the values of Lagrangian multipliers by exploiting the
properties of the steady state version of (4.B.4).
In order to formally describe the procedure let us rst rewrite the steady state version
of (4.B.4) as
U1() + 
 
f1() + 
 1f2()

= 0 (4.B.5)
57 fminsearch is the version of Nelder-Mead Simplex Method which is slower but more reliable relative
to the other nonlinear unconstrained optimisation routines.
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It is easy to notice that this system can be rewritten in a form of a standard OLS minimiza-
tion problem. Letting Y = U1()T , X =
 
f1() + 
 1f2()
T and 
 =  T we can
rewrite (4.B.5) in the standard OLS notation as Y = X
 where the dimensionality of Y
and 
 is N  1, and the dimensionality of X is N N   2. Our problem is then to mini-
mize the distance  , dened as Y  X
, with respect to 
; by searching over the pair of
values (R; ) untilminz 6 . The solution for 
 is the standard OLS estimator dened as
(XTX) 1XTY ; z denotes the sum of 1 k k ; G1 and G2, and  denotes the termination
tolerance on the function value. More precisely, G1 represents the relatively large penalty
value to the objective function to be minimized in case the algorithm drifts away from the
values of interest rate R which are larger than one. G2 is the additional constraint measure
dened as the difference between the steady state version of the liabilities condition and
the imposed steady state value of the liabilities. Formally,
1 =

0 if R < 1
1 otherwise
; G1 =

10 if R < 1
0 otherwise
and
G2 =
 l4Ry   0:44

Chapter 5
Summary and Future Work
The need for product market liberalization and labour market deregulation, which
should improve the overall economic performance in Europe, is widely accepted among
policy makers. As an additional issue, labour tax reforms continue to be an important item
on the policy agenda in many European countries. However, surprisingly little formal aca-
demic analysis has been conducted in order to provide insights into the effects of particular
tax, labour and product market reforms. The scarce literature, mostly conducted within the
partial equilibrium setup, focuses on the labour market reforms and their effects on long-
run labour market performance, thereby abstracting from potentially important general
equilibrium effects. Moreover, the role of product market reforms is absent. On the other
hand, very few exception in the literature conducted the reform analysis within the gen-
eral equilibrium setup, but fully neglected the importance of the scal issues, although at
least as much effort has gone into arguing for reforms that reduce the distortionary effects
of taxation, as has gone into advocating other deregulation programmes.
As pointed out in the introduction, the main aim of this thesis is to shed new light on
the effects that various labour and product market reforms have on the overall economic
performance, and to explicitly consider the taxation issues largely neglected in previous
research. Chapter 1 provides a review of the main empirical and theoretical literature
and identies the gaps and drawbacks which serve as the motivation for the remainder
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of the thesis. In Chapter 2 we start by analyzing the benets (or costs) of tax reform
and address the question of its effectiveness relative to product market or other labour
market institutional reforms. We contribute by showing how tax reforms can contribute
to the reforms process; how the composition of the price mark-up determines the long
run effects of structural reforms and how the effectiveness of different reform instruments
varies depending on the policy maker's ultimate objective. We nd the difference between
the short and the long run consequences of reforms and identify the existence of short run
costs in employment and welfare, but potential gains in the long run. We also show the
importance of the choice of the reform instrument. More specically, we nd that tax
reforms are most effective for raising welfare, whereas labour market deregulation will
be a better choice for employment creation if product markets are "competitive", but the
product market liberalization will be better if they are not. We also show the differences in
the effects of wage and payroll taxes on wages, employment and output which contradicts
the widely used assumption in the public nance literature.
The framework used in Chapter 2 allowed us to gain useful insights about the reform
process, but is abstracting from several important empirical regularities and theoretical
considerations. Specically, it is based on the so called stock approach and was therefore
unable to capture large ows in the labour market characterized by high rates of hires by
rms and large number of separations from rms evident in the data. Moreover, the dy-
namic implications were based on the clear cut difference between the short and the long
run, induced by entry and exit, and therefore rather limited. In order to correct for these
drawbacks, we have employed a new modelling strategy in Chapter 3, based on a fully
5 Summary and Future Work 215
edged microfounded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework in line with the
recent New-Keynesian macroeconomic models. More precisely, we have abandoned the
widely used assumption of Walrasian labour markets and have them replaced with labour
markets characterized by a search-matching process which results in involuntary equilib-
rium unemployment. Moreover, we have introduced the endogenous job destruction and
costly ring decisions, as well as explicit scal considerations by enriching the model
with two types of distortionary taxes, a progressive wage tax and a at payroll tax. This
allowed us to explicitly consider not only the long-run effects of tax changes as well as
product market reforms, but also the effects they have on the uctuations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates such as ination, output and consumption. We conrm the detrimental
effects of the marginal tax distortions on the overall economic performance within a gen-
eral equilibrium model characterized by the search-matching process with endogenous job
destruction and costly ring decisions. We nd a positive effect of an increase in the degree
of wage tax progressivity which implies that promoting income equality leads to positive
employment, output and consumption effects. We also identify positive effects of product
market liberalization on the economy as a whole. We have also analyzed the effect of a
particular tax and product market reform on the behavior of the economy following a tech-
nology or a government spending shock. Following a positive technology shock we nd
that the tax reforms aiming to decrease the tax distortions, as well as product market re-
forms aiming to increase competition, lead to a reduction in the volatility of employment,
consumption and output. On the other, ination response is in both cases more pronounced
on impact, but subsequently becomes quickly dampened. On the contrary, following a pos-
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itive government spending shock, ination response under both reforms is larger relative
to the benchmark case along the whole adjustment path. However, employment, output
and consumption are less volatile in the reformed economy. We complete the analysis by
considering the effect of a reduction in the marginal payroll tax which is partially offset by
an increase in the marginal wage tax rate, such that the marginal tax wedge is unchanged.
We nd a detrimental long run effect of this type of reform on employment, output and
consumption. Moreover, if the reform is anticipated one period in advance, we identify
the negative effects of this tax reform on employment, output and consumption along the
whole transition path.
In Chapter 4 we have studied the optimal monetary and scal policy implications
of the New-Keynesian setup where Walrasian labour markets are replaced with search-
matching framework, and the policy maker has only distortionary taxes at his disposal.
To our knowledge this is the rst attempt in the literature to study those issues within the
New-Keynesian framework enriched with search-matching frictions. By replacing Wal-
rasian labour markets with the search-matching setup, we were able to analyze an impor-
tant ination-unemployment trade-off arising from real labour market frictions induced by
costly search-matching process. We were also interested in testing the robustness of the
conclusions from former widely used setup which abstracts from real labour market fric-
tions in more realistic environments in which economies are subject to multiple distortions.
We nd that, following a positive technology shock, Ramsey planner can reduce both ina-
tion and tax rate in order to fully exploit the benets of this productivity increase which is
the consequence of the increase in employment and consumption. Moreover, the optimal
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policy features deviation from strict price stability which somewhat contrast the standard
New-Keynesian predictions. We also identify an additional channel through which Ram-
sey planner can inuence efciency, and that is the expectational dynamic effects that tax
rates have on wages. Moreover, we nd that the optimal tax rate and government liabili-
ties inherit the time series properties of the underlying shock. We also identify a certain
degree of overshooting in ination and tax rates following a positive productivity shock,
and undershooting following a positive government spending shock. It is the consequence
of the assumed commitment which allows the policy maker to internalize the effects of its
current decisions on future expectations.
5.1 Future work
To conclude this chapter and the thesis, we provide an outline of the several issues that
have not been addressed in this thesis but would represent interesting extensions of the
research work conducted here. In each of the chapters we have considered the outcomes of
the Nash bargaining. It would certainly be useful to compare the results from this setup to
the alternative wage setting mechanisms, such as efciency wages or monopoly union, in
order to determine how much difference it makes when different mechanisms are used to
evaluate the impact of a particular policy. As pointed out by Pissarides (1998), the analysis
of alternative wage setting mechanisms can be justied by the lack of a denitive model
for the European labour market. Moreover, as argued by Rochetau (2001), both bargain
and efciency wage mechanisms may coexist, whereby the tightness of the labour markets
determines which one will be binding. Additionally, it would be interesting to analyze
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the dynamic effects of different wage setting mechanisms on aggregate macroeconomic
outcomes.
In Chapters 3 and 4 labour supply decisions were exogenous, which implies that the
labour market frictions affect mainly labour demand. An interesting extension would be
to endogenize labour supply decisions along the extensive margin which would allow us
to study taxation issues taking into account both the supply and demand side of the labour
market. Alternatively, it would be useful to extend the models by incorporating intensive
margin via the hours of work, and to compare the policy implications of this setup to
the one where labour supply decisions are exogenous. When decisions over intensive
margin are introduced, the efciently bargained wage will depend on the hours of work.
In this case changes in marginal tax could generate scale effects which would potentially
reinforce the negative marginal tax effects on wages, but the effects on unemployment
will be ambiguous and dependent on the labour supply elasticity. The general equilibrium
effects of tax changes in this setting have not been analyzed yet.
Moreover, we have assumed that households are able to perfectly insure against the
unemployment risk. It would be interesting to relax this assumption and to consider distri-
butional consequences of various policy reforms. The main methodological challenge in
solving this type of model would be related to the interaction of nontrivial and time depen-
dent distribution of wealth among consumers, which would inuence prices and aggregate
quantities, and the distribution of wage solutions which would in turn inuence workers
and rms decisions. A potential promising avenue would be to combine the Aiyagary
(1994) and Huggett (1993) modelling framework with search-matching setup.
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Regarding the optimal monetary and scal policy analysis, it would be certainly im-
portant to analyze the implications of alternative wage setting mechanisms, as well as the
implications generated by the removal of the perfect consumption insurance assumption.
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